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ACCORD. See WILL, 5.
Note of debtor endorsed by third person for less sum than debt received by
creditor in settlement of same, is a good accord and satisfaction. Varney v.
Conery, 138.
ACTION. See ATTACHMENT, 6-8. CHAMPERTY. CONFLICT OF LAWS, 6, 7.
CONTRACT, 15, 22. DEED, 1. DOWER. EQUITY, 14-16. EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS, 3, 4. FRAUD, 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 17-18. INsuR-
ANCE, 5, 6, 25, 30. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 6. MORTGAGE, 1. NEGLI-
GENCE, 6. SELIPrING, 3, 4. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 2.
1. Both at law and in equity a living person has no heirs, even if non compos
mentis or otherwise incapable of managing his estate. Sellnan v. Sellman, 69.
2. Children of grantor cannot maintain bill against grantor and his grantee,
to set aside conveyance upon ground of' fraud and undue influence. Id.
3. If party continues to occupy premises after being notified by owner that
if he does so, he will be expected to pay rent, he becomes liable to owner for
use and occupation. Illinois Cent. Rd. v. Thompson, 670.
4. Where one has paid to another money on a contract and subsequently
there is rescission of same entitling former to recover part of money so paid, he
may do so on count for money had and received. Evans v. Givens, 670.
5. Rule that person injured by a felony is not allowed to sue for damages
until he has instituted criminal proceedings, only applies between parties injured
and injuring. Appleby v. Franklin, 304, and note.
6. Under building contract containing clause that the work shall be done
under direction and to satisfaction of particular person, to be testified by his
certificate, no action accrues to contractor until lie has certificate or is entitled
to it. Kirtland v. Moore, 206.
7. An action of assumpsit cannot be sustained for use and occupation of real
estate, unless relation of landlord and tenant exists under a contract express or
implied ; and a contract will not be implied when neither party expected pay-
ment of rent. Clark v. Clark's Adm'r., 768, and note.
8. An executor, during settlement of an estate, allowed father of devisecs to
occupy lands bequeathed them, neither party expecting payment, they living
with their father, but never having had possession or the right of possession :
Held, that assumpsit would not lie against their father's estate for the use, and
that nothing could be recovered, although the case was tried under a reference.
Id.
9. Relation of parent and child tends rather to rebut than to raise implication
of contract for rent. Id.
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ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTORS AND ADnmiMSTEATORS.
ADVANCEMENT.
Acceptance by son of conveyance of land from father, in satisfaction of his
share in father's estate, not only bars his own right to share in distribution of
father's estate, real and personal, but also that of his children, in case he should
die before his father. Simpson v. Simpson, 404.
AGENT. See BAILIIENT, 1, 3. BAWK, 8, 9, 12, 20, 22. BILLS AND NOTES,
3, 8. CORPORATION, 2. CRDIINAL LAW, 9. INSURANCE, 12, 27, 31-33.
LimiTATIONS, STATUTE Or, 8. MASTER AND SERVANT, 10. SALE, 4. SET-
OFF, 3. USURY, 1.
1. Agent who has authority to contract for sale of chattels, has authority to
collect pay for them at the time or as part of same transaction, in absence of
any prohibition known to purchaser. Trainer v. Mforison, 538. See injra 9.
2. Knowledge of such prohibition may be inferred from circumstances of sale
or from customs of trade known to parties. .d.
3. Persons dealing with agent have right to presume his agency general, and
notice of limited authority must be brought to their knowledge before they are
bound to regard it. Id.
4. Notice of limited authority of agent, in this ease, printed at top bill accom-
panying goods and not seen by purchasers, is not so prominent as to hold them
at fault in not observing it. Id.
5. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that an agent
with general authority to sell, has authority to warrant, and that warranty is
not an unusual incident to a sale by an agent for a dealer where the thing sold
is not subject to the inspection of the purchaser. Tabnae v. Bierhouse, 276.
6. Though the authority of the agent be restricted by instructions from his
principal, the latter will be bound by a warranty attending a sale by the agent
unless the purchaser knew of such restriction. Id.
7. In action by commission-merchant against manufacturer, to recover bal-
ance due for advances on manufactured goods, former will be allowed to charge
for printing the goods, it appearing that this was necessary and done according
to custom of trade. Yalcott v. Smith, 795.
8. Rule that authority of agent to sell goods imports authority to receive
proceeds of sale, is limited to cases where circumstances induce belief in purchaser
that such authority exists. Meyer v. Stone, 539.
9. Agent to sell goods who has possession of them, and delivers them to pur-
chaser, has authority to collect purchase price ; but if merely employed to sell
and without possession of goods, he has no authority to receive price, and pay-
ment to him will not discharge purchaser, unless there is known usage of trade
to justify him in making it. Id.
10. A deaf mute who does not understand any matter of business, and can
not be made to understand it, except it may be such as is of the most simple
character, and who has no comprehension of business matters, obviously can
not manage his own affairs and is incapable of selecting an agent to transact
them. In re Perrine, d-c., 776, and note.
11. Contract to sell land purporting to belong to feme covert, was made by
one who acted as her agent : held, that contract was not binding onfemne, 1st,
because of her coverture, and 2d, because agent's authority was not under seal.
Such contract is not binding on agent, because its terms do not purport to bind
him. Boyd v. Turpin, 341.
12. Son conveyed land to mother, afeme covert, to defraud his creditors, and
afterwards contracted in her name and as her agent, to sell the land to bonafide
purchaser. After portion of purchase-money had been paid, mother attempted
to repudiate contract and recover possession ; Held, by court of equity, that
she must either surrender land to son or abide by his disposition of it. Id.
AMENDMENT. See JUDGMENT, 2.
1. Court cannot, except by consent, allow amendment which changes plead-
ings so as to makh substantially a new action, but an amendment which only
adds to original cause of action is not'of this nature. ERl v. Early, 342.
2. In an action to recover land, court may allow amendment so as to set up
mistake in a deed. Id.
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3. Where distinct cause of action is inserted in complaint by amendment, it
is tantamount to bringing a new action, and statute of limitations runs to time
when amendment is allowed. Ely v. Early, 342.
4. Court will only correct mistake in deed or other written instrument, upon
clear, strong and convincing proof ; mere preponderance of evidence is insuf-
ficient. Id.
5. In trial by jury of issues arising in equitable matterz, rules of equity
should be followed as far as possible. Id.
6. Issues of fact, as distinguished from questions of fact, in equitable as well
as in legal actions, must he tried by jury ; but this does not authorize finding
of such issues on less evidence than chancellor would find them. Id.
ANNUITY. See WIL, 11.
ARBITRATION.
1. Court of equity will enjoin suit at law on award,and set same asidewbere
one of the parties in interest made statement to arbitrator, in absence of adverse
party, designed and having tendency to influence his decision, without its being
shown that any harm resulted therefrom to other party. Catlett v. Dougherty,
405.
2. Party to an arbitration, who, by overt acts, attempts to improperly ilufis-
ence an arbitrator in his favor, will not be heard to say that he was impotent
to accomplish what he sought and raise an issue thereon. Id.
ASSIGNM1ENT. SeeBANKRupTcy, 2, 3; CONTRACT, 18 ; COVENANT, 1 ; DEED,
7, 8 ; EQUITY, 23; GIr, 4 ; MORTGAGE, 29 ; PARTNERsHIr, 2; REiOVAL
OF CAUSES, I.
1. Reservation of reasonable fee for preparation of deed is a preference for-
bidden by insolvent act of Maryland. Wolfshener v. Rivinus, 343.
2. Order drawn by creditor on debtor, directing payment out of specified
sum, presented but not accepted, is a good assignment in equity. Kirtland v.
Moore, 206.
3. To make an oral assignment of a debt due on account valid, there must be
a valuable consideration, and at least a symbolical delivery. White v. Kilgore.
138.
4. An order, draft, or bill, drawn for valuable consideration for the whole of
a particular fund, is an equitable assignment of such fund to payee. Lee v.
Robinson, 670.
5. Such assignment is valid against creditor subsequently garnishing, even
if garnishee was not notified of assignment until after garnishment, provided
he has time to disclose it by affidavit before judgment. Id.
6. A. had made contract to erect school house for city, and, becoming insol-
vent, in order to secure funds with which to complete his contract, assigned to
C. $600 of the sum to be due him when school house should be finished, fIeld,
that assignment was not in fraud of insolvent law and could be enforced in
equity. .Janes v. City, 791.
7. In absence of forbidding statute, sole surviving partner of insolvent firm,
who is himself insolvent, can make valid assignment of partnership assets for
benefit of joint creditors, with preferences, his fraudulently omitting from sched-
ule certain property and appropriating same to his own use, does not affect
rights of assignee and of beneficiaries, they being ignorant of grantor's fraud.
.Emerson v. Senter, 472.
ASSUMIPSIT. See ACTIoN, 7, 8.
ATTACHM %ENT. See ASSIGNM5ENT, 5. BAic, 14, 16, 18. BILLS A-D NOTES,
15. E rXE.MPTIox, 6, 7, 9. HUSBANWD AND WIFE, 16. INsURANcE, 22.
PARTNERSHIP, 1, 2. SALE, 9.
1. Claim for tort is not a " debt" within foreign attachment statute, even if
suit haq been brought and case stands for hearing in damages after a default.
.Holcomb v. lVinchester. 70.
2. Stock in privatc corporation may be attached b y service upon the corpo-
ration, which may itself he the attachifig creditor. lNorton v. Norton, 70.
3. Where, prior to service of suleh process, shareholder has pledged the cer-
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tificates with absolute power of sale and transfer upon default endorsed, attach-
ment only reaches surplus, and court may, proper parties being before it, order
sale of stock. Norton v. Norton, 70.
4. Such attachment has precedence over later one served upon pledgee, who
has never exercised power of sale and transfer. Id.
5. Dividends made by corporation and remaining in its hands after attach-
ment has been served, follow the stock. Id.
6. Where it is attempted to join in one attachment proceedingq for debts due
and for others not due, and allegations in affidavit as to debts not due are
insufficient, they will not vitiate allegations or proceedings as to debts which
are due, but will be treated as surplusage. Eng. Co. v. Hall, 670.
7. That attachment proceedings for debts due and those not due can be
joined in same suit doubted, but not decided. Id.
8. Purpose of statutory provisions as to attachment for debt not due, in re-
quiring affidavit that it is actually an existing debt or demand, is to exclude
from such remedy contracts on which liability of defendant is still contingent.
Rd.9. Is "improperly" sued out within meaning of statute when plaintiff has
no meritorious cause of action of class in which statute authorizes this remedy,
or having such cause, ground alleged in affidavit for its issue is untrue or not
one of grounds enumerated which must exist before it can be obtained. Steen
v. Ross, 735.
10. Mere irregularity in papers is not of itself ground for recovery on attach-'
ment bond for "improperly" suing out attachment. .ld.
11. In action on bond for "improperly" suing out the attachment, declara-
tion must state in what the impropriety c6nsisted. Id.
12. General attachment of all a debtor's interest in real estate, in a town,
does not hold land fraudulently conveyed by debtor by deed recorded before
attachment and conveyed by his fraudulent grantee to innocent purchaser for
value after attachment. Bank.v. Mead, 405.
13. Against the latter and subsequent purchasers from him, such attachment
is not constructive notice of a lien or of lispendens. Id.
14. Third party, whose goods are seized under an attachment and sold under
interlocutory decree, can, on dissolution of the attachment, sue the surety in the
attachment bond for the true value of the goods less net proceeds of sale paid to
him. Straub v. Wooten, 206:
15. Defendants, residing in Indiana, and owning stock in bank there, lodged
certificate with blank power to sell, &c., with corporation in Connecticut as col-
lateral for loan which its value considerably exceeded. Held, that their equitable
interest could not be reached by foreign attachment in Connecticut. Winslow
v. Fletcher, 734.
ATTORNEY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 25. CORPORATION, 24, 25. EVIDENCE,
14. ExEmPTIoN, 1. INJUNCTION, 2. REMOVAL OF CAusEs, 4.
1. Statements of client affording reasonable evidence of intent to commit a
crime, are not privileged. State v. Barrows, 70.
2. Rule protecting privileged communications is one of public policy and not
one of which only party making communication can claim the benefit. Id.
AUCTIONEER. See BAILMENT, 1-3.
AWARD. See ARBITRAT'ION, 1.
BAILMENT. See BANK, 3, 4. INNKEEPER, 2. SALE, 4.
1. An auctioneer selling goods "as auctioneer," but without naming the
person for whom he sells, is liable as if selling for himself, and if the title turns
out defective, may be sued by the vendee, independently of implied warranty
of title, in an action for money had and received, on the ground that the con-
sideration has wholly failed. Seemuller v. Fuchs, and note, 250.
2. An auctioneer has all the liabilities of an ordinary agent. He is not, like
a sheriff, a public officer. Id.
3. An auctioneer sold a piano at public auction, "t as auctioneer," but with-
out naming his principal. One with a superior title to the piano took it from
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the vendee, who sued the auctioneer to recover back the purchase-money. Hed,
that the auctioneer was liable. Seemuter v Fachs, 250.
4. Where, by a contract of hiring the owner of a team sends his own servant
to drive, he is only responsible for the acts of such driver in the handling of the
team, while being used in the stipulated employment; and where team is lost
while being used in a way, or at a place, or for a purpose not contemplated in
the contract, the hirer cannot escape liability to tie owner by showing that the
driver consented to such use, or that the driver's negligence contributed to the
loss. De Voin v. Michigan Lumber Co., and note, 234.
5. A. hired his team and driver to B. to haul logs, and by direction of C.,
B.'s foreman, the driver went to haul hay. Under guidance of C., in going to
a haystack, he drove over the snow-covered ice on the river, which broke through
and the horses were drowned: Held, that B. was liable to A. for the value of
the horses. Id.
BA.NK. See CONTRACT, 18. ConPORATIow, 20, 23.
1. Certifying check, is primarily liable thereon. Bank v. Anglo-American
Co., 735.
2. Taking certified check on another bank, as payment on account or for col-
lection, can show check has availed nothing, when it has discharged its duty by
an effort to collect check ; but otherwise when it sends same directly to debtor
bank for payment and debt is lost in consequence. Id.
3. Upon special deposit of money, bank is merely bailee and bound according
to terms of deposit; but on general deposit, money becomes property of bank
and depositors' claim is merely for like amount. MfcLain v. 117allace, 278.
4. General depositors of insolvent bank must be paid pro rata. Id.
5. Addition of word "clerk" to name of general depositor does not make
deposit special or change liability of bank. Id.
6. Rule that trustee can follow trust property- so lung as it can be traced, has
no application in action to recover money on general deposit. Id.
7. Depositor whose pass-book is written up from time to time, and checks
paid returned, is bound to examine account within reasonable time and report
to bank errors or omissions. Bank v. Morqan, 343.
8. Where altered checks have been paid, if bank's officers, by proper care
and skill, could have detected the forgeries, it cannot receive a credit for amount
of those checks, even if depositor omitted all examination of his account. Id.
9. The required examination can be made for depositor by competent clerk ;
but if agent who examines account committed the forgeries, principal mast at
least show reasonable diligence in supervising agent's conduct. Id.
10. Contract between cashier of bank and defendant, whereby defendant was
to buy railroad stock for cashier with money of the bank to be advanced by
cashier, for which defendant's note with said stock as collateral was to be given
the bank, was contrary to rules of bank and amounted to misappropriation of
its fnds forwhich both cashier and defendant are liable. Bank v. Hartridge,
278.
11. The knowledge of cashier in such transaction was *not the knowledge of
bank. rd.
12. President of bank cannot make valid contract between it and third party
for whom he also acts as agent in the transaction. English v. Bank-, 278.
13. Where Coker, who was president of bank, and English agreed with
bank in writing, to become guarantors for safe return of certain jewelry to
bank by Sharpe, and by such return agreement was abrogated, it was not sub-
sequently revived by note of English to Coker, authorizing him to make any
arrangement with Sharpe, for Coker and English, by which Sharpe might take
the goods, and an arrangement by which Sharpe was allowed by Coker to take
the goods, giving a receipt to Coker and English therefor, and Coker bound
himself verbally to the bank to be jointly responsible with English for their safe
return. Id.
14. Where depositor drew check in favor of another before service of process
on bank attaching depositor's funds, and same was paid by bank after service
of writ and charged to account of depositor, held, that bank was entitled, as
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garnishee, to credit for check so paid. Bank of America v. Indiana Banking
Co., 277.
15. Aliter, had check been drawn after service of process on garnishee. Id.
16. Where depositor endorsed promissory note of third party and discounted
same in bank where he had funds to his credit, held, that a payment of the
amount due on such note by the endorser to the bank, out of his funds on de-
posit, after service of garnishee process on bank at suit of creditor of such
endorser, could not be allowed bank as a set-off, the endorser's liability to the
bank being contingent. Td.
17. If a depositor dmwp check on his banker, who has funds to cover it, it
operates to transfer the sum named in check to payee, who may sue for and re-
cover same in his own name. Id.
18. It is as lawful for an attachment debtor to draw his check in favor of the
garnishee with whom his bank account is kept, as in favor of any one else, if
done in good faith before the service of process, and the garnishee will be enti-
tled to credit for the amount named in the check in the absence of fraud. Id.
19. A check drawn by a depositor in the state of Indiana, on his banker,
payable in Illinois, will be construed by the laws of Illinois, and operate to
transfer the sum named therein in accordance with such laws; notwithstanding
a different rule obtains in the other state. rd.
20. In suit against firm of private bankers on note given by their cashier for
money borrowed by him in firm name and appropriated to his own use, which
turned on his authority to give the note, evidence of custom of bankers at thtit
place to borrow money on time properly admitted as tending to show that act
complained of was within scope of defendant's ordinary business. Crain v.
Bank, 278.
21. In same suit it was held, a paper directed to distant bank giving signa-
tures of persons authorized to sign for defendants, one of which was in hand-
writing of cashier, and another, that of one of defendants, was evidence of an
admission by defendant so signing of cashier's authority to execute note in firm
name. And the fact that payee of the note did not act on faith of such paper,
though detracting from its weight, did not render it irrelevant and improper.
Id.
22. The fact that cashier of private bank gave notes of other persons of his
bank, amounting to over $5000, as collateral, to secure note of that amount
given by him in name of his principals, with usual power of sale, &c., not suf-
ficient to affect party making the loan with notice of cashier's lack of authority
to execute the note or of fraud in giving it. Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
1. New promise to pay debt discharged by bankruptcy is not an original con-
tract but revives the old debt. Nowland v. Lanagan, 206.
2. Fact that assignee has not recovered property assigned or realized its
money value, within time limited by bankrupt laws does not give bankrupt or
his creditors right to recover property. Mount v. Manhattan Co., 608.
3. Assignee not compelled to accept property which is onerous, and will yield
nothing toward payment of debts. Glenn v. Howard, 735.
4. Discharge in bankruptcy no bar to action for suhscription to stock of incor-
porated company called after discharge, though bankrupt was stockholder at
time of bankruptcy. Id.
5. Where suit was commenced in state court, prior to filing by defendant of
petition in bankruptcy, on a debt provable, but not proved, thereunder, and
judgment was obtained thereon subsequent to granting of discharge to said
bankrupt, held, in suit on said judgment in another state that discharge could
not be pleaded as bar thereto. Dimock v. Revere Copper Co., 405.
6. After sale of land by assignee has been confirmed and lands conveyed,
U. S. Circuit Court has no jurisdiction at suit of purchaser to enjoin sale of
same land upon order of state court upon judgments in suits commenced by
attachment of the land a few days before defendant was adjudicated a bank-
rupt. Sargent v. Belton, 71.
BENEFICIAL SOCIETY. See IsuR.&cE, 17, 18, 24.
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BILL OF LADING. See BILLS AND NOTES, 15, 16, 19. CoMoN CARRIER,
20, 21. INSURANCE, 7. SALE, 11.
BILLS AND NOTES. See ACCORD. ASSIGNMENT, 4, 5. 'BANX, 20, 22,
CONTRACT, 17, 18. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1. GIFT, 1. LIMITATIONS,
STATUTE OF, 1, 2. MORTGAGE, 29.
I. Form, Consideration, 4-c.
1. Production of bill with alteration apparent upon its face makes prima
facie case for acceptor alleging material and unauthorized alteration since ac-
ceptance. Harris v. Bank, 736.
2. Contracts for the purchase and sale of cotton "futures" are illegal, and
evidences of debt executed on such consideration are void, even in hands of
purchaser for value without notice. Bank v. Cunningham, 138.
3. Brokers cannot recover fbr services rendered in a gambling transaction.
Id.
4. A promissory note reciting "we promise to pay," and signed "D. P.
Livermore, Treas'r, Hallowell Gas-Light Co.," is the note of the individual
and not of the corporation. McClure v. Livermore, 792.
5. An action on such a note against the corporation, and its default, will not
estop owner from maintaining action against the individual, when it does not
appear that acts of plaintiff caused defendant to change his position, or to take
some action injurious to himself. Id.
6. Bill of exchange payable 60 days after sight, was accepted " due twenty-
first May,'" but without date of acceptancee. Held, that in absence of affirm-
ative proof that days of grace had been included, they must be allowed. Bell
v. Bank, 71.
7. Surrender of old promi.sory note is sufficient consideration for new one
executed by surety, although surety had been released from payment old note by
action of insolvent principal, where both parties knew substantial facts, but, being
ignorant of law, in good faith supposed surety liable for old note. Churchill v.
Bradley, 671,
8. Drawee of bill of exchange drawn by "Kanawha and Ohio Coal Co.,"
was described in bill as "John A. Robinson, Agt.," and it was accepted by
him as "John A. Robinson, Agent, K. & 0. C. Co." Held, that acceptance
was personal obligation of Robinson, and that in suit by endorsee against him
parol evidence was not admissible in absence of fraud, accident or mistake, to
show that defendant so accepted the bill intending to bind drawer as his prin-
cipal, and that this fact was known to plaintiff at time it became owner and
holder of it. R'obinson v. Bank, 736.
9. Acceptor of non-negotiable draft, may pay same to payee, after maturity,
without production and delivery of draft, provided acceptor has had no notice
of transfer of draft by payee to third person; and such payment would be a
valid defence against the note, should suit be brought thereon against acceptor
by arother person. Johnston v. Allen, 540.
10. In event of such suit by another person, burden of proof would be on
plaintiff to show that defendant had notice of transfer belbre payment was
made. Id.
!I. Where party under arrest for embezzlement, gives draft for amount
embezzled to person from whom it was embezzled, such draft is not invalid,
unless given in consideration that prosecution should be suppressed. Id.
12. Where non-negotiable draft, valid in its inception, was loaned by payee
to person under arrest for embezzlement, to enable him to compromise with
party who caused his arrest, and such draft is transferred to such party, who
brings suit thereon against acceptor, it is no defence that the holder received it
in consideration of sunopressing prosecution of party to whom it was loaned by
payee. Id.
II. Rigqthe of Parties.
13. If fraud in procurement of note be shown, onus is upon plaintiff to show
that lie is bona fide holder for value and without notice. Crampton v. Perkins,
736.
14. Evidence of parol agreement, prior to or at time of drawing and deliv-
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ering bill of exchange, that drawer is not to be liable as such, is inadmissible.
Cummings v. Kent, 207.
15. Draft for sum stated, drawn by seller against buyerin favor of anational
bank, by whom it is discounted or purchased, with bill of lading attached,
passes title to goods therein mentioned to bank; and bank may recover them oa
dishonor of draft, from sheriff who had seized goods as property of seller under
attachment subsequent to purchase by bank. Bank . .Rowan, 405.
16. Draft so drawn is a bill of exchange, and its purchase by a national
bank is not beyond po.vers conferred on it by Acts of Congress. Id.
17. Where holder promissory note gratoitously permits it to run after matu-
rity and subsequently on payment of part agrees to wait until maker can collect
money with which to discharge balance, such maker is not estopped to set up a
defence then existing, or which might thereafter arise, of which neither such
maker nor holder had notice at time of agreement. Henry v. Gilliland, 279.
18. To defeat clear defence to note, not payable in bank, in hands of assignee,
on ground of subsequent contract to pay in consideration of extension of time,
extension must be for definite time on valid consideration. Performance of
plaintiff's par not sufficient to bind maker. Id.
19. Although contract between the parties may have been embodied in a
draft, with bills lading attached, drawn in favor of plaintiff below, if proof shows
borrower gave it with intent to defraud lender, and lender became aware of
fact, it had right to repudiate draft as void and sue on the account for money
loaned, and to put in evidence draft, bills lading, letters of drawer to drawees,
and sayings of drawer showing intent to defraud. Mlassengill v. lRrst Nat.
Bank, 539.
20. Declaration upon a conditional acceptance must allege a performance of
the condition. Myjrck v. Merritt, 539.
21. Allegation of delivery of house, and that acceptor has been in possession,
not sufficient allegation of performance of condition that house has been "fin-
ished according to contract and delivered," upon which draft is payable. Alle-
gation that plaintiff, the payee, gave acceptor notice that he held himself ready
to complete the house according to contract or to pay her a reasonable sum for
his failure if she would point out deficiencies or omissions, and that she refused
to do so or to permit him to enter house for purpose of completing it according
to contract, is not sufficient averment of performance of conditions named in
acceptance, whether considered alone or in connection with above allegation of
delivery to and possession by acceptor. Id.
22. It'f, in any case of non-performance by drawer of conditions named by
acceptor in acceptance, the payee has a right of action against acceptor who
refuses to permit him to perform conditions, ouch action is not on the accept-
ance, but in case for damages. Id.
III. Endorsement.
23. If endorsee, before maturity, knew or was put on inquiry as to equity of
maker, he takes cam onere. Hulbert v. Douglass, 343.
24. Where negotiable note is secured by mortgage, fact that one-half of land
has been released, is some evidence to charge purchaser with notice of partial
payment. Id.
25. Notice to attorney of any matter relating to business of client in which
he is engaged, is notice to client. Id.
BOND. See DAMAGES, . GIFT, I. INJUNOTIO N, 2, 5. MUNICIPAL CoRPO-
RATION, 22.
BROKER. See BIrs AND NOTES, 3.
BUILDING ASSOCIATION. See Usrny, 3.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See BILLS AND NOTES, 10. Coum3ON CARRIER, 5.
CRIMINAL LAW, 3. INSURANCE, 6. MALIcIous PROSECUTION, 1. NEGLI-
GENCE, 3, 13. PRESUMPTION. TELEGRAPH, 2.
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CASES AFFIRMED, COMMENTED ON, OVERRULED, ETc.
Burton v. Spiers, 87 N. C. 87; Duvall v. Rollins, 68 Id. 230; Crummen
v. Bennett, Id. 494, cited and approved. State v. Harper, 347.
Cannon v. United States, 116 U. S. 55, judgment vacated and writ of error
dismissed. Snow v. United States, 475.
Hoarev. Rennie, 5 H. & N. 19, approved. Norrington v. Wright, 21 Am.
L. Reg. (N. S.) 395, affirmed. Norrington v. Wriglt, 47.
Hemenway v. Hemenway, 134 Mass. 446, distinguished. Trust Co. v.
Eaton, 162.
Heruden v. Moore, 18 S. C. 339, distinguished. Fddman v. Charleston.
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Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 224, considered and applied. Dist. Co-h
lumbia v. McElligott, 409.
Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor, 9 App. Cas. 434, followed. Black-
burn v. Reilly, 59.
Mitchell v. Darley Main Colliery Co., 24 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 432, and
Brunsden v. Humphrey, Id. 269, criticized and distinguished. City oj North
Vernon v. Foegler, lot.
Patterson v. Wallace, I Macq. 748, and Hall v. Johnson, 3 H. & C. 589,
compared. .1ohnson v. Florence co., 580.
Saxby u. Gloucester Wagon Co., 7 Q. B. Div. 305, referred to. Gardner
v. Herz, 478.
Thomas v. Rd., 101 U. S. 91, reaffirmed. Penn Co. v. St. Louis, 6-c., Rd.
550.
United States v. Fisher, 109 U. S. 143, and United States v. Mitchell, Id.
146, distinguished. United States v. Langston, 549.
Waters v. The People, 104 Ill. 544, distinguished. Hoag v. People, 738.
CHAMPERTY.
The fact that a suit is being prosecuted under a champertous agreement be-
tween plaintiff and his counsel is no defence to the suit. Such irregularity can
only be set up where it is sought to enforce the champertous agreement. Bent
v. Priest, 115, and note.
CHARITY. See ConponuTmON, 14. PUBLIc POLICT, 2, 3. TRUST AN
TRUSTEE, 2. WILL, 6, 7.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See MORTGAGE, II.
CHECK. See BANK, 1, 2, 7, 8, 14, 15, 17, 19.
CITIZENSHIP. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES. UNITED STATES COURTS, 1.
CITIZENSJnP, 1.
CITY. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
COMMON CARRIER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12, 13. RAILROAD, 4, 6.
TELEPHONE, 1.
1. A railroad company is not a common carrier of express companies, t. e.,
a common carrier of common carriers. Express Co. Cases, 274. See infra 14.
2. A commom carrier may, by contract, limit his liability as an insurer, but
he cannot thus relieve himself from consequences of his negligence or fraud.
Roseiqeld v. Ry. Co., 279.
3. Though common carrier may limit his liability by fixing value of goods,
he must show this was done with knowledge of shipper, and for sufficient con-
sideration, or that shipper's statements justified carrier in so fixing value. Id.
4. Burden is on carrier to show any limitation on his common law liability
and contracts limiting amount of recovery are construed most strictly against
him. Id.
5. In action against common carrier for loss of goods, where defence is that
loss was occasioned by " act of God"-here extraordinary flood-burden of
showing that negligence of carrier contributed with act of God to produce low.
is on shipper. Davis v. Rd. Co., 650, and note.
6. Defence of act of God may be shown under general denial. I1.
7. When goods are received by carrier to be transported beyond terminus of




more, he is responsible to consignor for their safe delivery. Talvey v. Georgia
Road, 541.
'8. To ascertain if any contract was made by first carrier to transport beyond
its line, to place of destination, bill of affreightment may be looked to, and
aliunde evidence introduced, such as payment of all freight, way bill, &c. Id.
9. Condition in free pass that railroad company shall not be liable for injury
caused by negligence of its servants, is reasonable, amd will prevent recovery,
even though passenger was a minor, and injuries were caused by gross negli-
gence of the railroad employees. Griswold v. Railroad, 196.
10. The plaintiff was employed by keeper of restaurant at railroad station,
to sell sandwiches on train. While so employed he obtained the pass in ques-
tion, to make a journey for his own pleasure. Held, that pass did not give
plaintiff right of passenger for hire. Id.
11. Carriers of live stock are liable as common carriers and as insurers to
same extent as carriers of merchandise, except as to injuries caused by animals
to themselves or each other ; losses caused by their inherent rices and propen-
sities. Railway Co. v. Lesser, 541.
12. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsi-
bility for negligence of himself or servants, or insufficiency of cars for trans-
portation of freight deposited in them. Id.
13. When shipper of live stock, in consideration of reduced rates, contracts
with carrier, that in case of total loss of any of stock, the value of any animal
should not exceed a certain sum, then in case of partial injury, the damages
will be the proportion of that sum, the animal was lessened in value by reason
of the injury. Id.
14. A railroad company performs its whole duty to the public at large, and
to each individual when it affords the public all reasonable express accommoda-
tions ; it owes no duty to the public as to particular agencies it shall select for
that purpose, but may choose its own appropriate means of carriage, always
provided they are such as- to insure reasonable promptness and security. Ex-
press Company Cases, Legal Notes,°274.
15. Is not bound to establish commutation rates for particular locality, but
having done so must treat all alike. State v. Railroad Co., 444, and note.
16. Commuter one day forgot his ticket, and tendered to conductor regular
trip ticket, provided it should not he punched, and should be returned next
morning on presentation of commutation ticket, and otherwise refused to pay
his fare : Held, that relator made himself liable to ejectment from train, and it
maybe to forfeiture of commutation ticket then held, but that company were not
justified in refusing to sell him commutation tickets thereafter ; and that for
such refusal, mandamus would lie. Id.
17. Discrimination by, generally. Id., note.
18. Carrier by water may deliver goods on wharf, but generally consignee is
entitled to notice of their arrival. Notice, however, may be waived by previous
dealing between the parties. Turner v. Huff, 540.
19. Carrier by water is not responsible for loss of goods delivered at landing
place where consignee receives his goods, though there be no warehouse there
and consignees have no notice of their arrival, if it be the uniform usage of
carriers in same trade to leave goods at landing place, without notice, and the
manner of delivery conforms to the custom of the locality; and this, whether
shipper or consignee knew of usage or not. Id.
20. Stipulation in bill of lading that carrier shall have benefit of any insur-
ance on the goods is valid, and in such case, even though loss be occasioned by
negligence of carrier, insurance company cannot be subrogated to rights of ship-
per. Insurance Co. v. Transportation Co., 330.
21. Where goods were shipped under oral agreement, with understanding that
bills of lading would he subsequently issued, and afterwards, and after effecting
of insurance by shipper, bills of lading were issued, containing provision giving
to carrier benefit of any insurance on goods, which bills were not objected to by
shipper, and were similar to other bills previously issued to him, contract of
carriage is to be treated as if made on day of oral agreement and insurance
cc.npany i: F-mn hy eonditions of bills of lading. Id.
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CONDITIONAL SALE. See FIXTURES, 1. SALE, 8, 9, 11.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See BANx, 19. CONTRACT, 23. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw,
42-44. CORPORATION, 13, 18. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 7, 9. INSOLVENoY.
1. Validity of gift causa mortis is to be determined *by law of place where
made, without reference to domicile of donor. Emery v. Clough, 473.
2. If no place is agreed on for performance of contract, lex loci contractus
governs. Morris v. Hockcaday, 472.
3. Where bond was dated in North Carolina, but had no specified place
of payment, held, that it was governed by usury laws of that state, although
pleadings admit its delivery in Virginia. But contra, if bond was given for
goods purchased in Virginia. Id.
4. Qmuere, whether parties can agree on rate of interest, legal where contract
is made, but illegal where it is to be performed. Id.
5. Personal property of deceased person is to be administered according to
law of his domicile. The law of country of which he is a subject regulates
the succession. This law applies to mortgages on laud as well as to other
personalty. Thomas v. Morrissdl, 541.
6. Issues passed on by probate court of another state cannot be opened by
proceedings in our courts substantially between same parties and involving
same issue ; and there is nothing in the question of domicile to take it out of the
general rule. Id.
7. Defendant's discharge under insolvency law of Massachusetts, is no bar to
suit in New Hampshire, on contract made in former state before insolvency,
when plaintiff has not resided there since insolvency proceedings were begun,
and has not submiited to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court. iNorris v.
Attinson, 792.
8. Complainant in New Jersey court claimed as residuary legatee, part of
fund in defendants' hands, under what complainant claimed was a void bequest.
Held, that as testator was a non-resident, and his will had never been proved
nor recorded in New Jersey, complainant was not entitled to relief, although
bill states that fund is under control of defendants, who reside in New Jersey,
and are executors of surviving executor of will in question. Fan Gieson v.
Banta, 207.
9. In suit by stockholders of foreign corporation against it and corporation
to which it bad leased its road, lands, &c., all of which were out of New Jersey
courts' jurisdiction, seeking relief in regard to transactions of these corporations
with each other, that court, on demurrer, declined to take jurisdiction on ground
that courts of New York were proper forum. Gregory v. Railroad Co., 207.
CONSIDERATION. See Co.MON CARRIER, 10. CONTRACT, 18, 22. FRAUDS,
STATUTE OF, 2. INSURANCE, 23. PLEADING, 2.
CONSPIRACY. See INJUNCTION, 6.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See CRIMINAL LAW, 6, 9, 11, 15, 16. ERRORS
AND APPEALS, 2. HIGHWAYS, &C., 4; 5. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 13.
MfUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 14, 18. RAILROAD, 9. REMOVAL OF CAUSES,
2. SLANDER AND LIBEL, 7. STATUTE, i. TELEGRAPH, I. TELEPHONE, 2.
I. Powers of Legislature.
I. Statute authorizing executions against inhabitants upon judgments against
towns is constitutional. Eames v. Savage, 71.
2. General Assembly under general grant of legislative power in constitu-
tion, has power to provide by reasonable and impartial statute for registration
of voters. Daggett v. Hudson, 71.
3. Statute which authorizes seizure of intoxicating liquor, intended for un-
lawful use, in possession of express company, does not interfere with interstate
commerce and is not in conflict with sect. 8, of Federal Constitution. State v.
O'.Neil, 671.
4. Provision in the 14th Amendment to Constitution United States, forbid-
ding a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction, equal protection of
laws, applies to Southern and Central Pacific Railroad Companies. Santa
Clara Go. v. South. Pac. Rd., 541.
5. Law requiring liquor dealers to remove obstructions to clear view of pre-
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mises through window on Sunday is constitutional, though it does not define
what constitutes an obstruction. State v. Boyle, 671.
6. Ordinance requiring street railroads to make quarterly reports of number
of passengers, is not unreasonable or in restraint of trade, and is not in viola-
tion of art. 5 of Amendments to United States Constitution. St. Louis v. St.
Louis Rd., 609.
7. Where public officer has rendered services under law which fixes his com-
pensation, a constitutional provision, passed afterwards, lowering limit of taxa-
tion, impairs obligation of contract by destroying remedy pro tanto. aRsk v. Jury,
208.
8. Grant to corporation by legislature of Louisiana of exclusive privilege
supplying New Orleans with gas for certain period is binding on state, and it
cannot, either by its organic law or legislative enactment, impair the obligation
of the contract. Gas Co. v. Light Co., 139.
9. A state, by a statute subjecting railroads to double damages for failure to
maintain fences and cattle-guards, does not deprive the companies of their pro-
perty without due process of law, or deny them the equal protection of its laws.
Railway v. Humps, 71.
10. Authority for imposing such duties as prescribed by the statute in ques-
tion is found in the police power of the state. Id.
S1i. Act state legislature imposing tax on persons who, not having their prin-
cipal place of business within the state, engage in selling or soliciting sale of
certain liquors to be shipped into state, is unconstitutional, as in effect a regula-
tion of inter-state commerce. Walling v. &ate Michigan, 279.
12. Provisions Pub. Stat. R. I cap. 139, forbidding discriminations by
common carrier in his charges for transportation, apply to contracts made in
thatstate for transportation to points 'beyond state. Coal Co. v. Rd., 671.
13. These provisions so applying are not in confiict with Art. I., sect. 8 of
Federal Constitution. Id.
14. When railroad is built by corporations located in and chartered by differ-
ent states and these corporations consolidate, they make but one corporation,
whose acts and neglects are done by it as a whole. Id.
15. Act conferring certain corporate powers on cities of first grade of first
class is general, and is not in conflict with constitutional prohibition against
passage of special acts conferring such powers. State v. Hawkins, 473.
16. Power conferred on governer of state to remove members of board of
police commissioners, is administrative and not in conflict with clause of consti-
tution conferring judicial power on the courts. Id.
17. Where charges embodying facts that in judgment of law constitute official
misconduct, are preferred to governor, of which notice is given to members
charged, and he, acting upon charges so made, removes them from office, his
act cannot be reviewed, or held for naught on proceeding in quo warranto. Id.
18. Statute providing for appointment in city of board of four commissioners
to take charge of elections, two members thereof to be selected from each of the
two leading political parties of the city, such board to appoint registers,
inspectors and clerks of election from each of the two leading political parties,
is unconstitutional, as requiring an unlawful test for holding of public office.
Attorney-General v. Detroit, 34, and note.
19. Party representation being main object of such law, court cannot treat it as
not essential and sustain commission by allowing selection of its members with-
out such test. Id.
20. Creation by statute of board of commissioners for city, having control of
municipal elections and appointment of election officers, is unconstitutional, as
being a delegation of governmental powers. Id.
21. Legislature has no power to levy taxes for private purposes, and bonds
issued by city to be lent to applicants who will build up waste places and burnt
districts of the .city are not valid obligations. This case distinguished from
cases sustaining local taxation in aid of railroads. Feldman v. Charleston, 208.• 22. Statute forbidding and punishing sale of adulterated milk provided that,
in all prosecutions, if the milk be shown, upon analysis, to contain more than
88 per cent. of watery fluids, or less than 12 per cent. of milk solids, or les
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than 21 per cent. of milk fats, it should be deemed adulterated, held constitu-
tional. State v. Groves, 344.
23. Act establishing reform school in all counties In which is located city of
over 50,000 inhabitants, violates-provisions of constitution of Missouri against
passage of local or special laws. Court takes judicial notice of census returns,
and it is found that Jackson county is only county in state to which the law
could apply, or was intended to apply. State v. County Court, 609.
24. Where journal of each house of general assembly shows that a law
received concurrence of requisite number of members and was publicly signed
by presiding officers as also required, its authenticity cannot be impeached by
parol evidence that one or more members recorded as concurring and whose
concurrence was necessary, had, prior to adoption of law, been seated upon
determination of contested election, by less tb.,n constitutional quorum. State
v. Herron, 737.
25. Sects. 5 and 6 of Art. II of Military Code of Illinois, prohibiting any
body of men, other than organized militia of state and United States troops,
from parading with arms in any city without a license from the governor, do
not infringe right of people to bear arms, and clearly do not conflict with
Second Amendment to Constitution of United States. Presser v. Ill., 207.
26. The right to associate as a military company and parade with arms, not
having been specially granted by congress or the state, is not an attribute of
national citizenship protected by 14th Amendment to National Constitution.
Id.
27. Requirement that each vessel passing a quarantine station shall pay fee
fixed by statute for examination as to her sanitary condition and the ports from
which she came, is a part of all quarantine systems, and is a compensation for
services rendered vessel, not a tax within meaning of constitution concerning
tonnage tax imposed by the states. Steamship Co. v. Board of Health, 542.
28. Nor is it liable to constitutional objection as giving a preference for port
of one state over those of another. Sect. 9, art. Ist of Constitution is a re-
straint on powers of general government and has no application to quarantine
laws of Louisiana. Id.
29. Where state constitution provides that every white male citizen who shall
have resided in state for certain period preceding election, shall have right to
vote, any law which requires previous registry of citizen as prerequisite to right
to vote is unconstitutional and void. Such a law is not rule of procedure, but
legislative condition attempted to be attached to exercise of constitutional right.
White v. County Judge, 636, and note.
30. Act of legislature directed that all property of railroad and canal com-
panies used for railroad or canal purposes, including their franchises, should be
assessed for taxation in manner which differed materially both in ascertaining
values and in rate of tax from assessment of similar property not used for such
purposes. Held, that act did not contravene requirement of state constitution
that " property shall he assessed for taxes under general laws and by uniform
rules according to its true value." Board of Assessors v. State, Legal Notes,
666.
31. The words "due process of law," in the constitutional provision, "that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law," means general public law binding on all members of the community, under
all circumstances, and not partial or private laws affecting the rights of private
individuals or classes of individuals. Millet v. The People, 785.
32. So far as the owner or operator of a mine shall contract for mining or
selling of coal by weight, there is no constitutional objection to the statutes im-
posing upon him the duty of procuring scales for that purpoe ; but so much of
the act of 1885 as provides that all contracts for the mining of coal in which
the weighing of the coal, as provided for in that act, shall hc dispensed with,
shall he null and void, is in violation of the constitution. Id.
33. Such legislation for this particular class cannot be sustained as an exer-
cise of the police power. Id.
34. Sect. 29, art. 4, of the constitution of Illinois, wnch enjoins legislation
in the interest of miners, means legislation for the personal salety of miners,
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and relates only to the enactment of police regulations to promote that end.
Millet v. People, 785.
35. The legislature has not the power to require the owners and operators of
coal mines in this state to furnish sales, and employ a person to use them and
keep books of entries of weights, for the benefit or information of the public,
without first making compensation to the owners, that being tantamount to an
appropriation to public use of private property, which is the cost of the scales,
and a clerk to keep the books. Id.
36. Ordinances of San Francisco forbade any person to carry on laundry
without consent of bpard of supervisors, except in brick or stone buildings.
There were at the time about 320 laundries in San Francisco, of which about
240 were owned and conducted by subjects of China, and about 310 were made
of wood, the same material that constituted about nine-tenths of the houses in
San Francisco. All petitions of Chinese were refused, and all others, except
one, were granted. Held (1), That provisions of 14th Amendment to Consti-
tution of United States, are universal in their application, to all persons within
territorial jurisdiction ; and equal protection of laws is pledge of protection of
equal laws. (2) That ordinances were so administered as to amount to prac-
tical denial by state of that equal protection of laws. Yick We v. Hopkins,
473.
37. Sweble, That ordinances in question were void from their terms because
they compelled men to hold their means of living at mere will of another, differ-
ing from case where discretion is lodged in public officers to grant or withhold
licenses, &c. Id.
38. LEGISLATION IMPAIRING TUE OBLIGATION OF CONTRAOTS, 81.
39. TnE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJEoTIONS TO RETROSPEOTIVE AND Ex FOST
FACTO LAws, 681.
II. Powers of Judiciary.
40. Where by law of state in which judgment has been obtained in suit
against joint defendafits, one of whom only was served, judgment is valid
against defendant served, an action can be maintained thereon against him in
courts of another state. Harley v. Donoghue, and Renaud v. Abbott, 208. See
Legal Notes, p. 341.
41. When court of one state, in order to give full faith and credit to judg-
ment rendered in another, must ascertain effect which it has in that state, the
law of that state must be proved, like any other matter of fact; and conse-
quently an allegation in declaration of such effect is admitted by demurrer. Id.
42. A United States Circuit Court has jurisdiction on habeas corpus to dis-
charge from custody a person restrained of his liberty, in violation of the Con-
stitution of the United States, although he is held under the authority of the
state. Ex parte Royali, 344.
43. Where such a restraint is claimed, the United States Court has a discre-
tion (to be subordinated to any special circumstances requiring immediate
action) to proceed at once or await the result of his trial, and after trial it has
still a discretion whether the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his writ of
error. Id.
44. Upon construction of constitution and laws of a state, the Supreme Court
United States, as a general rule, follows decisions of highest court of state,
unless they conflict with or impair the efficacy of some principle of federal con-
stitution, or of federal statute, or a rule of commercial or general law, on many
subjects they are necessarily conclusive, such as relate to existence of her sub-
ordinate tribunals, and the eligibility of their officers, and passage of her laws.
Norton v. Shelby Co., 542.
45. On grounds of public policy, validity is frequently given to acts of officers
defacto, but there can be no officer de facto or de jure. if there be no office to
fill, and an unconstitutional act can create no office. Id.
46. In an action of ejectment the judgment turned on validity of sale of land
by guardian of plaintiff. It appeared, that all proceedings for sale were regular
save that no bond was entered by guardian, as statute provided, which court
held did not avoid sale. This judgment was appealed from to highest state
court, it being averred among other assignments of error, that plaintiff in error
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was deprived of his property without due process of law. The court affirmed
the judgment of the court below, but took no notice.of this assignment: Hdd,
thac the judgment, nevertheless, involved the decision of question whether there
had been denial of riaht so claimed, and therefore, Supreme Court United
States had technical jurisdiction ; but judgment was so clearly correct that
motion to affirm should be granted. The failure to enter the bond was at most
an error of the court. A state cannot be deemed guilty of viol.tion of consti-
tutional obligation referred to, because one of its courts, while acting within its
jurisdiction, has made an erroneous decision. Arrowsmith v. Harmoning, 542.
III. Eminent Domain.
47. Land may be taken for public cemetery, even though expense may exclude
some. Association v. Beecher, 737.
48. In proceedings to condemn strip of land for railroad track, which crossed
a pond, supplying owner's steam mill with water, on question of damages to
mill property not taken, defendant gave estimates on basis that pond would be
destroyed as water supply to mill, and that there would be no other source of
supply. Petitioner then offered to show that certain water-works would fur-
nish mill regularly with all the water it might require at less cost than that of
pumping from the pond, and also that a creek flowing nearer the mill than the
pond, had a capacity to furnish better water in abundance for the use of the mill,
which the court refused to admit. Held, that the court erred in excluding the
evidence. Railroad and Coal Co. v. Switzer, 793.
CONTEMPT. See HABEAS CoRPus, 2.
1. Where order issued against foreign corporation, defendant, to show cause
why it should not be punished for contempt, and the agent of said corporation
who was designated by it in accordance with law of state where suit was brought
as person on whom process may be served, purposely avoided being served with
said order ; and an order was entered that service be made upon "the attorneys
of record herein of said defendant :" Held, that such service was valid. Lend
Co. v. Yuba County, 280.
2. Defendant in suit procured postponement through counsel on ground that
he was too ill to attend court. Plaintiff's counsel, suspecting deception, applied
for an attachment for contempt. An order to show cause was issued and served,
but defendant did not appear ; his counsel appeared for him and filed answer,
asserting his illness and disclaiming intention to disobey court. To this plain-
tiff filed no reply. A hearing was then had in absence of defendant against
protest of his counsel, and court found him guilty and sentenced him to pay fine
and costs, the latter taxed as in an ordinary civil suit. Held, 1. That court
below having found defendant's conduct to be a contempt, appellate court could
not, as matter of law, say it was not so. 2. The contempt not being commifted in
its presence, court could only find defendant guilty on regular proof, making a
trial necessary. 3. That as the contempt was a criminal one, a civil proceeding for
its punishment was irregular; and that the proceeding should have conformed
as nearly as possible to those in criminal cases. 4. That court could not pro-
ceed in defendant's absence, and that he had a right to be heard. 5. That affi-
davits were improperly admitted as evidence on the trial; also, a deposition
taken on part of plaintiff. Welch v. Barber, 72.
CONTRACT. See ACTION, 6. B.AK, 10-13. BILLS AND NOTES, 21. Cot-
MlON CARRIER, 2-4, 8, 12. CONFLICT OF LAws, 2-4. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw, 7. CORPORATION, 30, 32. DAMAGES, 10, 11. EQUITY, 17, 18, 20,
22. EVIDENCE, 21. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 7. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 15.
INFANT, 4, 5. INSURANCE, 25, 26, 28. PARTNERSHIP, 3. PUBLIC POLICY,
1. RAILROAD, 13, 14. SALE, 5, 7, 11-14. SET-OFF, 3. SHIPPING, 1, 2.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. TELEGRAPH, 8. UNITED STATES, 1.
1. When written agreement consists of more than one distinct writing, all
the parts should be given due weight. The Cin., 4-c. Co. v. The Ind., 4-c. Co.,
474.
2. Mfere bid in answer to advertisement for proposals for building does
not constitute. Conditional acceptance, such as requiring bond, delays completion
of contract until condition is complied with. Howard v. Mai,,e School, 609.
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39. Where corporation acts through building committee, majority must con-
cur in making or varying contract. Howard v. Maine School, 609.
4. An offer made in Boston, Mass., and to stand until next day, was
accepted by telegram from Providence. R. I. Held, that contract was com-
pleted in Rhode Island, though to be performed in Massachusetts. Perry
v. Iron Co., 671.
5. A contract between physician and person injured by railroad company
that physician shall explain to company's counsel and medical adviser the
nature of injuries, and be paid for such service a sum graded by amount
received from company is illegal and void. Tlims v. Caulkett, 133, and note.
6. Under a contract to deliver 5000 tons of rails, to be shipped at rate of
about 1000 tons per month, seller's failure to ship required quantity in first
month gives buyer right to rescind whole contract. -Norrington v. Wright, 47,
affirming same case 21 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.), 395.
7. Upon contract of sale to be performed by a series of deliveries and pay-
ments at stated intervals particular defaults by one party will not release the
other, unless conduct of party in default be such as to evince intention to
abandon contract. Blackburn v. Reilly, 59.
8. One partner agreed in writing to sell to a copartner his interest in com-
pany's property, consisting of store and stock of goods, worth $25,000, on cer-
tain terms, with proviso, that whichever broke the contract, should ferfiuit to
the other $500. Held, that $500 were intended by parties as liquidated dam-
ages. Maxwell v. Allen, 542.
9. To constitute contract of sale of land by acceptance of offer to sell,
acceptance must be unconditional, not "provided the title is perfect." At any
.time before unconditional acceptance of offer and compliance with its terms it
may be withdrawn. Corcoran v. White, 737.
10. Offer in writing to subscribe to capital stock of railroad company, con-
ditioned upon construction of its road along designated route, is revocable until
delivered to and accepted by such company ; death of party works such revoca-
tion. Wallace v. Townseid, 73.
II. Contract giving party right to use fence of race course for advertising
purposes for period of years, confers right to use inside as well as outside of
fence, and includes right of entry on premises to reach inner surface of fence,
which latter right is not a mere revocable license, but a right of way in gross.
Wil'oughby v. Lawrence, 672.
12. The fact that a regular practising physician failed for a short time to
register under sect. 1409, et seg., Illinois Code, owing to no book having been
provided for the purpose, will not defeat his right to recover for professional
services rendered during that period. Parrish v. Foss, 140.
13. G. wrote to nephew in Germany that if he would come to this country
and take care of him and wife, who were childless, he would leave him all his
fortune. Nephew came and took care of uncle and aunt for ten years, when
uncle died. Held, that this constituted a contract enforceable by nephew against
legatees and representatives of uncle, claiming under will which made no pro-
vision for nephew. Schutt v. Miss. Soc., 610.
14. Railroad company contracted to give B. certain rights "over its entire
line of railway, and on all roads which it controls or may hereafter control by
ownership, lease or otherwise." Held, that though railroad company, by own-
ing a majority of stock of another railroad company, may have all the advan-
tages of a control of the road, yet that is not the control itself within the mean-
ing of the contract. Car Co. v. Rd., 140.
15. Where an employee, engaged under a contract for a specified time, the
wages being payable in instalments, is wrongfully discharged before expiration
of period of hire, and all wages actually earned at time of discharge have been
paid, an action will not lie to recover future instalments as though actually
earned, hut remedy is by action for damages for breach of contract, and one
recovery on such claim is bar to future action. James v. Commissioners Allen
Co., 521. and note; also 409.
16. The duty to perform a positive promise which is not contrary to law or
public policy, or obtained by fraud, imposition, undue influence, or mistake, is
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an obligation in morals, and being so, it is sufficient consideration for express
promise. Bentley v. Lamb, 632, and note.
17. A. gave B., who had been in his employ for years, due bill for $3000,
payable one year after his death. This was given in pursuance of agreement,
wherein he agreed to do so, and stated that it was as additional con.pcnsation
for services rendered. A. died, and suit being brought on due bill, his execu-
tors set up want of consideration, Held, that services rendered, though partly
paid for, were sufficient consideration for due bill. Id.
18. Treasurer of savings bank made his note to bank for $2000, and secured
it by assignment of insurance policy on his own life, for purpose of making up
to bank, a loss on loans for which he was neither morally nor legally rcspdusi-
ble. Note and policy were found by trustees of bank after treasurer's death,
which was first they knew of them. Held, 1. That note was without considera-
tion and void ; 2. That assignment of policy was void for want of delivery.
Bank v. Copeland, 72.
19. Plaintiff contracted to build house for defendant by time certain, for
$2250, of which $500 was to be paid in advance, and balance to be raised by
mortgage on house, which was to be negotiated by plaintiff. He failed to nego-
tiate mortgage and to complete house by time specified, but was allowed to con-
tinue work for two months after, when defendant took possession and finished
it. Held, that defendant waived materiality of time ; that by stopping plain-
tiff she virtually refused to permit him to raise money by mortgage ; that de-
fendant cannot complain that jury were instructed that plaintiff could recover
what his labor and materials were worth to defendant, because she admitted, if
liable, that this was correct rule, and no exception was taken to the charge as
to damages. Foster v. Worthington, 672.
20. A. agreed to sell B. a quantity of corn at a stipulated price, to be deliv-
ered at a day named, and B. promised to make advances on the contract to A.,
of what money he might require. In a suit on the contract for non delivery of
corn, it was held, that evidence of a custom requiring the vendor to give to
vendee his note, on receiving such advances, was inadmissible on behalf of B.,
as inconsistent with the express contract. Gilbert v. .McGinnis, 139.
21. Contract for sawing and delivery to purchaser, of lumber, provided that
he should measure same when delivered, and pay for only such as was absolutely
clear and suitable for certain purpose. Held, that while it gives buyer right to
pass upon quality of lumber, it does not make his decision beyond review. He
is bound to receive and measure such lumber as complies with contract, although
in his judgment, it is not of proper quality; and testimony of witnesses who
saw lumber after it was sawed, in the timber, and when it was being shipped, is
admissible to show its quality when delivered. If injured while being shipped,
such fact might be shown. Mulliner v. Bronson, 280.
22. A. having bona fide claim against C., placed it in hands of attorney for
collection, who exhibited it both to C. and to B., his father, and informed them
of consequences of suit, which he was instructed to institute. Afterwards, B.
obtained bill of sale from son, of all his property, and upon being told by A.,
that he was going to send sheriff up " that day ;" that he was not going to stop
for bill of sale, "1 it was a fraud," replied "you keep quiet and you will get
your money; I guess I am worth it." A., relying on promise of B., left him
and immediately stopped further proceedings : held, that the forbearance to sue
constituted sufficient consideration for B.'s promise, and A. was entitled to
recover against him. Bowen v. Tipton, 344.
23. Plaintiff sued in assumpsit to recover balance due for services, advances
and interest on purchases and sales of stock. Both plaintiff and defendant
resided in York, Pa., where former conducted business of banker and broker.
Plaintiff bought and sold for defendant, on margin, in markets of New York,
Baltimore, Chicago and Philadelphia. Defendant pleaded specially that by law
of Pennsylvania, where contracts were made and to be perfbrmed, they were
gambling transaction, and void. field, 1. That it was competent for defendant
to show that, although in form th. transaction was perfectly legal, it was in fact
a mere guise under which a gambling transaction might be conducted. 2. That
although plaintiff acted merely a defendant's broker and was suing not on the




fendant, he stood in same position as if seeking to enforce original agreemen
and could not recover for services rendered in forwarding a gambling transac-
tion. 3. As to the locus of the transaction, jury should have been given the
law of Pennsylvania as comprised in the decisions of that state bearing on wa-
gering contracts within its limits. 4. That action being for services rendered
defendant, it was plaintiff's relations with him on which the suit was based ;
and parties with whom he dealt in making purchases and sales were nowise
connected with the suit. 5. That validity of transaction was to be tested by
Pennsylvania cases, according to which, if, as defendant claimed, the under-
standing between plaintiff and defendant was that no stock should be delivered,
but a mere settlement of differences made, the transactions were wagers and no
recovery could be had by plaintiff. S.tewart v. Shall, 796.
CONTRIBUTION. See CosTs, 2.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. See NEGLIGENCB.
CONVERSION. See WILL, 15.
COPYRIGHT.
1. The judges and reporter being paid by the state, it can copyright their
work and say when and in what manner the decisions of the court shall be pub-
lished. Gould v. Banks, 738.
2. The courts and their records are open to all ; but the judges' opinions are
not part of the records, and are accessible to all who desire to use them to enforce
their rights. Id.
3. If owner of subsisting copyright seeks to enjoy exclusive right of selling
published work by making sales directly and only to individual subscribers, the
statute protects his monopoly from interference by other dealers offering surrep-
titiously obtained copies of genuine work, without his consent, unless there be
something in circumstances of particular case to estop him from relying on pri-
vileges of his monopoly. *Publishing Co. v. Smythe, Legal Notes, 668.
CORPORATION. See ATTACHMENT, 2-5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 4. Cox-
TRACT, 3. EQUITY, 3. bestUANcE, 1. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 2. M.AN-
DAMUS, 8. MORTGAGE, 7. NEGLIGENCE, 17. PuBLIC POLICY, 2, 3.
RAILROAD, 7. SALE, 10. WILL, 6, 7.
1. Corporation colorably organized, incurred debts, on which judgments were
recovered. After incurring those debts organization was perfected and mort-
gages given. Held, that judgments had precedence. Bergen v. Porpoise Co.,
610.
2. Where a director receives property for his vote on a proposed contract
with the corporation, he is a trustee for such property, and it may be recovered
from him in a suit by a receiver of the corporation. Bent v. Priest, 115, and
note.
3. In constructive trusts arising from fraud, if the facts cbnstituting the fraud
are open, the Statute of Limitations commences to run at once ; but if the facts
are secret the statute does not commence to run until their discovery. Id.
4. Turnpike company which collects tolls is directly liable to those who travel
upon it, for injuries occasioned by want of repair of road, without any express
statatoty provision. Turnpike Road v. Crowther, 73.
5. Where differences in grade exist, company is bound to make safe and con-
venient turnouts to side roads, and where they are necessarily dangerous to pro-
vide proper safe guards. Id.
6. Capital stock cannot be reduced except by express legislative authority.
&eignouret v. Home Ins. Co., 29, and note.
7. Such authority is not conferred by statute authorizing stockholders to'make
modifications, additions or changes in their act of incorporation, or to dissolve
it, with assent of three-fourths of stock. Id.
8. Semble, that writing off the value.of shares so that par value and estimated
value may be equal, the actual capital not being affected, can only be accom-
plished by consent, or clear power given in charter. Id.
9. New Jersey statute of 1880, authorizing any railroad to lease or merge with
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any other, does not authorize such lease by directors against minority of dissenting
stockholders, so far as latter's rights are affected. Mills v. Central Rd., 610.
10. Provision of general corporation act that charters thereafter granted shall
be subject to alteration, suspension or repeal, in discretion of legislature, does
not incorporate act of 1880, supra, in defendant's charter so as to injuriously,
affect stockholder's vested rights. Id.
11. Where there is no legislative authority for ascertaining damage inflicted
upon dissenting stockholders by majority delivering their vested righri by illegal
lease, and awarding them compensation therefor, court will annul leasc and
restore complainants to original position. Id.
12. The mere granting of a charter, it not appearing on the face of the
incorporating act or otherwise, that the named corporators had applied for
it or accepted tie grant, does not create a corporate body. Snith v. Mining Co.,
280.
13. A charter can be accepted and the corporation organized only within the
limits of the state creating it ; and this rule should be enforced in the tribunals
of the state in which the unauthorized acts were done or the suit was instituted,
as well as by the courts of the incorporating state. Td.
14. Upon dissolution of corporation (other than moneyed, trading or munici-
pal corporation) by expiration of charter, all of its property not validly. alien-
ated before dissolution reverts to the grantor. St. Philip's Church v. Zion
Church, 406.
15. Where corporation having no adopted seal, directed conveyance made of
lot of ground, and deed was executed, purporting to be under seal of corpora-
tion, attested by its president, and was signed by such president, and a wafer
was attached, intended as seal of the corporation: Held, that the wafer was the
corporate seal to this deed. id.
16. Allegations in bill that company is insolvent and has suspended busi-
ness for lack of funds, not sufficient to have corporation declared insolvent and
receiver appointed ; facts must be set out from which insolvency shall appear.
Construction Co. v. Schack, 140.
17. Sections 16, 34 and 57, of Corporation Act of New Jersey (Rev. p. 182)
construed. Id.
18. Courts of Maryland will not interfere in controversies relating only to
the internal management of affairs of foreign corporation. Such controversies
must be settled by courts of state creating the corporation. Mining Co. v.
rdd, 280.
19. Where act of foreign corporation affects one solely in his capacity as a
member of the corporation, such act may be said to relate to the management
of the internal affairs of corporation ; but it is otherwise where it affects his
individual rights only. Id.
20. Bill by "Drummond Tobacco Co.," to enjoin incorporation of another
company in same city as " Drummond-Rundle Tobacco Co.," will not be sus-
tained unless evidence satisfies mind of chancellor that plaintiff would thereby
be injured in its business. Drumniond Tobacco Co. v. Rundle, 289.
21. So the use of any particular name by a corporation will not be enjoined
unless it is clearly shown that complainant will probably be injured thereby.
Td.
22. The directors of a savings bank, though unpaid, are responsible for want
of ordinary care and being regarded as trustees for depositors, the statute of
limitations is no bar to an action against them for mismanagement. Williams
v. McKay, 141.
23. Where bill filed shows systematic violation of charter by president, it
raises a prinafacie presumption that directors were aware of the fact and the
latter cannot demur on ground that misconduct is not traced to them. Id.
24. Where by-laws of private corporation for profit, make it duty of presi-
dent to exercise general supervision over its entire businuss, and provide that
all company's property shall be under his control, and such president for num-
ber of years before, had acted as its attorney, there will be evidence of his au-




25. Attorney must have special authority to compromise a suit; but accept-
ing benefit of settlement may ratify it. Wetherbee v. Ftch, 738.
26. Where charter authorizes purchase of land for certain purpose, in absence
of evidence it will be presumed that any land purchased was for authorized pur-
pose. Mallet v. Simpson, 344.
27. Where charter of railroad company authorized purchase of land for pro-
curing stone and other tnaterials necessary for construction of road or effecting
transportation thereon, held, that charter authorized purchase of land to get
cross-tries and fire wood. Id.
28. Statutes of mortmain were never adopted in North Carolina. M.
29. Conveyance to corpoxation of land which its charter forbidsitsholding or
taking title to, is valid until vacated by direct proceedings instituted by the
sovereign for that purpose. Id.
30. Secret agreement made with subscriber to stock of railway corporation,
who subscribes with others, that he shall pay only part o' his subscription, is
fraudulent as to other subscribers and his subscription will be binding for whole
amount. Railroad Co. v. Ennor, 672.
. 31. Subscription to railway company to take certain number of its mortgage
bonds, containing clause that it is not to be binding, unless one hundred bonds
are subscribed for, is not binding until that number are so subscribed. Id.
32. A subscription payable when company's road should be graded to a cer-
tain point, to be in force only until a day named, cannot be enforced without
performance of condition. .d.
33. As a rule, officers of corporation are sole judges of the propriety of
declaring dividends, but where right to dividend is clear, court of equity will
compel its declaration. Belfast Co. v. Belfast, 73.
34. Where the papers by which an attempt is made in good faith, to organize
a private corporation have gone through the public offices, and there has been
uninterrupted and unchallenged user for a number of years, and valuable rights
in good faith acquired, enjoyed and disposed of by such organization, it is a
corporation de facto, and its c6rporate capacity cannot be questioned in a pri-
vate suit to which it is a party. Society v. City, 73.
35. A judgment of ouster against pretended corporation by reason of defect-
ive proceedings of incorporation, is not retroactive upon rights acquired, &c.,
in transactions in good faith with such acting corporation. Id.
36. A statute provided that members of every incorporated manufacturing
company should be liable for all debts of corporation until capital stock was
paid in and certain certificates filed. Held, that liability extended to all hold-
ing stock when debt was contracted, and also to all who were stockholders when
liability was enforced, but not to those buying stock after debt was contracted
and selling same before liability was enforced. Saules v. Bat, 672.
37. Another statute gave to stockholder paying such debts action for contri-
bution against stockholders "originally liable" with him. Held, all who were
stockholders when debt was contracted, and also all who were stockholders
w hen liability was enforced could be made to contribute. Id.
38. Trustees holding stock are liable to contribute from trust funds in their
hands. Married women are also liable to contribute, the liability being statu-
tory and incident to ownership of stock. Id.
COSTS.
1. Where board of aldermen have increased and are increasing city debt be-
yond statutory limit, the aldermen may be required personally to pay costs of
action by citizens to enjoin further increase. Scott v. Alexander, 209.
2. In suits where one person incurs expense in rescuing property for benefit
of many, court of equity has power to direct that expenses so incurred shall be
paid from common fund. Merwin v. Richardson, 74.
COUNTY. See MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIo;;.
COURTS. See CONTEMPT. CorYRIGHT, 1, 2. TRIAL.
Although a statute authorizing grant of letters of administration to creditors
upon failure of relatives to apply in specified time, contains no provision for
notice to relatives, Orphans' Court may, by rule, require previous notice to them.
Gas v. Dabergott, 187, and note.
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1. Action at law cannot be maintained after assignee has severed his relation
to land, in respect to breaches of covenant committed during his holding.
Remedy in such case is in equity. Dondson v. Polk, 474.
2. Covenant in deed for land containing a quarry, that grantor will not open
or work, or allow to be opened or worked, any quarry on certain farm owned
by grantor adjoining land conveyed, cannot be enforced against assigns of
grantor. Norcross v. .Taies, 64.
3. Where A.'s land was bound by a covenant to keep open a private road
for the use of the owner of an adjoining tract, and A. encroached on said road
by erecting piazzas, &c. Held, that the owner of the dominant tenement was
entitled to an injunction and was not estopped by reason of having offered no
resistance to erection of said obstructions, of which he had knowledge ; and that
statute of limitations was no defence. Gawton v. Leland, 141.
4. Agreement as to party wall provided that A. should build it, and that
before B. should use it, he should pay A. one-half of its cost, and that the pro-
visions of the agreement should run with the land. Held, that the agreement
to pay one-half the cost was personal to A., and that wall when completed,
became the property of each, although A. had right to retain possession of whole
as security for payment of sum due him. Gibson v. Holden, 610.
CREDITORS' BILL. See EQUITY, 11. RECOEIR. REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3.
CRIMINAL LAW. See ACTION, 5. ATTORNEY. BILLS AND NOTES, I1, 12.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 22, 42, 43. ERRORS AND APPEALS, 2, 10. EXTRA-
DITION. HABEAS CORPUS. SALE, 13, 14. SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4. SUN-
DAY.
I. Generally.
1. On appeal erroneous ruling will not be reversed if accused was not injured
by it. Soann v. State, 474.
2. That A. employs B. in a legal business during the week does not of itself
make A. liable for B.'s illegal acts on Sunday. State v. Burk, 673.
3. In criminal as well as civil cases, the rule is that insanity should be
established by a preponderance of testimony, and not to the exclusion of all
reasonable doubt. Danjorth v. State, 141.
4. To be fugitive from justice within Act of Congress regulating extradition
it is not necessary that party charged should have left the state after indictment
found, or to avoid prosecution. Roberts v. Reilly, 209.
5. The reasonable doubt the jury is permitted to entertain in criminal cases
must be as to the guilt of the accused on the whole evidence and not as to any
particular fact in the case. Davis v. The People, 142.
6. Statute making it misdemeanor to "commit an act injurious to the public
health or public morals, or the perversion or obstruction of public justice, or the
due administration of the law," is unconstitutional and void for uncertainty.
Ex parte Jackson, 209.
7. Before acts and declarations of felon can be put in evidence against alleged
accomplice, conspiracy must be proved to satisfaction of trial judge. Rowland
v. State, 209.
8. Acts and declarations of one accomplice, in absence of another, after deed
done and criminal enterprise ended, are not admissible in evidence against
latter. [d.
9. An act providing increased penalties for second and subsequent offences
of burglary, grand lareeny, robbery, forgery or counterfeiting, is not unconsti-
tutional either as visiting penalties disproportioned to the offences, or as placing
the defendant in jeopardy a second time for same offence. Kelly v. People.
397, and note.
10. Where such act provides that whenever any person convicted of either
said crimes shall thereafter be convicted of any one of'such crimes, he shall be liable
to such increased penalty, the second offence need not be identical crime for
which he was first convicted. Id.
1i. The fact that constitution of state has been disregarded in course of
judicial proceedings will not render judgment in which such proceedings termi-
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nate void, if error was not on jurisdictional point; nor can such judgment be
collaterally impeached. Kelly v. People, 397, ad note.
12. Conceding that trial by court of a criminal case, defendant having waived
a jury, is erroneous, yet such error not being jurisdictional will not make con-
viction void; and such conviction of one of offences enumerated in above cited
act will render a subsequent conviction of any of those offences a second con-
viction within the meaning of the act. Id.
13. Plea of guilty by principal offender, received and recorded, though sen-
tece is not pronounced, is in all essential respects equivalent to a verdict of
,guilty returned and entered on the minutes, and is such a conviction of princi-
pal as authorizes court to roceed with trial of an accessory. Groves Y. State,
543.
14. It is true, that before sentence, plea can be withdrawn and that verdict
can only be arrested or set aside for cause shown, whether a judgment has been
rendered on it or not. Still, so far as resorted to for showing guilt of principal
prima facie in order to bring on trial of accessory, they stand on same footing.
Id.
15. The constitutional provision that every person charged with an offence
shall have privilege of counsel, would amount to nothing if counsel for accused
were not allowed sufficient time to prepare his defence. Blackman v. State,
543.
16. Where crime charged was murder, committed early in September, and
court met on fourth Monday same mouth, bill of indictment was found on Tues-
day, and on Wednesday court assigned accused counsel and announced it would
take up case on Friday following, and counsel asked for continuance, as they
bad not had time to confer with prisoner and prepare his defence, he having
been brought from jail of anotter county late on Thursday evening before, the
continuance should have been granted. id.
17. There is no such inflexible rule of law as thatno person can be convicted
on testimony of accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence. It is for
jury t pass on credibility or accomplice as on that of every other witness.
Statements of accomplice should be received with caution, and court should so
advise jury, but if testimony carries conviction, and jury are satisfied of is
truth, they should give it same effect as that of witness not implicated in offence.
Bacon v. State, 543.
18. It is not error to charge that if witness sworn in case is an accomplice,
his testimony without more, cannot convict, hut if jury believe from evidence,
that witness was not an accomplice, then his evidence alone may convict; and
this would be true though he was charged in indictment with the crime, and his
own testimony alone showed he was not an accomplice, and though he was
present, if that presence was constrained, or he was enticed there by false claim
of defendant and another to the property and an anticipated lawsuit about it.
Bernhard v. State, 543.
II. Intoxicating Liquors.
19. Licensed dealer in spirituous liquors cannot escape penalty for unlawfully
selling to minor by proving that sale was made by his barkeeper, during his
absence, without his knowledge, and contrary to his instructions given in good
faith, and which were so undeistood by barkeeper. Carroll v. State, 74.
20. Under statute imposing fine for sale of liquor to minor, no conviction can
be had if accused made sale after exercise of proper caution and in honest
belief that purchaser was of lawful age. Kreamer v. State, 517, and note.
21. An indictment charging single sale'to one person only, for one price, of
a number of commodities, the unlawful sale of either one of which would, under
the statute, constitute a public offence, is not bad for duplicity. .7d.
I. Larceny.
22. It is error to instruct jury that the possession of stolen property soon after
theft is sufficient to convict, unless satisfactorily explained, and that an alibi
must be clearly and satisfactorily proved; if they have a reasonable doubt of
prisoner's guilt, they should acquit: Hoge v. People, 738.
.23. Defendant was indicted for larceny of gold watch. On trial, an expert
testified that the property stolen was not a gold watch, though known to the
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people as such, but was called by the trade a filled ease. All the witnesses
spoke of it as a gold watch, and it had every appearance of being such. ield,
that there was no variance between the allegation in the indictment and the
proof. Glover v. State, 673.
IV. Murder. See supra, 16.
24. Where there is no doubt that prisoner began encomter resulting in
death, previous threats of deceased are not admissible, there being no evidence
of intention at time of killing to execute the threats. Bond v. State, 345.
25. Nor is evidence of reputation of deceased as violent, quarrelsome and
dangerous man admissible when prisoner is assailant, without reasonable ground
to believe himself in danger of serious bodily harm. Id.
26. On trial for murder, evidence of what occurred at saloon half a square
from where homicide took place, four or five minutes before the killing, is ad-
missible, to show general conduct of prisoner immediately preceding the killing,
that he was armed and in frame of mind likely to result in mischief. -Kernan
v. State, 792.
27. What was said and done by others at same time and in company with
prisoner, was only a part of what he was directly connected with and necessary
to an intelligent appreciation of his actions. Id.
V. Wife Beating.
28. Where several witnesses testified to distinct beatings given the wife by
the husband, at no great intervals apart, but all within two years before the
indictment was found, no two of the witnesses testifying to the same cruel
treatment, it was error for the court to compel the state to elect one of these
transactions on which it would rely, and when the election was made, rule out
all the evidence in relation to the others. Member v. The State, 141.
CUSTOM. See AGENT, 7. CONTRACT, 20. INSURANCE, 12, 26.
DAMAGES. See ATTACHMENT, 14. CoMtON CAtRIER, 13. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 9, 48. CONTRACT, 8, 19. HIGHWAYS, &c.. 2. INJUNCTION, 2.
OFFICER, 2. PATENT, 2. RAIL.ROAD, 8. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. TRES-
PASS. UNITED STATES COURTS, 3, 4. WATERS AND tWATER-COURSES,
3-5.
1. When a bond in usual form for $500, was conditioned that the obligor
should never open and keep a barber shop within a certain town, the sum
named held to be a penalty and not liquidated damages. Burrill v. Daggett,
142.
2. Expenses of litigation do not fall under head of punitive damages, but
stand by themselves, and may be recovered whenever defendant has caused
plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense. Mloseby v. Sanders, 544.
3. Where cause of action is negligence of municipal corporation in improve-
ment of street, injury is complete, and siIl damages, present and prospective,
may be recovered ; a second action Will not lie for fresh damages resulting
from said improvement. City v. Voegler, 101, and note.
4. Semble : A temporary wrong might be done under such circumstances as
would make it reasonable to presume defendant would right the wrong before
recurrence of loss, and in such cases a second action might lie for fresh dam-
age. Id.
5. If lack of care and skill in devising plan of improvement is so great as
to constitute negligence, municipality is liable for errors of judgment. Id.
6. Punitive not recoverable where conductor, in obedience to rules ordered
purchaser of first class ticket to occupy car not so comfortable as one from which
he was removed, but used no force or insult in removing him. flobnes v. Rail-
road Co., 474.
7. Where plaintiff is aware of certain rules of railroad company, and takes
passage to violate these rules and bring suit, his declarations to this effect are
admissible in mitigation of damages. Id.
8. in action of lessee of mill, against lessor, for diversion of water, depriv-
ing plaintiff otr demised water-power, evidence of profits made is admissible on
question of damages, loss of profits being a consequence parties could rea-
sonably have anticipated. Crawford v. Parsons, 406.
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9. In determining value of lands taken for public purposes, their market
value is the thing to consider. Compensation to owner is to be estimated by
uses for which the lands are suitable, having regard to existing wants of com-
munity, or such as may be reasonably expected in immediate future. Low v.
Railroad, 474.
10. Measure of, for breach of contract of sale of personal property, is dif-
ference between market price at place of delivery, and contract price. Equit-
able Co. v. Balt. Co., 739.
11. If there is no regular market price at place of delivery, and goods are
costly and difficult of transportation from a distance, and are to be used for
manufacturing purposes, then market price may be arrived at, by deducting cost
of manufacturing and price of raw material, from market price of manufac-
tured article. Id.
DEATH. See CONTRACT, 10.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See EQUITY, 11, 12. EviDENOE, 21. FRAUD,
1. GUARANTY, 1. MORTGAGE, 16. SALE, 11, 12.
1. Retention of personal property by vendor after sale, is prima facie evi-
dence of fraud, explainable by showing that the retention is inconsistent with
the deed, or unavoidable or temporary, or for reasonable convenience of ven-
dee. Holliday v. McKinne, 345.
2. Creditors of intestate can question his fraudulent transactions by proper
proceedings in the courts. Id.
3. Better rule is not to permit representative of estate to question such trans-
actions for benefit of creditors. Id.
4. Vendee who takes possession sbbsequent to sale, but before rights of
creditors have accrued by attachment or otherwise, can hold property against
creditors. Gilbert v. Decker, 739.
5. Fresumption of fraud from retention of possession, is only raised in favor
of attaching creditors or those who stand in their position, and does not exist
in case of sale of property exempt from execution. Id.
6. It was shown that A. owed B. a debt which he had given a mortgage to
secure; that B. purchased other notes of his without his knowledge : and that
he had scat B. cotton to be credited on his indebtedness. Held, that A. mani-
festly intended to pay the mortgage debt, and that payment should have been so
applied. Holle.y v. Hardeman, 544.
7. When one purchases goods, being insolvent and not intending to pay for
them, and conceals his insolvency and his intention npt to pay, he is guilty of a
fraud, which entitles the vendor if no innocent third party has acquired an
interest in them, to disaffirm the contract and recover the goods. Johnson v.
O'Donnell, 142.
8. Where a bill in equity showed goods so purchased to have been fraudu-
lently transferred to other parties also made defendants, it was held that the sub-
ject-matter being the goods, in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, courts of
equity would have jurisdiction, there being no objection of multifariousness or
misjoinder of defendants. Id.
9. A debtor for the purpose of defeating his creditors, conveyed his property
to his son with understanding that it should be reconveyed to him when
requested, and if reconveyance was not demanded then that son should provide
for him during his life, and have property at his death. Held, that the convey-
ance was merely colorable, that a secret trust existed for the grantor, and there-
fore, the sale was void both as to precedent and subsequent creditors. Gordon
v. Reynolds, 142.
10. A. being indebted, conveyed his land, and afterwards judgments were
obtained against him on this antecedent indebtedness. B.. with notice of
conveyances, advanced a sum sufficient to pay off these judgments, which
were then assigned to him, and as further security, A. gave B. bond with higer
rate of interest, and mortgage of land embraced in said conveyances. In action
by B. against A. and his grantees to foreclose mortgage, Held, that the con-
veyances were not a fraud upon any rights which B. was seeking to enforce ;
and, therefore, whether A. owed any other debts at the time he made convey-
ances was irrelevant in this action. Carrigan v. Byrd, 209.
INDEX.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See CONFLIOT OF LAws, 5. DEBTOR AND CRED-
ITOR, 3. ERRORS AND APPEALS, 7. INFANT, i.
1. Debt due by decedent as surety on county treasurers' bond, is a "debt
due to the public," and as such entitled to priority. 3axter v. Baxter, 210.
2. Executors' verbal statements to creditor of estate, that his claim was all
right, and that they would pay it as soon as they had money enough, will not
excuse creditor's neglect to present claim to them formally within time limited
by order of court ; nor will allegation that they have wasted the estate, unsup-
ported by statement of facts, render them personally liable to creditors of estate.
Lewis v. Champion, 209.
3. In a proceeding by an administrator for leave to sell land to pay debts the
court, exercising a mere statutory authority, has no jurisdiction to determine
conflicting titles to the land. It may determine all questions relating to the sale,
but in respect to land can only find that decedent had a claim to same, and pur-
chaser will take subject to adverse claims of title and must establish his right to
possession by action in court of law where legal titles are cognisable. Rarding
v. Le Aloyne, 148.
4. If in such proceeding paramount owner of land is made defendant, he
should assert his rights to prevent an estoppel in pais, even though an issue to
determine same could not be entertained. Id.
DECEIT.
1. Plaintiff alleged in complaint that as sub-contractor in construction of build-
ing for defendant he had inchoate lien for his claim and was about to perfect
it, when defendant, to prevent his doing so, falsely represented to him that she
had paid original contractor in full, and that plaintiff, believing the representa-
tion, did not perfect his lien ; claiming damages for false representation. Held,
on demurrer to complaint that it presented good cause of action. Alexander v.
Church, 739.
2. And held not to affect case, that it did not appear that original contractor
was irresponsible, nor that demand had been made on him. Id.
DEED. See AmEPNIDENT, 4. EQUITY, 4. EVIDiNCE, 3. FRAUD, 1. Hus-
BAND AND WIFE, 13. MORTGAGE, 23.
1. Maker may prove there was no acknowledgment of deed, but if acknow-
ledged, officer's certificate is conclusive of terms. Petty v. Grisard, 210.
2. There cannot be a delivery of a deed to the grantee in escrow. Such
delivery makes the deed an absolute one to the grantee. Stevenson v. Cropwell,
143.
3. Conveyance of land after delivery is binding on grantors without any
acknowledgment. The purpose of acknowledgment is to prove execution of
deed, and when this is otherwise proved, it is as binding as if properly acknow-
ledged. Robinson v. Robinson, 673.
4..A "reservation " is something newly created or reserved out of the thing
granted; an exception is part of the thing granted. Elliott v. Small, 714, and
note.
5. Warranty deed conveyed paralleloiram of land "containing five acres,"
but "reserving from said grant a strip, thirty-three feet wide on the south side
of said tract, for a public street." Held, that fee to strip thirty-threo feet wide
was in grantee ; and that if it was either an exception or reservation, it was
the latter. Id.
6. A deed conveying to the grantee his heirs and assigns forever, the right
of having and repairing a dam on certain premises, with the right to so much
of premises as may be necessary on which to build and maintain the dam, con-
veys a fee in the land upon which the dam stands. Inhabitants S&rsnwnt v.
Plimpton, 143.
7. Assignee for benefit of creditors is not bona fide purchaser for value so as
to make assignor's deed to him have precedence over deed of real estate from
assignor to purchaser for valuable consideration, which was delivered before,
but not recorded until after assignment deed ; even though the creditors have
executed a general release of all claims against debtor, in consideration of as-
signment. Tyler v. Abergh, 739.




real estate in question, this would have constituted assignee or creditors bona
fide purchasers within the meaning of Maryland code, Quare? Tyler v.
Abergh, 739.
9. One who has accepted specific property in payment of specific debt, is
within the act. .d.
10. General deed of premises lying upon bank of river, in which is con-
structed a canal, conveys grantor's rights to centre of stream. Day v. P. Y..-
C. Rd., 740.
11. Where the canal company had right only to use for canal purposes, bed
and waters of such river, on ouster of such company from its corporate fran-
chises, and its dissolution by order of court, the trustees winding up its affairs
have no power to convey such rights, but they revert to the proper owners. Id.
DELIVERY. See CONTRACT, IR. GIFT, 3, 4.
DEMURRER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 41. EQUITY, 2. F auDs, STAT-
UTE OF, 8. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3. MANDAMUS, 4. NEGLIGENCE, 17.
DESCENT. See CONFLICT OF LIws, 5, 9.
DEVISE. See WILL, 3, 6, 8.
DIVIDENDS. See ATTAC ENT, 5. CORPORATION, 33.
DIVORCE. See Husn D Aim WIFE, I.
DOMICILE. See CONFLICT OF LAws, 5, 6. * ExEcuTos "D ADMINISTRATORS,
1. UNITED STATES COURTS, 1.
When a home of a person is once established in a town, it requires less proof
to show continuance there, than would be necessary to show both establishment
and continuance. Bodily presence at all times is not necessary to show con-
tinuance. The departure of a minor daughter from home for temporary em-
ployment, leaving behind articles not required for immediate use, even though
she receives the wages 6f her labor for her own use, is not sufficient to raise
presumption of emancipation, and these facts together with expression of an
intention to return and actual returning to visit, to repair wardrobe, and on
account of sickness, are sufficient evidence of continuance of domicile. inhab-
itants Searmont T. Inhabitants T7orndike, 143.
DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS. See CONFLICT OF Lws, 1. GIFT, 1,2,3.
DOWER.
When widow is entitled to dower in land which has been divided by parti-
tion between several persons, she may bring a separate suit against the owner
of each portion. Perhaps she may proceed against all in one suit, but she is
not compelled to do so. Coburn v. Harrington, 144.
EASEMENT. See CONTRACT, 11. DEED, 6. EJECTMENT. HIGHWAYS, .
LICENSE, 2, 3. WATERS AND WATER-COURsES, 6-9.
EJECTMENT. See HusBND AND WIFE, 14. MORTGAGE, 22. REMoVAL Os
CAUSES, 8.
Certain persons were permitted to build a public hall as a second story of new
school house, and an agent authorized by the district leased that second story
to the builders of it, with necessary easements of ingress and egress, and with
equitable provisions as to use and repair of the building, &c., "so long as the
building shall stand." The building was occupied in accordance with the
agreement, for nearly thirty years, when the district voted "to sell the school
house and lot under" the hall, and by deed their agent conveyed all their inter-
est in the lot and building thereon. In a real action by the grantee against the
occupants of the ball, the court, after discussing the nature of the titles, held,
that defendants, having disclaimed all but the hall with its easements, and being
m possession of that, have a color of title, and plaintiff bad failed to show a
.etter one. Peaks v. Belthen, 144;
ELECTION. See WILL, 12.
ELECTIONS. See CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW, 2, 18.
INDEX.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, III. DAMAGES, 9.
EQUITY. See ACTION, 1, 2. AGENT, 12. AMENDMENT, 1-6. AnnITRATION,
1, 2. ASSIGNMNENT, 1-6. CoRPoRATIoN, 1, 6, 33. COVENANT, I. COSTS, 2.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 9. ERRORS AND APPEALS, 1. EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS, 2. GIFT, 4. INJUNCTION, 3, 6. INSURANCE, 18, 24.
LICENSE, 2, 3. LIEN, 1, 2. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 10. Lis PENDENS.
MORTGAGE, 9, 10, 24. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 11-13. rARTITION, 2.
PARTNERSHIP, 10, 11. PUBLIC POLICY, 3. RECEIVER, 7. TAX AND TAX-
ATION, 6. TRADE-MARK, 3. USuRY, 7.
1. Answer upon oath to bill in equity that does not call for answer upon oath,
does not operate as evidence of facts stated therein. Clay v. Towle, 544.
2. Lord Bacon's ordinance, declaring that all suits under the value of 101.
shall be dismissed, is in force in New Jersey; and defendant may make the ob-
jection, either by demurrer or by motion on notice. Allen v. Demarest, 611.
3. Oral agreement by dircctors to indemnify one of their number who en-
dorses promissory note for benefit of the corporation, is not within Statute of
Frauds and remedy thereon at law is adequate. Cortelyon v. Hoagland, 210.
4. Stipulation in deed of lot in grounds of Camp. Meeting Association, pro-
hibiting erection or use of buildings for stores, boarding-houses, hotels, or sta-
bles thereon, without consent of association, is enforcible by injunction. l in-
nipesaukee v. Gordon, 475.
5. Equity to have the securities embraced in trust for benefit of creditors of
different classes, marshalled and appropriated in exoneration of liens of less
preferred class, is an equity against the debtor, and not against the doubly
secured creditor. Pope v. Harris, 346.
6. Right of debtor to homestead is superior to that of all creditors except so
far as it may be impaired by voluntary act of claimant. Id.
7. Debtor understandingly and deliberately conveying property to hinder or
defraud creditors cannot recover it. Nichols v. McCarthy, 740.
8. But whether party guilty of independent fraud in receiving or retaining
property upon such conveyance should be allowed to avail himself of fact that
conveyance to him was made to defraud creditors, as defence against suit to re-
cover property back, qumre; court inclined to opinion that such qualification of
rule would be reasonable. Id.
9. Where court of equity attempts to act directly upon property, whether real
or personal, it is, in absence of statutory regulation, essential that said pro-
perty be within territorial jurisdiction of court. Johnson v. Gibson, 673.
10. But where one claims property situate in foreign jurisdiction, which int
good conscience belongs to another, the latter may sue him in equity wherever
he may be found and compel a conveyance. In such case decree operates on
person of defendant. Id.
11. Creditor may maintain bill to set aside fraudulent conveyance of his
debtor wherever debtor and fraudulent vendee may be found. In such case
court does not act upon land itself, but simply declares conveyance void, and
removes same as an obstruction to credit6r's legal remedy. Id.
12. Where debtor conveys all his property in distinct parcels to separate par-
ties and dies, creditors' bill to set aside said conveyances for fraud may inelude
all the grantees. In determining whether bill is multifarious much is left to
discretion of court. Brian v. Thomas, 74.
13. Where several respondents, acting independently, deposited refuse mate-
rial, &., arising from operation of their mills into same stream, where it com-
mingled into one indistinguishable mass before reaching complainant's premises;
held, that all the respondents may be joined in same bill to restrain the nui-
sance. Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence, 75.
14. A receiver filed a bill in his own name to foreclose a mortgage made to
A. in trust for B. It not appearing by the recitals of the bill that the decree
appointing the receiver transferred to him the legal title which A., as trustee,
had in the mortgage: Held, that A. was a necessary party to the bill. Tyson
v. Applegate, 144.
15. Further recitals in the bill justified the conclusion that the decree divested
B. of her interest in the mortgage, and vested that interest in three persons
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named in the bill: Held, that these three were necessary parties to the bill, but
that B. was not. Tyson v. Applegate, 144.
16. The rule that cestui que trustent, as well as trustee, should be made par-
ties to bill to foreclose mortgage is to be observed where the former are known
and not so numerous as to render such practice highly inconvenient. Ad.
17. It is not essential to enforcement of contract for sale of lands that it
should be signed by complainant as well as by defendant. Carakadden v. Ken-
nedy, 145.
18. A contract induced by fraudulent representations would not be enforced
in equity, even though parties did not intend to make representations part of
contract. Id.
19. If tender of purchase-money is refused by party on ground that be is not
bound to convey, the propriety of tender cannot afterwards be objected to
because there was a misdescription of land in deed which he was requested to
execute at time of tender. Id.
20. Oral evidence is not competent to establish agreement to change descrip-
tion of land previously bargained for by a written contract signed by vendor.
Id.
21. Where release to railroad company for injuries received is brought about
by fraud, or where there has been no aggregatio mentfum, or where unconscion-
able advantage has been gained by mere mistake or misapprehension, and
where there is no gross negligence on part of plaintiff, equity will interfere, in
its discretion, to prevent intolerable injustice. Blair v. C. A. Rd., 611.
22. Chancery will not reform promissory note payable in futuro, with ten per
cent. interest from date, by adding words "until paid," though parties intended
it to bear that interest after as well as before maturity, if they omitted the
woids only because they thought them unnecessary. A contract written as
parties intended it to be written, cannot be reformed for their mistake of its
legal effect. Rector v. Collins, 544.
23. Assignee of void security, issued in lieu of valid one, is, in equity, sub-
rogated to all rights of his assignor (the holder), in original security, and is
entitled to have it delivered up to him, and if imperfect, to have it reformed by
party that executed it, or his successor in office. GoldsmitA v. Stewart, 2 10.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See CixiT.N LAw, 1, 7, 18. IIANT, 2, 3. PRO-
IITION.
I. No appeal lies from an order of court of equity dismissing petition for re-
hearing. Zimmer v. Miller, 347.
2. Supreme Court of United States has jurisdiction to review judgment of
state court, denying that defendant is entitled to immunity from second trial for
same offence, by reason of Art. V. of Amendments Constitution United States.
Bohanan v. Womska, 544.
3. Upon motion to dismiss, this court cannot consider merits of question on
which its jurisdiction depends, unless there is also a motion to affirm. .d.
4. Supreme Court of United States cannot review weight of evidence, and
can look into it only to see whether there was error in not directing verdict for
plaintiff on question of variance, or because there was no evidence to sustain the
verdict. Lancaster v. Collins, 75.
5. Decision as to which party shall make closing argument is not reviewable.
.d.
6. Mntion filed April 26th 1886, to reinstate case docketed August 1Ith 1883,
submitted January 7th 1886, and dismissed for want of jurisdiction January
19th 1886, was denied, because court was not. willing, at so late a day, to re-
ceive and consider affidavits to supply defect'in record. Johnson v. Wilkins,
475.
7. Where suit is brought against heirs to enforce their liability for payment
of note on which ancestor was befind, and they plead neither counter-claim nor
set-off, and ask no affirmative relief, and separate judgments are rendered
against each for his proportionate shai-e, the Supreme Court of United States
has jurisdiction in error only over those judgments which exceed $5000. Hen-
derson v. Wadsworth, 75.
8. Defendant in execution delivered to sheriff sufficient moneyto satisfy it on
INDEX.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
his agreeing to return it if supersedeas was obtained by certain day, but, if not,
to apply it to satisfy execution. No supersedeas having been obtained within
time stated, sheriff paid over money in satisfhetion of execution. H'eld, that
defendant did not waive his right to prosecute writ of error to judgment on
which execution was issued. Burrows v. Miller, 674.
9. In suit to collect interest due on certain bonds of - ,ailroad by foreclosure
of mortgage made to secure series of bonds aggregating $500,000, the bill was
dismissed. Suit was brought by two complainants for themselves, and all
others in like situation who might join, but no one did so. The principal of
complainants' bonds exceeded $5000, but the interest, which suit was brought
to recover, was less. LHeld, that matter in dispute was less than jurisdictional
limit of Supreme Court United States. Bruce v. Railroad, 406.
10. Writs of error were brought to Supreme Court of Utah, to review judg-
ments affirming judgments of District 'Court of Utah, rendered on convictions
on indictments under sect. 3 of Act of Congress of March 22, 1882, for cohab-
iting with more than one woman. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of United
States was endeavored to be sustained under sect. 2 of Act of March 3, 1885,
giving jurisdiction, on appeal or writ of error in any case "in which is drawn
in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under,
the United States." Held, that all that was drawn in question was whether or
not there was error in administration of the statute, and the writs were dis-
missed. Snow v. United States, 475.
ESTOPPEL. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5, 17. INsURANCE, 31. MORTGAGE,
27. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 22. PARTITION, 1. REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 4.
EVIDENCE. See ATTORNEY. BANE, 20, 22. BILLS AND NOTES, 1, 8, 14, 19.
COMMON CARRIER, 8. CONTRACT, 21, 23. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 24, 41,
48. CRIMINAL LAw, 7, 8, 17, 18, 24-27. DAMAGES, 7, 8. ERRoRS AND
APPEALS, 4. EQUITY, 1, 20. FORMER RECOVERY. HUSBAND AND WIFE,
5, 6. INSURANCE, 8, 25, 33. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 1, 2. LUNATIC,
3, 4. MASTER AND SERVANT, 14, 15. MORTGAGE, 13. NEGLIGENCE, 5,
13. NOTICE. PARTNERSHIP, 4. PLEADING, 3. RAILROAD, 10-12. TELE-
GRAPH, 2. TRIAL. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 8, 10-12. USURy, 9. WILL,
1, 16-21, 27, 28. WITNESS.
1. Rule that communications between doctor and patient are confidential and
inadmissible may be waived by patient. Blair v. C. 4- A. Rd., 611.
2. Where records have been burned or destroyed, the entries in court minute
books are admissible to establish regularity of proceedings. Hare v. Holloman,
346.
3. Where land has been sold under decree of court, and records have been
destroyed, the recitals in the deeds are evidence of regularity of proceedings. Id.
4. 'Where question is as to authority given by telegram, party sending it
should not, when sued, be permitted to testify what his intention was in sending
it. Meirhardt v. Mode, 
346.
5. Where telegrams do not contain entire contract, other parts may be proved
by verbal testimony, or by other writings, or by both. Id.
6. Privilege of witness not to criminate himself is personal, and he must claim
it under oath: neither party nor counsel can make the objection. Club v. State,
75.
7. Mere statement of witness on oath that he believes answer to question will
tend to criminate him, will not suffice, if court be satisfied that answer will have
no such effect. Id.
8. After witness has been sworn, protection may be claimed at any stage of
inquiry. Id.
9. Witness to refresh his recollection may refer to memoranda made by
himself or others, either originals or copies ; such memoranda are not evidence
to go to jury. Erie Go. v. Miller, 75.
10. In civil cases verdict of jury should he determined by mere preponder-
ance of evidence, even though conclusion imputes to defendant guilt of felony.
Mead v. FHust, d. 76.
11. Evidence of declaration of son of one of parties made in hearing of his
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father, who remained silent, was admitted against objection and jury instructed
that it was for them to determine what significance they would attach to it.
ield, no error. Johnson v. Day, 674.
12. Where a hypothetical case, covering the leading facts testified to, and
practically admitted, is stated to a witness 6hown to be an expert, his opinion
based on such hypothetical case, is proper evidence. Lotz v. S&ott, 281.
13. The contents of a public record maybe proved by the production of the
record itself, or by a copy duly certified by proper officer or by an examined
copy sworn td by an unofficial witness who made the examination. State v.
Ly.nde, 145.
14. Instructions by grantor to #attorney drawing deed are not ordinarily
privileged communications. If grantor had instructed attorney to make con-
veyance to grantee in trust, it would be competent for attorney to so testify.
Todd v. Munson, 741.
15. It is only where suit is upon cause of action, to which one party is dead,
that other party is excluded, to preserve mutuality. Horner v. Frazier, 741.
16. Where such contract only incidentally arises in another suit, on another
contract, and about something else, as matter of evidence, death of one party
does not close mouth of other. Id.
17. Party disappointed in his witness may, to refresh witness' recollection,
ask him if he has made contradictory statements, but cannot prove such state-
ments by other witnesses, unless the witness is one whom law obliges party to
to call. .Hildreth v. Aldrich, 346.
18. Where it is shown that evidence of indebtedness of party to decedent's
estate, has been suppressed or destroyed by debtor, or some one acting in his
interest, such indebtedness may be, established by testimony, which would
ordinarily be regarded as too indefinite. Love v. Dilley, 346.
19. Averments under oath in a pleading in an action at law, are competent
evidence in another suit against the party making them ; and the fact that they
are made on information, and belief goes only to their weight and not to their
admissibility. Pope v. Allis, 145.
20. In action to recover for injuries received by one driving on highway,
whose horse ran and bits attached to harness broke, and it became important to
determine what effect breaking of bits had on accident. Hdd, (1) that testi-
mony of witness was not admissible to prove that bits in a horse's mouth could be
broken by pulling on reins ; (2) or that witness had had bits broken in way
similar to that the plaintiff claimed his were broken. Carpenter v. Town of
Corinth, 674.
21. A receipt is only prima facie evidence of what it imports, and may be
explained or contradicted by party signing ; but a settlement and receipt in full
of an unliquidated demand, when made with full knowledge of all circum-
stances, is bar to subsequent action on the demand, although creditor accepts
amount paid under protest and threats of suit for balance claimed to be due.
Railroad v. Allen, 544.
22. Montana Statute provided: "All acts of the legislature declaring that
they should take effect from and after their passage, shall so take effect only at
the seat of government, and in other portions of the territory allowing fifteen
miles from the seat of government for each day." Held, where, by reason of
this statute, the question whether a certain law was in effect at a certain time
in a certain part of said territory, depended upon distance of that place from
seat of government, the distance was a fact of which the court was bound to
take judicial notice. Hoyt v. Russell, 406.
23. Where in suit brought by reprdsentatives of decedent, the testimony of
living defendant, concerning conversations had with decedent, is admitted with-
out objection, the court cannot afterwards strike it out, because its admission
is opposed to the statute. Testimony so admitted, can be struck out only when
its exclusion is demanded by som consideration of public policy. Rowland v.
Rowland, 145.
24. THE COXPTZNC'r, AS WITEiSSES, OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, 353,
417.
EXCEPTION. See DEED, 4, 5.
INDEX.
EXECUTION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 1. XEM rTION. IhUSBAND AND
WIFE, ii. PARTNERSHIP, 1, 2. OFFICE, 1, 2. RAILROAD, 7.
1. Court of county, to sheriff of which execution has been issued from
another county, has no jurisdiction of motion to quash levy upon lands in its
county, advertised for sale by the sheriff, proper forum bcing the county of the
judgment. Mellier v. Bartlett, 611.
2. Statutes of Rhode Island provide, that execution may issue against body
of defendant whenever it shall be made to appear to court, which rendered the
judgment that " defendant has been guilty of fraud * * * in the concealment,
detention or disposition of his property." Held, that such execution properly
issues where one owns a patent right which lie refuses to apply to paymcnt of
judgment against him, and that itmay issue without notice to defendant.
Petition of Keene, 674.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See COURT. DEBTOR AND
CREDITOR, 3. DECEDENT'S ESTATES, 2-4. GIFT, 2. INFANT, 1, 13.
INSURANCE, 8-10, 25. JUDGMENT, 2. LEGACY. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE
OF, 9-12. UsuRy, 2. WILL, 4, 5.
1. Non-residence does not, of itself, disqualify for office of administrator.
Ehlen v. Elen, 475.
2. Executor cannot file bill against his co-executor, to compel latter to pay
to him, certain claims alleged to be due from defendant to estate of decedent.
Tiitng v. WAiting, 281.
3. Where money is bequeathed to one for life, with remainder to another,
and executor has converted it to his own use, remainderman cannot sue on bond
of executor, during lifetime of tenant for life. State v. Brown, 281.
4. In such case, remainderman's remedy is to file bill in a court of equity, or
apply to Orphans' Court for order on executor to bring money into court to be
safely invested. Id.
5. Upon neglect of executor to comply with such order, Orphans' Court will
revoke his letters, and appoint administrator d. b. u. e. t. a., and direct him to
bring suit on testamentary bond of recusant executor. Id.
6. Where testator devises his estate among his children, equally, each child's
share to be charged with all advances made or to be made to him or her, ad-
ministrators c. t. a. have right, as against judgment ereditors of one of his
children, to impound so much of his share as may be necessary to pay judgment
recovered against such administrators on bond of such child on which testator
was surety. Stieff v. Collins, 741.
7. Mississippi Code of 1871, sect. 2173, by which any action to recover pro-
perty, because of invalidity of administrator's sale, by order of probate court,
must be brought within one year, "if such sale shall have been made in good
faith, and the purchase-money paid," does not apply to action by heir, to re-
cover land bid off by creditor for payment of his debt. In this case, no bond
was given as required by statute. Clay v. Fietd, 76.
8. Administrator d. b. n. is officially interested in his predecessor's bond, to
extent of unadministered assets, and may originate suit thereon, provided his
interest has been specifically ascertained ; otherwise he must have authority
from probate court to bring the action, and cannot rely on authorization given to
another. In either case he must allege such facts in writ, as will authorize him
to bring and maintain action. Waterman v. Dockray, 545.
EXEMPTION. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 5. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 11.
RAILROAD, 7. SURETY, 4. TAX AND TAXATION, 4.
1. Statute exempting debtor's necessary working tools, not exceeding in
value $200, covers only tools used in manual labor; does not coverlawyers' law
books. Petition of Ciurch, 346.
2. Debtor is entitled to have his personal property exemption ascertained up
to sale. State Y. Harper, 347.
3. Allotment of exemption may be corrected until execution is returned.
Id.
4. If property of debtor has been omitted by appraisers, they can correct
the allotment. Id.
5. That mortgage is unregistered will not subject to sale under execution,
property which would be exempt if there were no mortgages. Id.
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6. Members of insolvent firm are not entitled to exemptions allowed by law
out of partnership property after it has been seized to satisfy demands of firm
creditors. 1 ,ichardson v Adler, 545.
7. Right to exemption as head of family must exist at time creditor's lien
attaches. To become head of family after attachment is levied will not exempt
property from sale under judgment of condemnation. Id.
8. One partner, with assent of other, is entitled to have personal property
exemption out of partnership property before partnership debts are paid, al-
though he has'individual property sufficient to make up the exemption. &ate
v..Kenan, 475.
9. A general waiver of exemption of wages from the process of garnishment
extending indefinitely is void. Green v. Watson, 145.
10. Whether special waiver upon specific wages in certain employment and
for a certain time by specific orders on employers containing such specific waiver
is enforceable, not decided. Id.
EXPERT. See EviDENon, 12.
EXTRADITION. See CnMcaUnL LAw, 4.
1. It is immaterial whether warrant of governor of one state for arrest of
fugitive from another is based on original affidavit or copy thereof, when either
one presented to resident governor is certified to other governor as authentic.
Kurtz v. &ate, 345.
2. Fugitive from justice cannot on habeas corpus impeach validity of affidavit
on which extradition was founded, if it distinctly charge commission of crime.
Id.
FACTOR. See SET-OFF, 3.
FENCE. See CONSTITUTIONa.L L w, 9, 10. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 4.
NAGLIGENCE, 1, 16. TAx AND TAXATION, 8.
FIXTURES. See LANDLORD A TENANT, 1, 2.
1. Innocent parchaserof certain dwelling-houses, in which portable furnaces
had been placed so as to become part of realty, is not affected by agreement
between his grantor and vendor of furnaces, by terms of which latter was to
retain property in furnaces until paid fur. Stove Co. v. Way, 660, and note.
2. Portable furnaces placed in cellar of house on row of bricks, set in circle,
with pipes fastened to ceiling of cellar and connecting with registers, are annexed
to and become party of realty. Id.
FOREIGN ATTACHMENT. See ATTAOHExNT, 15.
FORMER RECOVERY. See CONTRACT, 15. DAxAGES, 3, 4.
Judgment of Supreme Court of New York city in favor of plaintiff is bar to
further prosecution of action in Maine between same parties, and for same
cause, although prior in commencement; such judgment may be pleaded spe-
cially or proved under general issue. Whiting v. Burger, 612.
FRAUD. See ACTION, 2. AGENT, 12. ARBITRATION. ASSIGNMENT, 7. BANE,
16. BILLS ARD NOTES, 13. CORPORATION, 2, 3, 30. DEBTOR AND CxnD-
ITOR, 1-3, 5, 7-9, 10. EQUITY, 7-8, 12. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 9-12.
OFFICERS, 6. SALE, 1, 6, 10. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 1.
1. In order to justify annulment of deed as void under statute of 13 Eliz.,
ch. 5,'because made with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, a fraudu-
lent intent must be proved. Manner of proof. Zimmer v. Miller, 347.
2. Where party effects exchange of real estate, situate in another state, with
person residing in this state, for property here, by false representations as to
quantity of his land, location thereof and improvements thereon, knowing them
to be false, an action on the case for fraud and deceit may be maintained by
party injured. Under these circumstances reliance on trith of statements is not
such negligence -As to preclude recovery for fraud practised ; though had pro-
perty been near enough to permit examination without inconvenience a different
rule might prevail. Ladd v. Pigott, 407.
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FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See EQUITY, 3. LIcEsE, 2, 3. TRUST AND
TRUSTEE, 9-13.
1. Agreement by third party, to accept for creditor his debtor's draft for
amount of debt, is same as promise to pay debt. Chapline v. Atkinson, 211.
2. Parol promise to pay another's debt is not within statute when it arises
upon new and original consideration between newly contracting parties. Id.
3. Description of the land in agreement for its sale is sufficient, if it so de-
scribes a particular piece or tract that it can be identified, located or found.
Lernte v. Clark, 741.
4. An express trust between the grantor and grantee of land that the grantee
is to hold the land in trust for the grantor is invalid, unless evidenced by some
writing signed by the grantee. Stevenson v. Crapned, 141.
'5. Where there is an express trust there cannot be an implied trust ; and in
case of a voluntary conveyance, no resulting trust can arise in favor of the
grantor. Id.
6. Where the moving consideration for the promise to pay money is the lia-
bility of a third person, the promise must be in writing; but if there is a new
consideration from promisee to promisor added, that makes it a new agreement
which is not within the Statute of Frauds. Power v. Rankin, 146.
7. So where holder of chattel mortgage relinquished and permitted property
on which it rested to be delivered by his debtor in consideration of promise of
third party in whose hands $1000 had been placed to pay it to him on delivery
of property, it was held that the verbal promise to pay was not within the
Statute of Frauds. Id.
8. It is not necessary in pleading to allege that promise was in writing.
Such a plea, in addition to general issue plea, is an argumentative answer to
declaration, asserting nothing not cognizable under general issue, and is there-
fore demurrable. Horner v. .Frazier, 741.
9. Where, as part of consideration of sale and transfer of a lease for ten
years of real estate, the assignee agreed "to assume the covenants and pay the
rent agreed in said lease" such contract is not a promise to answer for default
of' another within Statute of Frauds. Wolke v. Fleming, 282.
GARNISHMENT. See ATTACHMENT.
GIFT. See DONATiO CAUSA MORTIS.
1. Bills, bonds and promissory notes, and all other evidences -of debt,
although payable to order and not endorsed, may be given as donatdones causa
mortis, and donee may sue on them in his own name. Kiff v. Weaver, 476.
2. Assent of personal representative is not essential to validity of donatio
causa mortis. If needed to pay debts it may be recovered by representative,
but residuum goes to donee. Id.
3. Before his last sickness, G. had expressed a desire that his children should
have his notes (of which most of his property consisted) and his son should
have his farm. On the morning of the day of his death, and in the presence of
a daughter's husband, herself and sister, G. called the daughter and said to her
"my notes are in a little box on the bureau there, I want you to take them and
divide them equally among you children," ho told her to get the key, which she
got and tried in the box and gave to her husband for safe-keeping. Held, that
these facts do not show such a delivery as constitutes a valid gift causa mortis.
Gano v. Fisk, 76.
4. Father made assignment under seal (as gift, though expressed to be for
value), of certain shares of stock, certificates for which at the time had been
made out in name of assignor, but remained uncut in certificate book of cor-
poration. The assignment, which contained no power of attorney authorizing
transfer, was left by assignor with attorney of corporation, with whom also was
left book of certificates, with instruction that, upon obtaining assent of mortgagee
of cerporatiou, transfer should be made to daughter on books of company. No
transfer, however, was made in lifetime of father. Held, 1st. That assignment
was incomplete and could not be enforced in equity. 2d. That there was no
element of trust in the case. 3d. That if father had declared he held or would
hold the shares in trust for daughter, perhaps equity would enforce such trust,




1. Agreement by creditor to extend time of payment of debt guaranteed upon
debtor paying him sum of money due on another transaction, is Dot based on
good consideration and will not discharge guarantor. Solary v. J&utz, 545.
2. Appended to paper purporting to be bill for merchandise sold by A. to
B., was following instrument : "In consideration of seven and a half per cent.
I guarantee the above bill to the amount of two hundred dollars," signed by S.,
which had been written by A. and presented by him to S. for his signature at
conclusion of negotiation between them, signed by S. and returned to A. Held,
that this was a guarantee, and not an offer to guarantee, which would require
acceptance by beneficiary and notice thereof to guarantor. Id.
GUARDIAN AND WARD. See IFA-mT, 1-4. SUxTr, 1.
HABEAS CORPUS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 42.
1. A writ of habeas corpus is not removable from a state court into a Circuit
Court of the United States, under Act March 3, 1875, c. 137, sect. 2. Kurtz
v. Moffitt, 136.
2. Petition for, showed that petitioner was regularly brought before grand jury
as witness, that he refused to answer certain questions, and that court thereupon
fined him twenty-five dollars, and on refusal to pay same, ordered him to stand
committed to county jail until fine and costs should'be paid.' Held, that if court
erred in imposing fine, remedy was by appeal or writ of error, and not by writ
sought. If order had been simply a committal until petitioner answered ques-
tions, different question would be presented. Ex parts Smith, 742.
HEIR. See Acunow, 1.
HIGHWAYS; STREETS. See CoxROwTio, 4, 5. Munsrnkn ConwiowTiox,
1, 2, 9, 10, 21. NEGLIGEliOC, 18.
1. Owner of land in public way may lawfully plant shade trees within limits
of way, if public use is not thereby obstructed or endangered. Welman v.
Dickey, 545.
2. Trees so planted are a public benefit and highway surveyors who destroy
such trees without reason or necessity, are trespassers, and if act is wanton are
liable for exemplary damages. 1d.
3. Owner of city lots has no right to make subterranean passage from one to
another through underlying soil of public street, the fee. of which is not in him,
in order to mine and remove minerals, even though no injury may'result thereby
to the street as such. Zinc Co. v. City of La Salle, 797.
4. Public easement in public street is public and common right to use same
for passage of persons and property, and purposes incidental thereto. Newell
v. Railway Co., 431, and note.
5. Owner of soil of street has right to insist that street be used for legitimate
purposes and in proper manner ; but his power to question the authority for its
legitimate use by particular corporation, is limited. Id.
6. When street is being used for legitimate purposes, but objection is made to
mode of use, question is whether use objected is consistent with the common pub-
lic use; and is a question of law, the facts being ascertained. .d.
7. Doctrines applied in cae of use of street by railway company using steam-
as motor. Id.
8. Baltimore and Frederickstown Turnpike Road is entitled to charge and
collect toll for ten miles from person passing through the ninth gate on its road
westward from Baltimore city-toll for three miles east and seven west of gate
-whether lie actually starts from Frederick and stops at Middletown, which is
only five miles west of gate, or not; and person going east must pay for same
ten miles, and not simply for six miles between gates eight and nine. Turnpike
Road v. Routzshn, 798.
9. Bill for injunction filed by owners of large tract of land, stated that they had
laid it out into building lots, and had opened and dedicated streets thereon (which,
however, had never been accepted by public authorities), and bad filed map
thereof in county clerk's office ; that complainants had sold some of the lots, and
that present owners thereof had admitted easement in adjacent streets ; and
that complainants annually expended large sums of money for repairing all the
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streets and keeping them in order. Held, that complainants could not enjoin
hackmen from ordinarily using any of the streets, in carrying their passengers
to and from railroad station. Land Co. v. Cramer, 215.
HOMESTEAD. See EQUITY, 6. MINES AND MINING, 4.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. SeeAGE NT, 11. CORrORATION, 38. EViDENCE, 24.
LEADING ARTICLE, p. 692. INsURA2cE, 23. PnEsuMPTIoN, 1, 2. TRUST
AND TRUSTEE, 9-11.
I. Marriage, Divorce and Alimony.
1. Where alimony has been granted, in instalments, to divorced wife, and
she marries a man able to and who does support her, there is prima facie good
ground to reduce the alimony. Olney v. Watts, 77.
2. Husband and wife separated by mutual consent shortly after marriage and
lived apart for sixteen years, the husband allowing wife small sum for support,
when he discovered she was living in adultery. Held, that husband was not
entitled to divorce. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 97, and note.
3. A judgment ordered for defendant on an agreed statement of facts which
showed that mortgage in suit was given to secure payment of sum of
money by husband to his wife, under collusive agreement for obtaining divorce
in her favor, is not conclusive against rights of wife, after such divorce has been
decreed, to recover alimony from the husband. Cross v. Cross, 407.
4. Nor is adultery of the wife, both before and after such divorce, a legal bar to
the granting of alimony upon her petition subsequently brought. Id.
5. Paper found in possession of or produced by one of parties to alleged
marriage purporting to be marriage certificate, is admissible in civil cases other
than actions for seduction, without proof of its genuineness, or that it was given
by one acting in an official capacity. Inhabitants of Camden v. Inlzabitants of
Belgrade, 612.
6. In proof of disputed marriage in such actions, cohabitation, reputation,
the declarations of the parties, written or oral, and their conduct and all other
circumstances usually attending the marriage relation, are admissible; and
where there is shown to have been cohabitation for some years and children, it
is admissible to show what kind of family woman had previously belonged to
and what kind of home she had left. id.
7. Courts of other states have no authority to decree divorce between citizens
of Maine, and its courts are not bound by findings of courts of other states upon
jurisdictional question of residence of parties. Gregory v. Gregory, 612.
8. Adultery by libellant at any time before final decree constitutes perfect
bar to divorce, and if after answer filed, defendant may recriminate by supple-
mental answer. Fuller v. Fuller, 612.
9. A. and P. were married in West Virginia, at their domicile, where A.
retained his domicile, but P. went to Tennessee, where, in ex parte proceed-
ings, she obtained a divorce a vinculo from A., but, as there was no personal
service upon A., her application for alimony was dismissed without prejudice.
She then brought suit in Ohio for alimony alone, and to reach certain property
there belonging to A. ; she obtained service upon A., who also appeared and
filed pleadings, and on trial court found sufficient cause, and allowed her ali-
mony. Held, that course of proceedings was lawful. Woods v. Waddle, 742.
II. Separate Estate. See infra, 16.
10. Husband is not liable for separate property of wife received by him with
her knowledge and acquiescence, and without any express piowise to repay
her. Machine Co. v. Radcli, 77.
11. The statute prohibiting conveyances by the wife without joinder of her
husband of such real estate as has been conveyed to her by her husband, does
not exempt such real estate from attachment and levy by her creditors. Vergil
v. Stetson, 146.
III. Torts, Contracts, Conveyances, 4-c.
12. Funeral expenses of wife are to be paid by husband. Staple's Appeal, 77.
13. Private examination of wife before proper officer is indispensable requi-
site to conveyance of her real estate. Carn v. Haisley, 347.
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14. Plaintiff cannot avail himself of title acquired or which did not subsist
in him until after he commenced suit. Cam v. Haisley, 347.
15. The promise of a married woman, made when under common-law dis-
ability of coverture, does not furnish consideration upon which her promise to
pay the same debt, made after the disability is removed, can be sustained. Kent
v. Rand, 784.
16. Married woman was attached as garnishee before a magistrate. She
failed to appear, and judgment was rendered against her for debt, interest and
costs. Between time attachment was laid and judgment rendered, husband of
garnishee died. On bill filed to restrain execution, held, that, in absence of
clear proof of fraud or'urprise, unmixed with negligence or fault on her part,
she had no standing. Ahern v. -Rnk, 347.
17. A married woman, in Kansas, can sue in her own name for alienation
of husband's affections, &c. Meiwaffv. Mehrhoff, 194.
18. In such an action, a complaint alleging that defendants began systemati-
cally to poison and prejudice husband's mind by telling him false stories about
his wife, the plaintiff, and charging her with unwillingness and inability to do
housework, and by treating her with gross disrespect in his presence, and,
finally, by falsely and maliciously charging her, in his presence, with adultery,
is not sufficient, except as to allegation of charge of adultery, and as to that
it should be made more specific as to words, and time and place they were
spoken. Id.
INFANT. See Commow CARRIn, 9. CamiA, LAw, 19, 20. MASTER ASD
SaRAnT, 17. NEGLIGENCE, 16. PARENT AND CHILD.
I. Decree of probate court in settlement of administration account concludes
an infantwhose guardian has notice and is present. Simmans v. Goodell, 407.
2. If appeal is not taken, decree has same effect as judgment of court of
law. Id.
3. Errors in decree can be corrected only on appeal; errors in record of
decree may be corrected avy time. .d.
4. Where infant sold his claim against his guardian, for present consideration
and proinised to give receipt when he became of age, it is an executed con-
tract. State v. Rosseau, 476.
5. Executory contract of infant requires express confirmation or new promise
after coming of age ; but ratification of executed contract may be inferred, and
any acknowledgment of liability, or holding and treating property as his own,
will amount to such ratification. Id.
6. A., an infant, had parents living, but who did nothing for his support, he
being in almshouse, and sickly ; B. was told by A.'s father, that A. would, at
father's death, be worth $10,000, and was requested by father to care for A.,
and B. after satisfying himself of truth of these statements, and relying upon
credit of A.'s estate, removed A. from almshouse, and undertook and continued
maintenance of A., for number of years. Held, that A. was liable for the
necessaries furnished him. Trainer v. Trumbull, 695, and note.
INJUNCTION. See ARBITRATION, 1, 2. BANKRUPTOY, 6. COPYRIGHT, 3.
CORPORATION, 20-21. COSTS, 1. COVENANT, 3. EQUITY, 4, 13. HIGH-
wAYs, &c., 9. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 16. MORTGAGE, 15, 16. MUNICIPAL
ConponATioN, 13. PARTxERSHIp, 11. RAUaOAD, 5. TR.AIrm rK, 3.
WATERS AND WATER-COURsES, 2.
I. Will not issue to restrain libel calculated to injure property. Kidd v.
Smith, 730.
2. Under injunction bond, defendant is entitled to recover reasonable counsel
fees necessary to get rid of injunction, but not compensation for his time and
service, or for his mental strain and anxiety. Cook v. Chapman, 612.
3. A bill in equity and injunction is not proper remedy where municipal cor-
poration has been organized, even, though it is alleged that such organization was
illegal and not in conformity to law. McDonald v. Rehrer, 546.
.4. When franchise or office is usurped, injunction willnot lie to prevent such
usurpation, even though respondents have not entered on duties of their office.
The remedy is at law, by quo warranto to be invoked after entry into, or exer-
cise of authiority, by virtue of their election or appointment Id.
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5. Injunction undertaking was conditioned for payment of damages "If it
be finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted." On
motion on part of defendants, and because co-defendants bad not been served,
court dismissed action without prejudice and injunction was dissolved, and costs
paid by plaintiff. Held, that there was no breach of condition of undertaking.
Krug v. Bishop, 476.
6. Complainant's bill alleged that he was part owner of a pilot boat, duly
licensed, &c. ; that defendants had combined to destroy his business and pro-
perty, by divers publications and suits at law, impugning his right to use
his vessel as pilot boat. Bill also alleged that defendants had bound themselves
not to serve as branch pilots in certain district, with those outside the confeder-
tion, and that these acts would injure plaintiff's business. Hdd, that plaintiff
had full remedy at law. Francis v. Flynn, 546.
INNKEEPER.
1. Receiving piano in character of innkeeper, and as property of guest, is
entitled to lien for board and lodging, although piano is property of third per-
son. Cook v. Prentice, 700, and note.
2. W., keeper of gambling-house, closed his business at 2 A. M., and visited
an inn for purpose of depositing his money for safe keeping; he found inn in
charge of night clerk; inquired for and was told he could have lodgings for
the night; stated that lie did not desire to go to his room then, but wished to
leave some money with clerk, and would return in about half an hour. Clerk
said he would reserve a good room for him. He did not enter his name. It
was not upon any book of inn. No room was assigned to him. He left the
money with clerk, received check for it, and departed. He returned in about
three hours to have room assigned and retire. Clerk had absconded with money.
Reld, W. was not a guest at time of deposit with clerk, and innkeeper was not
liable. Arcade Rotel v. Wiatt, 211.
INSANITY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 3. LuItATIC. WILL, 16.
INSOLVENCY. See AsSIGNMENT, 6. CONFLICT Or LAWS, 7.
Insolvent law of Maryland does not operate to discharge contract with citi-
zen of another state. Glenn v. Clabaugh, 737.
INSURANCOE. See Coxeox CARRIern, 20, 21. CONTRACT, 18. JUDICIAL
SALE, 2.
I. Generally.
1. The surplus of earnings accumulated from operations of stock department
of insurance company, run upon stock and mutual principles, the business of
the two departments being entirely distinct and conducted separately, none of
the earnings of stock department being paid to holders of mutual policies, upon
winding up of stock department should be distributed among shareholders of
funds of that department. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 793.
11. Marine.
2. In ordinary marine policy insurance against fire does not cover case of
spontaneous combustion caused by inherent infirmity of goods insured. Ins.
Co. v. Adler, 793.
3. In marine insurance, if article is injured by reason of its own inherent
tendencies, and these tendencies are not called into activity by any perils in-
sured against, insurer is not liable. Ins. Co. v. Adler, 468.
4. Qutare, whether same rule applies in fire insurance. 1d.
5. Action may be maintained for pro rata premium under continuation clause
of marine policy, when vessel was at sea, at expiration of term of insurance,
though a previous action had been brought on premium note and judgment
therefor had been rendered. Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Rogers, 675.
6. In action for premium due on marine policy, which was in name of part
owner for benefit of whom it may concern, defendant presented evidence of
other insurance, which made an over insurance on his part of vessel, and
claimed to be liable, if at all, for only a ratable proportion of the premium.
Held, that if this proposition i, sound, burden is on defendant to show that pol-
icies were simultaneous and not intended to cover interests of other owners. Id.
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7. THE EFPEOT OP A RECENT DEcIsION ON THE LAW Or MARINE INsUR-
ANcE, 365.
I. Life ad Accident.
8. Where insurance company contracted'in writing to pay sum of money to
personal representative of insured, it cannot be shown by parol that children
were intended. Elliott v. Vhedbee, 348.
9. Where by-law of company allowed holder of policy to designate benefi-
ciaries by endorsement signed and witnessed, hed, that endorsement without
signing was insufficient. Id.
10. Where policy is 'payable to personal representative of deceased, his ad-
ministrator may maintain action for the money against next of kin who received
it; but if estate is solvent they can retain their distributive shares. fd.
11. Duty of insured to keep alive-his policy, assigned as collateral security
to insuring company, just as much as if it had been assigned to any third per-
son. Grant v. Ins. Co., 282.
12. Where company is in habit of notifying insured through its local agent
when premiums are due, it is bound to give notice before substituting another
mode; but insured must act with reasonable diligence and six months delay to
pay premium for want of notice is so unreasonable as to evidence purpose to
abandon policy. Id.
13. It seems that a certificate for the payment of a premium to one holding
a number next to that held by one who dies, and solely because he does die, is
in nature of a wager on life of one in whom party benefited has no interest, and
is therefore illegal. 2%e People v. Golden Rule, 146.
14. When policy is issued and accepted upon express condition that answers
and statements of application are warranted true in all respects, and if they are
otherwise policy is to be void, an innocent mis-statement in matters material
to the risk will render the policy void ab initio, though the premium paid may
be recovered. Ins. Co. v. Pyle, 212.
15. While powers of iisurance agent are prima fade co-extensive with bus-
iness entrusted to his care, yet company may limit authority of its agents and
thus bind all dealing with them with knowledge of limitation. Ins. Co. v.
K I/etcher, 407.
16. Application for policy contained provision that no statements or repre-
sentations made, or information given to person soliciting or taking application
for policy, should be binding on company or in any manner affect its rights unless
reduced to writing and presented at home office in the application. Bldd, that
such a stipulation is binding on the parties. id.
17. Where by-laws of mutual benefit association provide that upon death of
member benefit shall be paid to his direction, member may change beneficiary
by surrendering his certificate of membership and procuring new one payable
to person therein named. Barton v. Provident Association, 476.
18. Certificate of membership in mutual relief association may be reformed
after death of member by inserting name of beneficiary, when it appears that
secretary of association and assured both understood at time of application that
proposed name should be entered upon record without further direction. &cott
v. Provident Association, 477.
19. Where one whose judgment and will are overthrown by insanity takes
his life by hanging, his act is not "suicide," as that word is used in accident
policies, nor his injuries "self-inflicted," or his death " caused wholly or in part
by infirmity or disease," but byinjuries "effected through external, accidental
and violent means." Cjrandall v. Ace. Ins. Co. of N. A., 373, and note.
20. Where the last of several successive causes has produced an effect, the
law will not regard the cause of that cause. Id.
21. Where an application for insurance iliffers from the policy issued thereon,
It is not considered a part thereof; and admissions by insured in application as
to extent of insurance do not limit insurers liability. d.
,22. By terms of policy insurance money was payable to assured, his exec-
utors, &c., for sole use and benefit of his four children therein named. Held,
that insurance was payable not to children but to his legal representative, who
would thereupon become trustee for children ; and that company, before pay-
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ment to administrator, was not liable in trustee process at suit of creditor of one
of children. Stowe v. Phinney; 613.
23. Policy was isssued on husband's life in favor of wife, and she paid
the premiums until her death,. when by arrangement between company and
husband the policy was allowed to lapse, and new policy was issued in favor of
husband, of which old policy was part of consideration. Bed, on interpleader
between administrators of estates of husband and wife that insurance money should
be divided in proportion of premiums paid by their respective estates. Ins. Co.
v. Ealey, 613.
24. A mutual beneficial association gave a certificate of membership to a
member in sum of $5000, whereby it promised upon proof of his death, that an
assessment should be levied upon surviving members to the amount of the certifi-
cate which it would pay to his devisees or heirs. It was held, that a court of
chancery had jurisdiction of a bill brought by heirs of the deceased member to
enforce payment of the certificate, by compelling a specific performance of the
contract. Ben efit Association v. Sears, 147.
25. C. obtained certificate of life insurance from the United Order of the Golden
Cross which provided that sum insured should be paid H. at C.'s. death, which
was done. Reld, in action by C.'s executor against H. evidence was admissible
to prove defendant promised C. that, after deducting from insurance money
whatever C. owed him, he would pay balance to C.'s heirs. Hed, further,
that C.'s executor was proper party to bring suit on such promise. Catland's
Executors v. Hoyt, 793.
26. Where, by terms of contract of life insurance, beneficiary named in policy,
is entitled to participate in profits, a portion of which is to be applied each year
in reduction of premiums and it has been custom of company to give notice of
amount of premium and dividend and balance to be paid in cash, and company
neglects to give such notice, knowing residence of beneficiary, and by reason
thereof a premium is not paid at time specified in policy, company cannot set
up such failure to pay as defence to recovery on policy, though by its terms
same is forfeited on failure to pay premium on any of dates stipulated therein.
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 407.
27. In such case where company has uniformly sent notices to insured (hus-
band of beneficiary) and he has paid premiums, law will treat him in making
such payments as agent for wife; but where husband wrote company shortly
after notice sent, that he and wife had separafed and that she had commenced
proceedings against him for alimony and that he desired to have policy changed
and made payable to his estate, company is not justified in treating him as her
agent, either for purpose of surrendering policy or of receiving notice for her.
Id.
28. Where in such case company repudiates contract and by its course of
conduct clearly indicates that tender of premium after death of insured, if made
would not be accepted, a failure to make such tender will not bar recovery on
policy. Id.
IV. lire.
29. Whether agent used reasonable diligence in cancelling a policy after
being instructed so to do by company is a mixed question of law and fact; and
where it appears that agent could have notified insurer of company's refusal to
take the risk in half an hour and did not do so for several* days, it will not be
held that court before whom case was tried without a jury, erred in finding that
agent was negligent; and an offer by agent to show custom of insurance agent
to notify insured in such cases at their own convenience, and that they are
given from five to ten days to cancel a policy, is inadmissible. Ins. Co. v.
Frissell, 794.
30. In such case, the company having paid policy after proof of loss, may bring
action against agent for amount so paid, immediately after such payment although
the sixty days which it reserves as a time within which to pay the loss has not
expired. id. ,1
31. Plaintiff signed application written by an "insurance broker" in office
of defendant's agent. Defendant having returned application for further infor-
mation to its agent, he turned it over to the broker aforesaid, requesting him
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"to go and get reply." The broker, though correctly informed by the assured,
wrote false statement in application. This broker was not recognised as agent
by the company or its agent. Held, that the writing of the false statements, in
legal significance, was the act of the agent; that the knowledge of the broker
was the knowledge of the company, and it was estopped from claiming a for-
feiture ; that defendant could not avoid its responsibility by repudiating acts of
its agents, though done in part by a person employed by him. Mullin v. Ins.
Co., 675.
32. Plaintiff, in preparing proofs of loss, could properly employ his wife to
make inventory of household goods destroyed ; but when he made affidavit to
same, without scrutiny or knowing it was correct, and it contained false state-
ments, calculated and intended to work a fraud, he thereby made the fraud his
own. And it was error for the court, on request, to refuse to so charge the jury
and to put it on the theory of honest intention. Id.
33. A party applied to an insurance agent to procure insurance on certain
property, leaving him to select the company. He forwarded application to cer-
tain insurance brokers in Chictgo, who procured the policy in a company with
which they had considerable dealing, and sent same to insured through first-
named agents, whereupon he sent premium to Chicago agents, who failed to
pay over same to insurapce company. Policy contained usual clause that it
should not be binding until actual payment of premium. field, that liability
of insurance company depended upon whether Chicago agents were its agents,
and correspondence between them was proper evidence for purpose of showing
their previous relations and methods of business, and as tending to show that
the Chicago firm were, in fact, agents of the company and authorized to receive
payment of the premium. Sun Mut. -lis. Co. v. Saginaw Barrel Co., 147.
INTEREST. See MORTGAGE, 21. UsuRy.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITTIOxAX LAW, 3, 5, 11. CmRm-
NAL LAW, II. MUNICIAL CoPORATION, 16. STATUTE, 2.
A., duly licensed in Providence, sent liquors in bulk to B., in Hopkinton,
where no licenses were granted, with agreement that they should remains A.'s
property, but that B. might draw ten gallons at a time, as he wished, paying
therefor when drawn. Held, that A. was illegally keeping for sale and selling
liquor in Hopkinton. In re Liquors, 348.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY. See REcEivER, 7.
JUDGMENT. See BAiYKRUpTy, 5. CONSTITUTIOxA. L&w, 40, 41. CoR-
PORATION, 1. FORMER RECOVERY, 9. MORTGAGE, 1, 9. NoTICE, 1.
OFFICER, 5. RECEIVER, 5, 6.
1. When jurisdiction over a case, of court of limited jurisdiction, depends on
some fact whih can be decided without deciding case on its merits, the juris-
diction may be questioned and disproved collaterally, although the jurisdic-
tional fact is averred of record and has been on evidence actually found by
court. Bank v. Wilcox, 613.
2. 'When suit is brought against an administrator, and judgment rendered,
adding only after his name "1 administrator of estate of J. S. Adams," and
whole record shows that suit was based on claim against the deceased person,
court will, on motion, at subsequent term, permit the record to be amended so
as to show that defendant was sued, and judgment rendered against him as ad-
ministrator. Adams v. Requa, 348.
JUDICIAL SALE. See DECEDENTS' ESTATES, 3. EXECUToRs ANrD AxmnIIs-
TRAToRs, 6, 16. MORTGAGE, 19.
1. Where parties take possession of property purchased by them at sheriff's
sale, under circumstances that indpced court of equity from considerations of
public policy, to set sale aside, sale cannot be said to have been void, but rela-
tion of purchaser to execution creditor.is like that of trustee to cestui que trust.
Pdper Co. v. Langley,, 212.
2. Where quasi trustee has insured property of cestui que trust, for which,
being burned, he receives insurance money, he is accountable therefor, less pay-
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mests in affecting and collecting insurance. Paper Company v. Langley,
212.
3. The conditions of a judicial sale were that purchaser should pay ten per
cent. cash and balance by certain day ; that, on non-compliance with condi-
tions, property would be resold and first purchaser held liable for all loss incurred
thereby, but not to receive benefit of any advance. A. purchased a lot, paid
ten per cent. of his bid, and failed to pay remainder. The lot was resold for
a sum in excess of A.'s bid sufficient to pay interest thereon-and expense of
second sale. field, that A. was entitled to be repaid the ten per cent. The
Chancellor v. Gummere, 147.
JURISDICTION. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 9. CONSTITUTIONAL LIw, 46.
ERRORS AND APPEALS, 2, 9. JUDGMENT, 1. UNITED STATES COURTS,
2-5.
JUROR AND JURY. See WITNESS.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See ACTION, 3, 7. -COVENANT, 1. NEGLI-
GENCE, 1. REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 8.
1. Tenant may remove buildings erected by him for better enjoyment of
leasehold, during his rightful continuance in possession, if the removal can be
accomplished without permanent injury to freehold. iledderick v. Smith, 21,
and note.
2. If tenant takes new lease without reserving right to remove buildings
erected during previous term, he cannot remove same at expiration of new
term; otherwise in case of mere extension of old lease upon same terms. Id.
3. A. having rented his land for a certain portion of the crop to be raised
thereon, had no right to enter upon it, against the will of his tenant, even for
the purpose of gathering the crop which was in danger of perishing. The con-
tract was not a mere cropping agreement ; the title to the crop was in the ten-
ant, and the landlord had merely a lien thereon. Wadley v. Williams, 147.
LARCENY. See CRIMINAL LAw, III.
LEASE. See RAILROAD, 13.
LEGACY. See WILL, 3-5, 9-11
The entire personal estate of decedent ought tq be returnea in the inventory
to Orphans' Court ; but the title of a legatee to property specifically bequeathed
him does not depend on its being included in the inventory returned by execu-
tors, nor, necessarily, upon a decree of distribution by the Orphans' Court.
Matthews v. Turner, 282.
LIBEL. See SLANDER AND LiDEL.
LICENSE.
1. One who travels through country, carrying all necessary tools for putting
up lightning-rods, charging, so mueh forrods and so much for putting them up
(never having sold any without putting them up) and soliciting patronage from
house to house, is not bound to take out county license as pedlar, being rather
a skilled mechanic than pedlar in sense of the law. Ezelt v. Tharsher 546.
2. Where license is a power coupled with an interest of permanent character,
it is irrevocable ; and if interest be in land and contract by parol, court of
equity will hold contract binding, where licensee has incurred trouble and ex-
pense in carrying it out, notwithstanding Statute of Frauds. Meetze v. Rd.,
212.
3. Doctrine applied where railroad company, for certain privileges, was per-
mitted by parol to construct upon plaintiff's land a dam, canal and water-wheel,
for purpose of keeping its tank supplied with water. In such a case, upon
withdrawal of such privileze by railroad company, plaintiff could not sue for
use and occupation but only for tdamages for breach of special contract. d.
LIEN. See BANK, 14, 15. EXEMiPTION, 7. INNKEEPER, 1. MORTGAGE, 3.
VENDOR AND VENDEE, 3, 4.
1. As a general rule, the equitable lien of the grantor of real estate for the




favor of persons who merely stand as representatives of grantor. Hammond T.
Peyton, 390, and note.
2. The lieu itself is not in accordance with the policy of the law, and should
be restrained rather than fostered. Id.
IFE TENANT. See EXECUTORS AmD ADMINIsTEATORS, 3, 4. TnUST AND
TRUST=, 3.
1. A conveyance to husband and wife, without words of limitation, render,
them tenants by entireties ; but such an estate may be limited to a life estates
and words clearly expressing an intention to create an estate for their joint
lives, and providing that after the termination of such life estate, the land shall
be divided among the heirs of the husband and the heirs of the wife, creates a
life estate in the husband and wife. Haddock v. Gray, 266, and note.
2. Land was conveyed to husband and wife with provision that survi-
vor should hold the same until his or her death and after decease of hus-
band and wife it should be equally divided between the heirs of each. Held,
that the husband and wife were not tenants by entireties ; that they did not take
an estate in fee under rule in Shelley's Case, but the word "heirs," es-used
here, means "heirs apparent," and does not designate those who shall take an
indefinite succession. Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See AxmmsErN, 3. ConProaiTio, 2, 3.
CovEzAwT, 3. LEADING ARTICLE, p. 691.
1. Endorsement of payment on note barred by statute is to be regarded as an
entry in holder's interest. Con's Appeal, 77.
2. Where in such case, court below found that there was no evidence that
such payment was made by maker or with his knowledge: held, that court
above could not infer such payment from endorsement. .d.
3. Benefit of, may be had on general demurrer to petition, though special
demurrer is the better- practice. Se&ymour v. P. C. 6- St. L. Rd., 212.
4. Action against railroad company to recover damages for killing or injur-
ing domestic animal, killed or injured solely by neglect to fence road, as required
by law, is founded upon "a liability created by statute, other than forfeiture
or penalty" and is barred in six years. Id.
5. Acknowledgment of debt made to stranger and not intended to be com-
municated to creditor, will not remove bar of Statute of Limitations. Parker V.
Remington, 675.
6. Two breaches were made of a bail bond. The creditor, plaintiff, brought
an action of debt, alleging second breach. Held, that Statute of Limitations
against an action on bond began to run at time of first breach, whether creditor
knew of it or nor, there being no fraud or concealment to prevent creditor ob-
taining knowledge of breach. Pearce v. Curran, 676.
7. Where prinicipal and sureties gave their joint and several promissory note,
upon which, after maturity, the principal debtor made several payments, the
legal liability of all parties to note was disehaiged at expiration of six years from
its maturity, and thereafter action could be maintained only on the new pro-
mise implied from partial payments, credited in note. Walters v. Kraft,
408.
8. But as such subsequent promise constituted a new contract and a new cause
of action, no one is liable except him who made it ; the liability of sureties was
not continued by payments and promises of principal debtor, the relation of
agency not existing between them. Id.
9. Purchase of intestate's lands at administrator's sale by agent of adminis-
trator with his means, who takes deed in his own name, and conveys to wife
of administrator, is fraudulent, and though not void, the purchase and deeds
may be avoided by one interested in lands. cllcGauighey v. Brown, 546.
10. Courts of equity, in caseg of concurrent jurisdiction, consider themselves
bound by Statutes of Limitations which govern courts of law in like cases, and
this rather in obedience to statute than by analogy. Id.
11. Rule that Statute of Limitations will not bar a trust, applies only t,
express and positive trusts, and not to those where circumstances raise pn
sumption of extinguishment of trust, or where open denial of trust is broug'
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to knowledge of parties in interest, which requires them to act as on asserted
adverse title. -McGaughey v. Brown, 546.
12. The Statute of Limitations will commence against action for fraud of
administrator from time of his discharge by probate court. Id.
13. Where the Statute of Limitations was set up as a defence to a contractr
and the question was the constitutionality of an act removing the bar, passed
after it had become perfect, held, that it merely took away a purely arbitrary
defence to an action, which fell with the repeal of the law on which it depended,
and such a defence is not a right of property protected by 15th Amendment to
Constitution of United States. Campbell v. Holt, 148.
LIS PENDENS. See ATTACeItENT, 13. RECEIVER, 6.
To constitute, bill must be actually filed, having special reference to specific
property, and subpoena must also be served upon defendant. Sanders v. McDon-
ald, 77.
LUNATIC. See AGENT, 10.
1. Guardian of, may carry on ward's business. State v. Jones, 614.
2. Reasonable compensation only should be allowed for so doing, and the 5
per cent. rule should not always be adopted. Id.
3. Annual settlements and orders of approval made thereon by probate court
are competent evidence to show that business was carried on under supervision
of court, although there was no previous order. Id.
4. Such annual settlements are not conclusive, but subject to review at final
settlement. rd.
5. Sureties in second bond given by such guardian, are not liable for exces-
sive commissions retained by or allowed to such guardian in previous annual
settlements under first bond. Id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. In an action of malicious prosecution, the burden of proving malice and
absence of reasonable and probable cause is on plaintiff. J4brath v. Northeast-
era Railway, 757, and note.
2. Per Lord BRAMWELL: An action for malicious prosecution does not lie
against a corporation aggregate, such a corporation being incapable of malice
or motive. Id.
MANDAMUS. See CommoN CAIntiE, 16.
1. Allegations of return to alternative writ of mandamus, should be stated
positively, not upon information and belief. State v. County Comn., 349.
2. The rules requiring pleas to be sworn to, does not restrict defendant to
pleading matters of defence within his personal knowledge. Id.
3. Mandamus will not issue to enable person to effect illegal purpose. Id.
4. If alternative writ of mandamus shows pribna facie case, it is not demur-
rable. State v. Mayor of Jacksonville, 547.
5. Where writ alleges power in municipal body to levy taxes, and such
power is limited by statute to certain percentage on value of taxable property, it
is not necessary to allege in writ, that power has not been exhausted ; that is
matter of defence. Id.
6. Where levy of taxes is desired by judgment-creditor of municipality, for
payment of his claim, whose right is based on ordinary status of judgment-cred-
itor, and power of board of aldermen to make levy, a demand on proper officers
for levy to pay judgment, must be made before relief by mandamus can be
had. Id.
7. Where exercise of a discretion is involved, writ of mandamus will not be
allowed against an inferior court or tribunal. So discretion of probate court
as to time it will receive probate of will, or which of two papers purporting to
be wills of same person, shall be passed on first, will not be interfered with by
this writ. People v. Knickerbocker, 409.
8. R., resident of Michigan, filed petition in Delaware court, against S.,
president of D. Company, S. being resident of Delaware, and D. Company
being Connecticut corporation, doing business in Delaware. Petition asked for
mandamus to compel S. to allow R., who was stockholder of D. Company, to
INDEX.
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inspect and make copies of certain books and papers of D. Company, in pos-
session of S., and which R. desired for use in suit in Michigan, between R. and
third person. Held, that court had jurisdiction; that corporation was not
necessary party, and that mandamus should be granted. Sw/l v. State, 594.
MARRIAGE. See Huisam Awis WiPE, I. PEsum x iox, 1, 2.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See CRIMNa L LAw, 2. Imixxuzrx , 2. SLn'w-
DER AND LIBEL, 1.
1. City is not liable for injury to laborer employed in constructing a sewer,
when caused by negligence of one who had oversight and direction of -% ork.
Conley v. City, 676.
2. Where master delegates duties which law imposes on him to an agent, he
is liable for injury to employee, due to negligence of such agent, whatever Itis
rank. Copper v. Louisville, , y., 283.
3. A foreman, except when master's duties are delegated to him, is a fellow-
servant with those immediately under him, and master is not answerable to
them for his negligence. Id.
4. One engaged in repairing tunnels on railroad, who is injured while being
transported from one point to another on said road, is a'fellow-servant of the
engineer of train. Ad.
5. A locomotive engineer and a section-master of track-workers, are not fel-
low-servants in sense that the company employing them would not be liablo to
one for damages resulting to him from negligence of other. Calro v. Rd., 409.
6. Where engine is thrown from track and engineer injured, through negli-
gent violation of company's rules, by a section-master, the company is liable
to engineer, the section-master being a representative of company. Id.
7. It is duty of master who sets servant to work in place of danger, to give
him such notice and instruction as is reasonably required by youth or inexperi-
ence, or want of capacity, of servant ; and this duty is not confined to cases
where servant is man of manifest imbecility. Atkins v. Thread Co., 795.
8. To renddr master liable for injury to employee, caused by defective ma-
chinery furnished by former for latter's use, it must appear that master knew, or
by exercise of proper diligence, could have known of its unfitness, and that
servant did not know or could not reasonably be held to have known of defect.
Hall v. Hall, 547.
9. Where a master or his representative has expressly promised- to repair de-
fect, servant can recover for injury caused thereby within any period which
would not preclude rational expectation that promise might be kept, provided,
that danger which plaintiff apprehended from beginning was not so imminent
as to prevent a reasonably prudent man from risking it, uponu assurance by pro-
per authority that cause from which peril arose would be removed. Dist. Co-
lumbia v. McElligott, 409.
10. A roadmaster of a railroad company or conductor of a train are not so
far agents of company as to be legally authorized to employ physician to attend
employee injured by cars of company, unless they are specifically charged with
that duty ; but action of general manager ratifying such contract will render
corporation liable. Rd. v. Gray, 547.
I1. Plaintiff, while being driven in hired hack, was injured by its collision
with railroad train, the accident being due to concurrent negligence of hackman
and engineer, and sued railroad company. Held, that unless plaintiff exer-
cised some control over conduct of driver further than to indicate places to which
he wished him to drive, and required him to cross track at time injury occurred,
negligence of driver was not imputable to him. Little v. Hackett, 213.
12. Co-employees, within the meaning of rule exempting master from lia-
bility for injuries sustained by onp servant through negligence of another, are
those whose usual duties bring them into habitual consociation, so that they may
exercise a mutual influence upon each other promotive of proper caution. Roll-
idg Mill v. Johnson, 148.
13. Where there is no opportunity to take measures to avoid the negligent
acts of another without disobedience to the orders of an immediate superior,
the doctrine exempting the master can have no application. Id.
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14. Master is not bound to fence machine where it is not of peculiarly dan-
gerous character, and is not liable for personal injuries caused by machine to
employee, who was obliged to pass it in going to his work, to whom suitable
instructions bad been given, having reference to his age and capacity, so as to
enable him to understand dangers of employment in which be was engaged.
Neither is master liable for injuries because machine might have been placed in
less dangerous position. Evidence that a gate might have been placed in front
of machine is immaterial. Rock v. Indian Orchard Mills, 794.
15. Where there was evidence that plaintiff was playing about machineon which
he was injured, a statement in judge's charge that if jury found that to be a
fact, plaintiff" was guilty of contributory negligence, which would prevent him
from recovering, is not open to objection. Id.
16. It is not charging upon the facts for a judge to state in his charge that a
machine on which plaintiff was injured, was not a peculiarly dangerous one, the
fact being self apparent. d.
17. Where master employs, to work in dangerous place, servant who, from
youth, inexperience, or ignorance, is unable to appreciate the danger, it is duty
of master to explain same, and if, without such explanation, servant is set to
work and is injured, master is liable, even though danger would have been
apparent to person of capacity and knowledge, and immediate cause of injury
is negligence of co-employees. Jones v. Florence Co., 580, and note.
18. Semble. Duty of guarding against danger resulting from leaving loose
stones or ore in roof or sides of mine, is one which employer may reasonably
impose on miners themselves, but if neglect of it is brought to knowledge of
master, and he takes no steps to remove danger, he is liable to employee, who,
without contributory negligence, is injured thereby. .1d.
MERGER. See WATERS .Aim WATER-CoURSES, 9.
MINES AND MINING. See HIGHWAYS, &c., 3.
1. Revised Statutes, U. S., sect. 2322, gives owner of mineral vein or lode not
only all covered by surface lines of claim vertically extended, but also right to
follow that lode or vein when it passes outside those vertical lines laterally.
Mining Co. v. (Jkeesman, 283.
2. Acts of Congress use words vein, lode or ledge as embracing a more or
less continuous body of mineral lying within a well-defined boundary of other
rock in the mass within which it is found, or it may be said to be a body of
mineral or a mineral body of rock within defined boundaries in this general
mass. Id.
3. A vein is not necessarily straight or of uniform dip, thickness or richness
throughout its course; the cleft within which it is found may be narrowed or
widened and even closed for a few feet and then found further on, and the
mineral deposit may be diminished or even suspended for a short distance, but
if found again in the same course with the same mineral within that distance,
its identity may be presumed. Id.
4. No title from United States to land known at time of sale to be valuable
for its minerals of gold, silver, cinnabar or copper, can be obtained under the
pre-emption or homestead laws, or the town-site laws, or in any other way than
as by the laws especially authorizing the sale of such lands, except in the states
of Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri and Kansas. Deffebach v.
Huwke, 148.
5. It would seem that there may be an entry of a town site, even though
within its limits mineral lands are found, the entry and the patent being inop-
erative as to all lands known at the time to be valuable for their minerals, or
discovered to be such before their occupation and improvement for residence or
business, under the town-site title. Id.
MINOR. See Do3tIoILE. GUARDIAN AND WAD. INFANT. PARENT AND
CHILD.
MISTAKE. See AmENDMENT, 2.
MORTGAGE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 24. CoNFLiCT OF LAws, 5. CooRPOR-
'DEX.
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TION, 4. ])EsTOR Aim CmrDITOn, 10. EquiTy, 14-16. EzXswTioN, 5,
15. RzcavEa, 3. Usuax, 3.
I. Generally.
1. On bill to foreclose, decree was entered to pay within certain time and in
default of such payment, appointing master to sell and deposit proceeds in
registry of court. Held, that action of debt on judgment would not lie to
recover sum mentioned in decree. lurgess v. Souther, 615.
2. Foreclosure proceedings in equity are of nature of procedings in rem, and
do not ordinarily act in personam. Id.
3. As against bondholders who presented their coupons at office of company for
payment and not for sale, and who had right to assume that they were paid,
person who advances money to take them up, under undisclosed agreement with
company that coupons shall be delivered to him uncancelled as security for his
advances, is not entitled to equal priority of lien. Cameron v. Tome, 477.
4. Though usual,* it is not necessary that mortgage state amount of debt
secured or that it is evidenced by note or other instrument. If it contains
general description, sufficient to embrace liability intended to be secured and to
pnt person examining record on inquiry, and direct him to proper source for
information of amount of debt, it is sufficiently certain. Curtis v. Finn,
548.
5. Mortgage to secure agreement to support another during life is assignable
and condition may be performed by assignee unless support is required by mort-
gage to be furnished personally. Bank v. Holt, 676.
6. And if assigned, amount agreed upon in good faith between the assignee and
mortgagor to be paid for the support, is the sum to be paid by a subsequent
mortgagee in redemption and not what a master found was actual cost of sup-
porting, although agreement was made after second mortgage was given, the
subsequent mortgagee taking mortgage with knowledge that there was con-
troversy over what was to be paid on first mortgage. Id.
7. ITOcos Boiws Aim MORTGAGES, 553.
II. Of Chattels.
8. Foreclosure without sale is satisfaction only to amount of value of pro-
perty. Hazard v. Robinson, 614.
9. After such foreclosure the bringing suit by mortgagee and obtaining judg-
ment for whole debts presumptively waives foreclosure and leaves mortgage
subject to redemption in equity. Id.
10. A. mortgaged shares of stock by charter transferable by deed, and then
by deed assigned his property for benefit of creditors to B., who conveyed it by
deed to C. under same trusts. C. died. Hed, on bill to redeem, that C.'s
personal representative was necessary party to suit. id.
11. Instrument executed by partner, in firm name, and legally binding upon
partnership, and entitled to be recorded, may be admitted to record upon
acknowledgment by executing partner. McCoy v. Boley, 349. -
12. Mortgage duly recorded is not void between parties or as to third person,
whose claim is not based on valuable consideration, because it permits mort-
gagor to sell personal property covered by it without accounting to mortgagee
for proceeds. Id.
13. Sale or mortgage of crop to be planted, as well as one planted, and in
process of cultivation, is valid-provided place where crop is to be produced is
designated with sufficient certainty. It seems parol evidence is competent to
fit description to property. Rountree v. Britt, 350.
14. Mortgage conveying "my entire crop of every description "is too vague.
Id.
15. Mortgagor will be prevented by injunction from impairing or destroying
property embraced in mortgage.lien. Logan v. Slade, 743.
16. When merchant, on day after execution of mortgage on his stock of goods
in favor of some of his creditors, disposes of large amount of them to other
creditors, in payment of their debts, court can enjoin him from selling said
goods otherwise than for cash, and command him to pay proceeds, after deduct-
ing expenses of sale, into registry of court, and if remedy by injunction proves
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to be inetfctual, court may appoint receiver to take charge of goods, and dis-
pose of them under its direction. Logan v. Slade, 743.
III. Of Bealty.
17. Dated before, but recordied after deed to mortgagor, is notice to subse-
quent purchaser. Semen v. Terune, 461.
18. Mortgagor who pays bond after property has been sold under foreclosure
and proceeds of land have become primary fund for payment, is entitled to sub-
rogation. Id., and note.
19. Absence of one of the two trustees from foreclosure sale not sufficient,
of itself, to cause sale to be set aside, as against former owner of land. Smith
v. Black, 78.
20. Presumption of payment in favor of mortgagor in possession over twenty
years may be rebutted. Brown v. Jiardcastle, 78.
21. Where bond is given conditioned fbr payment of sum named, with one per
cent. interest thereon, by particular day, creditor is entitled to the legal interest
thereafter. Id.
22. Mortgage will not sustain recovery in action of ejeetment against holder
of legal title, nor will deed of conveyance made by master under decree in suit
to which person owning legal title at institution of suit was not party. Berlack
v. Halle, 548.
23. A deed absolute in form, intended, however, to secure payment of money
due from maker to grantee, and, upon payment of which, by certain time
grantee agreed to reconvey property to grantor, though in equity a mortgage
is not one at law ; therefore, to make it available against creditors of grantor
it need not be recorded as a mortgage, if it be recorded within time prescribed
for registration of deeds for conveyance or encumbrance of lands in Ohio.
Kemper v. Campbell, 409.
24. When surety on mortgage debt pays same to holder and receives note
and mortgage, without any assignment or discharge written thereon, he cannot
maintain bill in equity against owners of equity of redemption, praying that
mortgage " may be decreed to be still subsisting, that he may be subrogated to
the rights of the mortgagee therein, and may be empowered to foreclose the
same according to law." Lynn v. Bichardson, 795.
25. A. purchased real estate from B., subject to tne payment of a mortgage
thereon to 0. Held, that even though A. had expressly promised B. to pay the
mortgage debt, this would not, without the consent of C., convert B. from a
principal debtor to a surety ; and the relation of principal and surety not exist-
ing between A. and B., an extension of the time of payment of the mortgage
debt, granted by C. to A., would not discharge B. from his liability to C.
SShepherd v. May, 149.
26. Mortgage made by B. and wife to secure loan from A. would have been
valid, if sealed. C. attached B.'s interest in the realty, whereupon A. filed bill
against B., his wife and C., charging accident and mistake as cause of mortgage
not being sealed, actual notice of paper on C.'s part, and praying reformation
by sealing. C. demurred. Demurrer overruled. Bullock v. WMipp, 349.
27. A man cannot allow another to part with money, on faith of convey-
ance, and then taking advantage of defect known to himself, claim a title bet-
ter in equity by subsequent conveyance. Id.
28. By a well established general rule, the word "heirs," or other appro-
priate words of perpetuity, in a mortgage or deed, is essential to pass a fee
simple estate ; but where the language used in a mortgage, and the recitals and
conditions thereof, plainly evidence an intention to pass entire estate of mort-
gagor as security for the debt, and express provisions of the instrument cannot
otherwise be carried into effect, it will be construed to pass such estate though
no formal words of perpetuity are employed. Brown v. Bank of Hamilton, 400.
29. K. executed and delivered to T. three notes, payable to T.'s order, due
in one, two and three years, and a mortgage to secure their payment. Before
maturity of any of notes, T. endorsed them all, waiving demand and notice,
and delivered them to A. with assignment of mortgage. The first note due,
not being paid at maturity, was put in judgment against K. as maker, and T.
as endorser. K. being insolvent, T. paid the judgment. Subsequently T.
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commenced suit to foreclose mortgage, claiming benefit of that-security and a lien
prior to lien of A. who held remaining two notes, then past due. A., by an-
swer and cross petition, alleged facts showing T.'s liability as endorser on the
two notes,'that K. was insolvent, that land would prove insufficiett to satisfy
whole mortgage debt, claiming priority of lien, praying foreclosure and full
relief. Later S., on his motion, became plaintiff and filed supplemental peti-
tion, averring purchase from T. and assignmentof all his interest in mortgage and
suit, and claiming priority of lien. The land was sold and not enough realized
to pay whole indebtedness. feld, that A. was entitled to payment in full f'om
proceeds before application of money to claim of S. Anderson v. Sharp, 410.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 1, 18-21, 36-7.
CoSTS, I. DAMAGES, 3-5. HiGnwA-s, &C., 3-7. INJUNCTION, 3. MAN-
DAMUS, 5, 6. MASTER AND SERVANT, 1. NZEGIGENCZ, 3. OFFICER, 3-6.
STATUTE, 2. TAX AND TAXATION, 9, 10.
I. Generally.
1. It is duty of a city to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition, for
neglect of which it is liable. Bellamy v. City, 284.
2. If defect causing injury has existed for some time, the city is chargeable
with motice of it. If the city could have ascertained the defect, its failure to
do so is negligence, and a charge that the defect must be open and notorious is
error. ld.
3. In authorizing city counsel of Baltimore to 'settle their rules of proced-
ure," the legislature did not confer power to declare what number of membeis
6hold constitute a quorum. Heiskell v. The Mayor, 4c., 792.
4. In a municipal corporation, consisting of a definite number, in the absence
of any legislation on the subject, a majority of the members constitutes a quo-
rum. Id.
5. A mere majority of the members elected being present, the acts of city
council of Baltimore are valid, notwithstanding the existence of a rule adopted
by the council, that two-thirds of members elected shall be necessary to consti-
tute a quorum. Id.
6. A municipal corporation cannot, by a rule made by itself, increase or di-
minish its powers. [d.
7. Where duties delegated to officers elected by public corporations, are
political or governmental, the relation of principal and agent does not exist,
and the maxim respondeat superior does not govern. Summers v. Board, 284.
8. Counties are not liable for injuries caused by negligence of commissioners
in selection of unskilfnl physician for care of poor. Id.
9. Though city of Atlanta, Ga., by its charter, has right to establish a Sys-
tem of grading and drainage, yet the work must be done so as not to prove a
nuisance to citizens, or municipality will be liable for damages. Smith v. City
,of Atlanta, 283.
10. If a sewer becomes a nuisance, and thecity, having alone power to abate
it, fails to do so, it may be said to keep it up, and thereby becomes liable as for
maintenance of a continuing nuisance. Id.
11. If bill in chancery be brought in name of town without authority of
electors given at town meeting, court may dismiss same on motion of defend-
ants or on its own motion. Kankakee v. Kankakee Rd., 615.
12. Under Illinois system of township organization there is no officer or
board representing corporate authority of town ; the electors through town
meetings alone do so. Id.
13. It is probable that in extreme cases of threatened invasion or destruction
of property rights of town, any taxpayer may prevent such wrong by injunc-
tion. 11.
14. The fact that city has already exhausted its constitutional power to incur
debt cannot be shown to defeat prooeeing by it to improve street through special
assessment in part and partly by general taxation. That question cannot arise
until city seeks to borrow money or incur an indebtedness in that regard. Ry.
v. Cityf, 410.
15. A city is not liable for acts of officers of its fire department, unless made
so by statute or act complained of was expressly ordered by city government;
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they are public officers and not servants of municipality. Burrill v. City of
Augusta, 548.
16. Cannot make its want of legal authority to engage in particular business
(e. g., distillation and sale of spirits), a shelter from the taxation on 'such
business ; nor escape taxes due on its property, whether acquired legally or
illegally. City v. Hollister, 477.
17. Judgment and discretion of, in selecting plan of drainage is not subject
to revision in private action for not sufficiently draining particular lot of land:
but for negligence in construction and repair of sewers municipality is responsi-
ble to person whose property is thereby injured. Johnson v. District, 477.
18. Cities and villages incorporated under the general Incorporation Act of Ill.
giving power "to regulate the police of the city or village, and pass and enforce
all necessary police regulations," may pass an ordinance prohibiting persons
from keeping open stores for sale of goods on Sunday, and provide penalty for
violation of same. Such an ordinance is not inconsistent with section 261 of
Criminal Code, and the police regulations of a village may differ from those
of the state on the same subject, if not inconsistent therewith. lcPherson v.
Village of Chebause, 149.
19. City council, under Illinois Incorporation Act, may grant to individuals
or private corporation right to lay railroad tracks in streets, connecting with
public railway tracks previously laid, and extending to manufacturing estab-
lislments, &c., of those laying the tracks, but in such case tracks so laid become,
in legal contemplation, part of railway with which they connect, and are open
to public, and subject to public control in all respects as other railway tracks.
All railroad companies are required by law to permit such connections. Chicago
Co. v. Garrity, 609.
20. No corporation or individual can acquire exclusive right to use of city
streets. Id.
21. Where, by its charter, a city had power to pass ordinances to remove
nuisances from streets, and for preservation of peace and good order, and in
pursuance thereof had prohibited "any sport, play or exercise that might pro-
duce bodily injury or endanger property on any street, square or alley, within
the city limits," in an action against the municipality for injuries to plaintiff
caused by his being knocked down, while crossing a street, by a sled on which
boys were coasting, it was held, 1st, that defendant was under obligation to
exercise for public good the powers conferred on it by its charter, and that this
duty was not discharged by merely passing ordinances ; a vigorous effort must
be made to enforce them. 2d. If defendant made vigorous eflorts to prevent
nuisances complained of by enforcing its ordinance on the subject, it was relieved
from responsibility. 3d. Whether such efforts had been made was a question
for the jury. Taylor v. Mayor, 4c., 284.
II. Bonds of.
22. A county court was authorized to issue bonds for a subscription to such
amount of stock of railroad as should be proposed by certain commissioners
and approved by majority of voters of the county. Held, that bonds issued in
excess of this amount were void, and that certificate of judge of county court on
back of each bond that it was issued as authorized by statute, cannot estop
county to deny that the particular bond is void, because county court, at time
of its issue, had exhausted power conferred by act of legislature and vote of
people; nor can payment of interest on all bonds ratify bonds issued beyond
lawful limit, as county cannot ratify what it could not have authorized. County
v. Davies, 411.
23. Where legislature dissolves municipal corporation, and incorporates sub-
stantially the same people as municipal body under new name, for same general
purpose, and great mass of taxable property of old corporation is included within
limits of new, and property of old corporation used for public purposes, is
transferred without consideration to new corporation for same public uses, the
latter, notwithstanding great reduction of its corporate limit.,, is successor in
law, of former, and liable for its debts. Mobile v. Watson, 213.
NATIONAL BANK. See BILLS AND NOTES, 16.
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NEGLIGENCE. See BAILMENT, 4, 5. BANK, 2, 7-9. Comxow Csnum, 2,
5, 9, 12, 19, 20. COPORATIONe, 4, 5. DAMAGES, 3-5. FRAU)D, 2. IN-
SURANCZ, 30. MASTER AND SERVANT, 2--6, 8, 11-15, 17, 18. MUNICIPAL
COEO&TION, 1, 2, 15, 17, 21. RszaoAwD, 10-12. TELEGRAPH, 5-7.
WATZRZ AND WATER-COURSES, 1.
1. Tenant who erects insecure fence is liable for injuries to passer-by occa-
sicned by fall of fence after tenant had surrendered premises. i.ussey v. Ryan,
477.
2. When a person voluntarily walks along railroad track in public thorough-
fare, which he -knew was used as a switch-yard on which locomotives were
passing ight and day, where walking on either side of track was as good as on
track, and is killed by liassing train, his representative cannot recover. Louis-
ville Rd. v. YTiestra, 350.
3. It is settled law in Maine, that in an action against a town to recover
damages for death of person alleged to have been caused by negligence of town
in. not keeping highway in repair, burden of proof is on plaintiff tp show due
care on part of diceased. Merrill v. Inhabitants of North Yarmonth, 676.
4. A person undertook to drive over aroad across which wasa flowing stream
of water thirty yards wide, and in some places three feet deep, with swift cur-
rent, on which were floating large blocks of ice. In some way he and is
horse got out of the road, were precipitated into deeper channel of river below
and drowned. -Held, that one who knowingly and unnecessarily exposes him-
self to such perils, cannot be regarded as in the exercise of due care. Id.
5. In action for personal injuries sustained on leaving rear car of train .at
station, evidence that others had previously been directed to take that car, and
on alighting from it as plaintiff did, had been injured, is competent to show
negligence on part of defendant in not providing suitable stopping place, and
that plaintiff was not negligent in getting off train. Bullard v. Rd., 795.
6. Action to recover damages for personal injuries to plaintiff's intestate,
where evidence showed that deceased was burned by a quantity of starch which
escaped from a boiler, but failed to disclose that boilers were improperly con-
structed or out of repair; and that accident was not due to carelessness of
deceased, cannot be maintained. Blanchette, Adm'r., v. Border City Ifg. Co.
795.
7. One who makes excavation on his lot in such manner as to cause a pit-
fall upon adjoining lot is liable, in absence of contributory negligence, to one who
resides on latter, for death of his child, caused by falling into such pit. May-
hewv . Burns, 284.
8. But in such case, evidence that plaintiff's poverty prevented his employ-
ing any one besides his housekeeper to take care of his children, is inadmissible
in question of contributory negligence ; and if he knew of the danger and could
by reasonable exertion have averted it, his failure to do so will prevent a
recovery. Id.
9. Where fire is negligently thrown from mill smoke-stack and carried to
building outside of the mill property, and thence to another building of third
party, and thence to other property that is damaged by fire, whether such negli-
gence is proximate cause of damage is for the jury. Adams v. Young, .561, and
note.
10. Defendant dug pit under cotton gin for cotton press, near public high-
way, and left it unenclosed, corn and cotton seed being'scattered about it.
Plaintiff's cow fell into pit and was killed. Held, that defendant was guilty
of negligence and must pay value of cow, and that plaintiffwasnot guilty of con-
tributory negligence in turning cow out on commons remote from gin. Jones v.
Nichols, 549.
11. While railroad company cannot be said to owe no duty to one who un-
lawfully intrudes upon its engines or cars, it does not owe him same duty it
owes to passengers or employees. Darwin v. Rd., 411.
12. Where trespasser gets without authority upon most dangerous place on rail-
road engine and is killed, he is guilty of contributory negligence and no recovery
of.damages for his death can be had against company, even if it had been
guilty of negligence, and engineer knowing the person was in place of danger
did not warn him off. In case of passenger, rule would be different. Id.
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13. If plaintiff in case of personal injury can show negligence on part of
defendant without at same time showing contributory negligence on his own
part, then such contributory negligence is matter of defence and burden of proof
is on defendant. Texas, -c., Rd. v. Orr, 548.
14. Railroad companies, as a rule are bound to keep in safe condition all
portions of station ground and approaches to platform where passengers would
be likely to go, especially those places where by custom of company they do go.
Id.
15. That injured party does not adopt best remedies or Ibllow implicitly phy-
sician's directions will not excuse wrongful injury which directly produces dis-
ease from which death ensues. It is for jury to pass on reasonableness of dece-
dent's conduct and whether death was caused by the injury. ld.
16. Young child strayed from its home to railroad track, crossed track and
fell into adjoining trench. Track was not fenced on trench side. Beld, that
company was as to plaintiff child under no obligation so to fence its tracks, that
plaintiff child could not get from them on to adjoining land. Morrisey v. Rd.,
350.
17. On demurrer to declaration against corporation, its charter is not before
the court. Id.
18. Where a person has so made the way leading to building on his premises,
as to invite people to pass along the way to such building, he is bound to keep
the way clear of dangers ; and it is not necessary in such case that person using
way should be traveller on highway. Crogaa v. Seiele, 743.
19. Where fire is negligently thrown from a mill smoke-stack and carried to
building outside mill property, and thence to third party's building, and thence
to building damaged, whether such negligence is proximate cause is for the jury
under court's instructions. Adams v. Young, 213.
20. In action against mill owner for damages to property caused by fire so
thrown and carried to property by gale of wind blowing at time in direction of
property ; where the conditions continue the same as when negligent act was
done, it is no defence that fire first burned intervening building and was thence
communicated by sparks and cinders in some manner to building in question;
though buildings were 200 feet apart. Id.
21. In order to support a recovery against a railroad corporation on ac-
count of an injury or death, caused by a collision with its train at a crossing,
whether the action be in form civil or criminal, it must appear affirmatively:
1. That the defendant corporation was guilty of negligence. 2. That its negli-
gence was the cause of the accident. 3. That the injured party was in the
exercise of due care and diligence at the time of the injury, or, at least, that
the want of such care on his part in no way contributed to produce it. State
v. Rd., 150.
22. It is negligence to attempt to cross the track of a railroad without look-
ing and listening so far as there is opportunity to do so. Id.
23. Person waiting at railroad station for passage on train soon to depart,
who is invited by ticket agent to sit in empty car, standing on side track,
while station room was being cleaned, is entitled to same protection from
company while in car as if in waiting room; in either place he is a passenger.
Shannon v. Rd., 549.
24. For passenger to jump off or on moving train is prima facie negligence;
whether he had reasonable excuse for so doing is usually question for jury,
though extreme case either way may be determined by court. Fear of per-
sonal danger is not only excuse that will exonerate one in jumping from mov-
ing train; in some cases he may be justified in so doing to save himself from
serious inconvenience, but all depends on speed of train and attendant circum-
stances. Id.
25. Where there is no evidence of want of capacity or discretion in a minor
suing a railroad company for personal injury, and lie is present at trial and it
appears his parents permitted him to go unattended to school in a large city a
considerable distance from his home. it was held error to instruct the jury that
if they believed from the evidence that the plaintiff, at the time and place of the
injury, was of such tender years and was so immature, that the requisite capa-
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city to exercise proper care was wanting, then the law would not impute negli-
gence to him. Rd. v. Lininger, 149.
26. In a suit by plaintiff against a railway company to recover for an injury
received from a passing train at a! public stieet crossing-not in attempting to
cross the track along the street, but while unlawfully walking along the track
as a footway-it was held error to instruct the jury that if the injury happened
because of there being no flagman at the railroad crossing, contrary to a city
ordinance, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Under the facts the com-
pany owed no duty to the plaintiff in respect to a flagman. Id.
27. FELLow-SERvAxTS, 481.
28. NEGLIGENCE IN I MINENT PERIL, 617.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. See BILLS AND NoTs.
NONSUIT.
Before opening his case plaintiff may become nonsuit, as a matter of right;
after opening and before verdict, in the discretion of the court. Washburn v.
Allen, 78.
NOTICE. See ATTACHMENT, 12, 13. BANE, I1, 22. BILLS AND NOTES, 23-
25. EVIDENCE, 22. MORTGAGE, 4, 17, 26. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION: 2.
SALE, 8.
1. Without proof of, unregistered title is void against subsequent judgment-
creditor of grantor. Executors of Hodge v. Amerman, 214.
2. Burden of proving notice in such case is on holder of unregistered title.
Id,
3. Constructive notice of unregistered is as effectual as actual. Possession
(which may exist without actual residence), if open, notorious, exclusive and
unequivocal, will constitute notice. It is not necessary to show that person, to
be affected, knew of other's possession, if of such a character as to constitute
notice. Id.
4. H. conveyed to S. real estate, deed for which was not recorded until after
'third person, who had levied upon same real estate before conveyance, brought
action against H. for possession. Held, that S. was purchaser pendente lite.
Smith -i. Hlodgson, 615.
5. A purchaser of real estate pendente lite is chargeable with notice of char-
acter of suit, and of extent of claim asserted in pleadings, in reference to title
of such real estate, without express or implied notice in point of fact. Id.
6. The litigating parties are exempted from taking any notice of title so ac-
qeired. Id.
NUISANCE. See EQUITY, 13. MUNICIP"AL CORPORATION, 9, 10, 21.
OFFICER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 16, 17, 44, 45. SURETY, 4, 5.
1. That one transacts his business in his dwelling does not make it lawful for
an officer to break the outer door to serve process. Welsh v. Wilson, 190, and
note.
2. Where the sheriff makes an unlawful levy, and is sued for trespass, it
cannot be taken in mitigation of damages that, pursuant to such levy, he sold
the goods and paid proceeds to execution creditor. Id.
3. Where an officer is " subject after hearing to removal by the mayor, by
and with the advice and consent of the aldermen," the hearing must be by the
"beard of mayor and aldermen." Hearing by aldermen alone is insufficient,
even if by officer's consent. Andrews v. King, 79.
4. Where officer is removable in manner above stated, for "inefficiency or
other cause," mayor and aldermen must find sufficient cause to exist as matter
of fact, and so adjudicate, before valid order of removal can be made. Id.
5. Persons accepting position of school directors must defend suits against
district, and protect its property, to the best of their skill and ability, regardless
of any private interest they may have. Noble v. Directors, 743.
6. If such directors interpose no defence and allow decree to pass in their
favor against some of them, it may be set aside on bill by district and defence
allowed. Id.
7. Statute fixing annual salary of public officer at named sum, without limits-
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tion as to time, should not be deemed abrogated or suspended by subsequent
enactments which merely appropriate a less amount for the services of that
officer for particular fiscal years, and which contain no words that expressly, or
by clear implication, modify or repeal the previous law. United States v.
Fisher, 109 U. S. 143, and United States v. Mitchell, Id. 146, distinguished.
United States v. Langston, 549.
ORDINANCE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 36, 37.
PARENT AND CHILD. See ACTION, 8, 9. ADivANCEMENT. EVIDENCE, 11.
NEGLIGENCE, 7, 8, 25.
When minor son makes contract for his services on his own account, and
father knows of it without objecting, father cannot recover of employer wages
paid the son ; and in such case question is not whether son was emancipated,
but whether father knew of connact and made no objection. Atkins v. Sher-
bino, 676.
PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES.
1. "Act of God." Davis v. Rd., 650, and note.
2. "Control." Car Co. v. Rd., 140.
3. "Caused wholly or in part by infirmity or disease." Urandell v. Ins. Co.
of N. A., 386, and note.
4. "Effected through external, accidental and violentmeans." d.
5. "Debt." Holcomb v. Winchester, 70.
6. "Proved." Tyre J- Spring Works Co. v. Spaulding, 285.
7. " Reasonable doubt." Davis v. People, 142.
8. "Telephone." Hockett v. State, 317, and note.
9. "Vein, lode or ledge." Mining Co. v. Cheesman, 283.
PARTITION. See DowER.
1. Decree of partition not appealed from in probate cotrt is conclusive upon
parties and privies as to title at time of its rendition ; and they are estopped to
claim a greater interest in the land than the share decreed them. Davis v.
Durgin, 798.
2. In chancery suit for partition where defendant impeaches complainant's
title on equitable grounds, the court will not suspend the stit until tile title he
settled, but will pass upon such title and settle all disputes concerning it in the
partition suit, and grant relief accordingly. Read v. H f, 150.
PARTNERSHIP. See ASSIGNMENT, 7. CONTRACT, 8. EXEiPTION, 6, 8.
MORTGAGE, II. RECEIvER. 5, 6. REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 7.
1. Individual interest of copartner in firm effects is attachable. Attachment
may be made by seizure of effects, and officer may remove them for safe keep-
ing. Trafford v. Hubbard, 677.
2. That defendant has overdrawn his account with firm, does not invalidate
attachment ; but the execution by him of general assignment for benefit of
creditors, dissolves it. Id.
3. One may contract with particular member of a firm, for an interest in his
share of profits, without making himself a member of such firm and liable for
its debts. Meyer v. Krohn, 411.
4. Proof of mailing notices of dissolution of partnership and retirement of
certain members thereof, properly addressed to persons having had prior deal-
ings with firm, is prima facie evidence that notices were received by those par-
tics, but such presumption may be rebutted by proof to the contrary. Id.
5. In non-trading partnerships (e. g., one for cond uctint a theatre) presump-
tion is that individual partners have not authority to bind firm by note in Ii, in
name. This presumption may be overcome by proof of express authority, or
state of facts justly implying authority. Pease v. Cole, 744.
6. Where one partner was township treasurer, nndi with knowledge of
copartner deposited township funds to firm credit, feld, that each was part ieps
crzminis, and that as to such funds the law will aid neither party against tle
other. Davis v. Gelhaus, 214.
7. Where M. was to conduct a saw-mill, pay it, expenses from the proceeds,
and divide the net profits with two others, who with himself owned the mill
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property, there was clearly a partnership between the parties. Camp v. Mont-
gomery, 151.
8. The rule that there may be a valid partnership although one or more of
the parties are guaranteed by the others against loss prevails in Georgia, not-
withstanding the last clause of section 1890 of the code provides, that a "com-
mon interest in profits alone does not constitute a partnership." fd.
9. If parties go into an adventure, one furnishing money or stock and the
other skill or labor, and to share the net profits, they are partners, since they
have a joint interest in the profits as contradistinguished from the common in-
terest. A fortiori is there a partner.ihip where, in addition to this, there is
a joint interest in the property used. Id.
10. Upon application for receiver of partnership the only question for con-
sideration is, whether on the facts disclosed, it is apparently necessary in order
to protect partnership assets until rights of partners can be determined on full
hearing of case; and in determining the propriety of such action, the averments
of the answer will be considered as well as the allegations of the bill. Hefe-
bower v. Back, 284.
11. Where settlement of partnership affairs is nearly at an end, and it is
manifest that to grant an injunction and appoint a receiver would probably
cause unnecessary trouble and expense, without substantial benefit to any par-
ties concerned, the application will be denied unless the facts show danger to
partnership assets in hands of selling partner, by reason of insolvency or other-
wise, or some clear breach of duty or conduct amounting to fraud on his part.
Id.
PARTY WALL. See COvENANT, 4.
PATENT. See EXECUTioN, 2. PATmENT, 3. TELEPHONE, 2.
1. Cannot be taken out for article old in purpose, shape and mode of use
when made for first time out of an existing material, and with accompaniments
before applied to such article. Gardner v. Herz, 478.
2. Plaintiff was patentee of combination lock, the essential feature of which
was turning bolt. He granted no licenses, but manufactured locks himself,
being fully able to supply the demand. Defendant, infringing on plaintiff's
patent, sold a lock having the turning bolt device, at a reduced price, forcing
latter to do same in order to hold his trade. Held, that defendant's infringe-
ment must be considered to have. caused entire loss of plaintiff, by reduction in
prices, after allowing proper sum for any other patented device contained in de,
fendant's locks, and for any other causes which gave to defendant an advantage
in selling his locks. Yale Lock Co. v. Sargent, 411.
PAYMENT. See CONFLICT OF LAws, 3. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6. MORT-
GAGE, 29. SURETY, 43.
. 1. Action will not lie to recover taxes illegally assessed and voluntarily paid.
Dunnell CJo. v. Newell, 350.
2. Tax is not paid under compulsion merely because collector holds warrant
for levy or distraint, but if paid under protest tax illegally assessed may be re-
covered. Id.
3. A. relying wholly on representations of B., made without fraud, con-
tracted to pay and did pay B., fixed sum for privilege of workinLr under certain
patent, of which he was owner. It afterwards turned out That patent was
void : held, that A. could not recover his money. Schwarzenbach v. Odorless
Co., 744.
PENALTY. See DAxGES, 1.
PHYSICIAN. See CONTRACT, 12.
PLEADING. See ACTION, 4. ATTACHMENT, 11. BILLS AND NOTES, 20, 21.
COMMON CARRIER, 6. CRIMINAL LAW, 13, 14, 21. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF,
8.. HUSBAND AND WiFE, 8. MANDAMUS, 1, 2. SET-OFF, 1. SLANDER
AND LIBEL, 2, 3.
1. Counts in covenant and case may be joined in a declaration on a single
cause of action. Crawford v. Parsons, 412.
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2. Answer of failure of consideration must set out facts showing failure; and
error in sustaining demurrer to such an answer is not rendered harmless, merely
because general plea of want of consideration is left standing. Tyler v. Ander-
son, 570.
3. Plaintiff received consignments from defendant, who is owner of three
different mills, one being carried on in his own and the other two under dif-
ferent names, but being ignorant of this thct, plaintiff kept the three accounts
separate. In action brought by plaintiff to recover balance of account with
mill run under name of defendant, where answer is general denial and payment,
defendant not allowed to show balance due him on account between plaintiff
and another of the mills ; such balance can only be availed of by way of set-off';
and defendant cannot show that there were in plaintiff's hands goods from mill
run under defendant's name not included in account sued on. Talcott v. Smith,
795.
PLEDGE. See ATTACHMENT, 3, 4.
POSSESSION. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1. NOTICE, 3, 18.
POWER.
1. Where testator invests his widow with life estate in his property, with
power to dispose of remainder to his heirs, an attempted appointment in such
manner as to secure to herself a substantial pecuniary benefit not authorized by
testator is void. Shank v. De Writt, 412.
2. An honest misconstruction of power conferred, will not save exercise of
power, if true purpose of it is violated. Id.
PRACTICE. See CONTEMPT, I. EQUITY, 1, 2, 13. ERRORSAND APPEALS, 3,
6. EVIDENCE, 13, 23. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 7. INJUNCTION,
5. MASTER AND SERVANT, 16. NONSUIT. RECEtVER, 1. SET-OFF, 4.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 4. WILL, 18, 19.
Under stipulation of parties, a case was tried by a Circuit Court, without a
jury, and judgment entered finding certain facts, and, as a conclusion of law,
the issues joined for defendant. On same day stipulation was filed, that on the
trial certain facts were "proved." Held, that stipulhtion was not an agree-
ment as to existence of any facts, but merely a statement as to what the proof
showed on the trial ; and, therefore, as to any facts stated in stipulation to have
been shown by proof at the trial, if they were nut contained in'the special find-
ings, the only conclusion could be that court did not find them to be facts ; and
that the ease must be adjudicated on the special findings alone. T yreandSpring
Works Co. v. Spau'ding, 285.
PRESCRIPTION. See WATER AND WATER-COURSES, 7, 8.
PRESUMPTION. See ACTION, 9. AGENT, 5. INSURANCE, 7. MORTGAGE,
20. PARTNERSHIP, 4. SURETY, 2, 3, 5. TAX AND TAXATION, 4. TRUST
AND IRUSTEE, 12.
1. Where marriage in fact is shown, law raises strong presumption in favor
of its legality, and burden of proof is on party contesting its validity. Johnson v.
Johnson, 412.
2. So, although presumption in favor of validity of marriage in fact and inno-
cence of contracting parties may conflict with that of continued life of former hus-
band or wife not heard from for period less than seven years, yet if neither
presumption is aided by proof of facts co-operating with it, the former prevails
over latter. .d.
PROHIBITION.
1. Where inferior court has clearly no jurisdiction and defendant has objected
at outset, and ias no other remedy, he is entitled to writ as matter of right,
and refusal to grant it, where all the proceedings appear of record, may be
reviewed on error. Smith v. Whitney, 214.
2. It seems, that writ issues from law side of court with both common law and
equity powers. Id.




I. A. deposited with stakeholder amount of wager on games between C. and
D. When it was clear that A. would lose, he notified stakeholder not to pay
money over, denouncing the match. At close, stakeholder paid over amount to
winner. .ftdd, that A. should recover his deposit. McGrath v. Kennedy,
2. A condition of admission into aged person's home, besides payment of
stipulated entrance fee, was that applicant should transfer to institution all his
property or income of any kind. Held, neither ultra vires. nor against public
policy. Home v. Hasmerbarcker, 478.
3. Where applicant declared in writing that be had no property other than
entrance fee, and was admitted without conveyance of his property, and after
his death it was discovered that at time of application he had some $1200,
Beld, that institution was entitled to relief in equity against administrators of
deceased. Id.
QUORUM. See MuNIciPAL Com-oarxoN, 3-6.
RAILROAD.- See COMMON CARnti, 9, 10, 14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 6, 9,
10, 12, 14, 30. CONTRACT, 14. COnPORATIONr, 1, 27. DAMAGES, 7.
HIGHWAYS, &c., 7. MASTER AND SERVANT, 5, 6, 11. MORTGAGE, 3, 7.
NEGLIGENCE, 2, 11, 12, 14, 16, 21-25. TAx AND TAXATION, 8.
1. Railroad commissions : the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Stone, 10 U. S. Rep., stated and
commented on. Legal Notes, 202.
2. Damages are not recoverable by railroad company against a town which
has laid out ways over its tracks, for interference occasioned to its business by
opening of the new ways, nor for any increased risks or expense in running its
trains. Id.
3. While one railroad company 'may have the right to acquire the stock of
another company, it has no right to use its controlling influence, thus acquired,
with the directors of latter company, so as to sacrifice that company's interests.
State v. Brown, 344.
4. Discrimination in rates of freight, made exclusively on the basis of a
larger freightage, will not be sustained. Shofield v. Rd., 79.
5. Where plaintiffs were frequent shippers and remedy at law would lead to
multiplicity of suits, As/d, that the court would intervene by injunction, and
that it was not a pre-requisite that plaintiffs should have first established their
rights at law. .d.
6. Where railroad corporation is consolidated under statutes of several states,
its acts of injurious discrimination committed or threatened in one of the states
to shippers along the line of its road in that state, may be enjoined by the
courts of that state. Id.
7. Where office safe kept at railroad depot, and usdd by agent as place of
deposit for daily receipts and valuable papers, is useful and facilitates success-
fnl operation of road, it is not subject to levy under execution on judgment
against road. Rd. v. Shimmell, 644, and note.
8. In a~scssing damages to be recovered by railroad company against a town
for its land taken by locating town ways acro(s its track, jury may consider, to
ascertain present value, not only use railroad now makes of its located limits at
the crossings, but what use it may reasonably be expected to make of same in
near future. Rd. v. Inhabitants of Deering, 549.
9. It is not an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power to require a rail-
road corporation to build and maintain highway crossings laid out over its
tracks so far as said crossings are within its located limits, although law impos-
ing such burden was enacted since railroad was built, the company being sub-
ject to general laws of state in existence when its charter was granted, and such
as should thereafter be passed. Id.
10. In an action to recover damages for fire alleged to have been occasioned
by negligent runnihg of defendant's locomotives, plaintiff offered only indirect
proof that fire was so caused ; defendant • then offered to prove custom of farmers
to set fire to leaves at that season to improve pasturage, and that such fires had
been started there annually long before defendant's road was built. Held, that
the evidence was inadmissible. Green Ridge 
Co. v. Brinkman, 286.
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11. Where railroad company is sued for damages resulting from a fire com-
municated by defendant's engine, proof that fire so originated creates presump-
tion of negligence and onus probandi is on defendant to show the contrary.
Green Ridge Co. v. Brinkmaan, 286.
12. The fact that the engine habitually scattered sparks to such an extent as to
endanger combustible material along the line of road, is one from which the jury
may find negligence on the part of defendant. Id.
13. Unless specially authorized by its charter or aided by some other legisla-
tive action, a railroad company cannot, by lease or other contract, turn over to
another company, for a long time, its road and use of iis franchises ; nor can
any other company, without similar authority, make contract to operate road,
property and franchises of first corporation. Such contract is not among ordi-
nary powers of railroad company, and is not to be inferred from usual grant of
powers in railroad charter. Thiomas v. Rd., 101 U. S. 91, reaffirmed. Penn
Co. v. St. Louis Rd., 550.
14. Doctrine that acts may be done and property change hands, under void
contracts fully executed, with which courts will not interfere, is sound, but
relief in any such case must be based on invalidity of contract and not in aid of
its enforcement. While plaintiff here might recover in appropriate action
rental value of use of its road against lessee company, the other defendants
who had received nothing, but had been paying out money under void contract
cannot be compelled to pay more under same. Id.
RATIFICATION. See CoRPoRATION, 25. EVIDENCE, I]. MASTER AND SEA-
VrNT, 10. MUNICIPAL CoRrOnAp Tio , 22. PARTNERSHIP, 5. SALE, 1.
RECEIVER. See ConpoRsToN, 16. EQUITT, 14. MORTGAGE, 16. PART-
NEsrtip, 10, 11. TAX AND TAXATION, 6.
1. It is an inflexible rule that receiver should not be appointed except on
notice to person whose property is to be divested, save in cases of grave emer-
gency, demanding immediate interference of court for prevention of irreparable
injury. Meyers v. Coiner, 677.
2. Compensation of, in all cases not attended with peculiar circumstances
requiring augmentation, should be regulated by analogy to commissions allowed
guardians and trustees for similar services. Order making allowance for com-
pensation should be definite. Tome v. Kinp, 351.
3. Where receivers are appointed solely at instapce and for benefit of second
mortgage bondholders, and trustees were appointed to sell exclusively for ben-
efit oF same parties, first mortgage bondholder cannot be assessed for conmis-
sions and expenses of receivers and trustees. Id.
4. If fund in court be insufficient to compensate and indemnify receivers,
parties at whose instance they were put upon the property, should be required to
provide the means of payment. Id.
5. Recovery of judgment against partners after appointment of receiver to
take charge of firm assets for benefit of creditors generally, creates no lien
against property of firm in hands of receiver; such property being in custody
of the law is not subject to execution or garnishment. Jack-son v. Lahee, 286.
6. A receiver was appointed on bill filed by one partner against the other
for settlement of partnership accounts and payment of creditors of 'firm, which
was insolvent, and court had ordered notice to be given to all creditors to prove
their debts before the master. It was held, that one of creditors by recovery of
judgment against firm during 'pendency of bill and the filing of creditors' bill
on same day that notice to creditors was ordered, did not acquire any lien on
assets in receiver's hands or right to be preferred over other creditors-the more
especially when such creditor proved his claim before the master and shared in
distribution of funds in his hands. Id.
7. Plaintiffs (4) and defendants (13) are members of unincorporated joint-
stock company, property of which at commencement of suit consisted of build-
ing, small amount of furniture and $82 in money, in all of value of about
$1100 ; stock was divided into $10 shares, of which plaintiffs owned twelve
and defendants the balance ; building was erected for use of Patrons of Hus-




that equity does not require appointment of receiver to sell property and divide
proceeds among members of company. Hinkley v. Blethen, 616.
8. ACTIOns 39Y AND AGAINST R curvis, 289.
REFORMATION. See EQUITy, 22.
BELEASE. See EqUITr, 21.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETY. See TseusT AN TuSTZN, 2.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See HABEAS CORPUS, 1.
1. Cblorable assignment to prevent removal will not authorize United States
courts to take jurisdictibn. k! ey v. Goodnow, 478.
2. If it appears that some title, right, privilege or immunity on which reco-
very depends, will be defeated by one construction of ,onstitution or law of
United States, or sustained by opposite construction, case will be one arising
under the constitution or laws of the United States, within meaning of Act of
March 3d 1875; otherwise not. Starix v. New York, 79.
3. Bill iled byjudlgment creditor to marshal liens and obtain sale of debtor's
property free of encumbrance, to pay his judgment after satisfying prior claims
and in meantime to have receiver appointed, raises but a single, indivisible
cause of action, though each of lien holders may have a separate defence.
lelity Co. v. Huntingdon, 352.
4. Answer of defendant to complaint, which answer was signed only by her
attorney and was not under oath, stated that defendant was citizen of Neiv
York. Hld, that she was not thereby estopped from subsequently showing on
petition for removal, that she was citizen of Massachusetts, it having been
shown how mistake arose, and defendant having promptly denied erroneous
statement as soon as it was brought to her attention. Corson v. Hyatt, 478.
5. Mere filing of petition for removal of suit that is not removable, does not
work a transfer. If state court proceeds after petition for removal, it does so at
risk of having its final judgment reversed, if record shows that when petition
was filed, court ought to have given up its jurisdiction. &one v. State, 351.
6. No statute authorizes removal of suit between a state and citizens, on ac-
count of citizenship. Id.
7. Where money sued for was received by defendants as partners, all the par-
ners must unite in petition for removal. Id.
8. Plaintiffs having removed action of ejectment against a tenant on ground
of citizenship, the landlords who were of same citizenship as plaintiffs, were let
in as defendants. Reld, that cause was thereupon improperly remanded. Phelps
v. Oake, 352.
9. State statute provided that proceedings for condemnation of land for rail-
way purposes should be instituted in probate court of proper county ; that neces-
sity for taking lands, and their value, should be determined by commissioners,
or jury selected by such court, and that such proceedings should only be subject
to review by the Supreme Court. Under this statute railroad company peti-
tioned probate court for condemnation of defendant's lands. Defendant an-
swered petition, and demanded removal to federal court. Held, that case was
removable directly from probate court. Bailroad Co. v. Copper Co., 177, and
note.
10. It is no objection to jurisdiction of federal court in such cases, that it in-
volves exercise of right of eminent domain. Id.
RESCISSION. See SALE, l, 2.
RESERVATION. See DEED, 4, 5.
RESIDENCE. See DOmICILE.
REVOCATION. See CoNTACT, 10.
SALE. See AGENT, 1, 2, 4. BAILMENT, 1-3. CONTRACT, 6, 7. DAMAGE S,
10, 11. DEBTOR AND CREDiITOR, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8. FIXTuREs. MORTGAG -,
13 •
1. If vendor of goods after being advised of fraud of purchaser in misrep-
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resenting his ability to pay, accepts further security he cannot afterwards re-
scind. Bridgelord v. Adams, 214.
2. One who claims right to rescind sale must proceed within reasonable time
in making inquiries. Id.
3. The general rule in this coantry is, that where there is a sale of chattels in
the vendor's possession at the time, at a fair price, there is always an implied
warranty of title, unless the facts and circumstances are such as to warrant a
different conclusion. Edgerton v. I]ichels, 260, and note.
4. One intrusted with the possession, management, control and disposal of
goods to be sold, is an agent and not a broker, and is liable upon an implied
warranty of title. Id.
f 5. Under contract for sale of "500 tons No. I Shotts' (Scotch) pig iron, at
$26 per ton, cash, in bond at New Orleans; shipment from Glasgow as soon as
possible, delivery and sale subject to ocean risks,"--shipment from Glasgow is
a material part of contract. Filley v. Pope, 80.
6. Where vendors rescind a sale on the ground of fraud, and bring replevin,
under which a portion of the goods is seized and returned, they cannot recover
for the balance against the assigned estate of the vendee upon a claim for goods
sold and delivered, but must bring an action on the tort. Farwell v. Meyers,
243, and note.
7. T. agreed to put in for S. an elevator "warranted satisfactory in every
respect." After trying elevator, S. refused to accept it. Held, that provided
he acted in good faith, S. was sole judge whether elevator was satisfactory.
Singerly v. Thayer, 14, and note.
8. Where statute provides that no condition attached to sale of personal pro-
perty shall be valid as against creditors of vendee, or subsequent purchaser from
him in good faith, unless in writing, acknowledged and recorded, parol condi-
tion that title shall.not pass until payment of price, is valid against creditors of
vendee, who, at time of sale had notice of condition. Coover v. Johnson, 310,
and note.
9. Innkeeper sent following order to wholesale liquor dealer. "Please send
by first express, a half barrel Bourbon whiskey and two baskets of Piper wine.
What is used I will account for and ship rest back to you. I want it for the
commercial travellers who will be here Friday to dinner." Held, that title
passed on delivery to innkeeper, so that liquors could be attached by his cred-
tors. Hotchlcirs v. Higgins, 79.
10. Four hundred and ten shares of stock of a newly incorporated company
were sold at thirty cents on the dollar. The plaintiff sold five shares, thus paid
for, to the defendant at par, representing that all stockholders had paid par for
their stock. Held, that this was a misrepresentation of a material fact by which
the defendant was misled as to the company's assets. Coolidge v. Goddard,
151.
11. Flour was ordered by brokers for Dub & Co., with this direction:
"Ship as soon as you can, forty-five days draft, to B. Dub & Co." Dub &
Co. assigned it to M., without returning draft signed, it being sold with bill
of lading and invoice stating terms as forty-five days acceptance. Held, the
giving of acceptance was condition precedent to acquisition of title by B. Dub
& Co., and sellers of flour might maintain trover therefor against M. Matthew-
son v. Belmont Co., 550.
12. Agreement in writing to sell personal property, title to which is reserved
by seller until purchase-money is paid by buyer, is a conditional sale and does
not vest title in buyer until purchase-money is paid, notwithstanding possession
of property is given to purchaser at time of making agreement; and such an
agreement is valid against subsequent creditors and bona fide purchasers for
value without notice. Printing Press Co. v. Malker, 678.
13. Respondent, a dealer in New York, shipped intoxicating liquor to par-
ties in Vermont by express, C. 0. D. The liquor, intended for an unlawful
use, was seized without warrant while in possession of express company and
confiscated before delivery and payment. Held (a), that seizure was lawful;
(b), that contract was inchoate while goods were in transit ; that payment was
condition precedent, and there was no surrender of legal title ; that express
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company was agent of consignor, and that he was legally convicted under in-
dictment charging him with keeping liquor for unlawful purpose. State v.
O'Neil, 677.
14. When in such case the liquor has been delivered by express company to
consignee in Vermont and paid for, the sale is in that state and vendor is liable
to conviction for an illegal sale. Id.
SEAL. See AGENT, 11. Con.osrATio, 15. MORTGAGE, 28.
SET-OFF. See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 5. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 2.
I. In pleading set-off defendant, in order to recover, is required to prove
same facts as if he had brought suit on his demand. Ellis v. Cothran, 796.
2. Defendant cannot recover on matter by way of set-off, when his claim was
not due at time plaintiff brought suit; nor can he, after suit brought, purchase
a demand against plaintiff and set it up as a defence. Id.
3. If factor sell in his own name, as owner, and does not disclose his prin-
cipal, acting ostensibly as real owner, although principal may afterwards bring
his action against purchaser on the contract, yet latter, if he bona fide dealt
with factor as owner, will be entitled to set off any claim he may have against
factor in answer to demand of principal. Ruan v. Gvnn, 550.
4. It is not essential to proper allowance of legal demand, as set off in equity
against a judgment at law, on ground of insolvency of party in whose favor
judgment was recovered, that insolvency should have occurred subsequent to
judgment ; and although cross-demand might have been set off in action at law
in which judgment was recovered, that was permissive, not compulsory on
defendant. G. 4- S. W Rd. v. Ennor, 678.
SHELLEY'S CASE, RULE IN. See LiTE TENANT, 2.
SHIPPING.
1. Whether contract between two of several part owners of a vessel that
each shall sail her as master alternate years, is void as against public policy-
qtuare. Rogers v. Sheere, 80.
2. Assuming such contreci to be valid, true construction of it is, that each
shall sail the vessel alternate years, only so long as he properly performs the
duties of master. Id.
3. Action for money had and received cannot be maintained by part owner
(not ship's husband) for his share of freight money, against master who col-
lected and remitted same to ship's husband after receiving Ivritten notice from
such part owner to remit his share to him. Patten v. Percy, 80.
4. Tenants in common must join in an action to recover earnings of vessel
unless there is an excuse for severance of claim. Bankruptcy of one owner is
not valid excuse, his assignee should be joined, or if assignee has not been
appointed, suit should be commenced in names of bankrupt and co-owners until
assignee comes in. Stison v. Fernald, 151.
SLANDER AND LIBEL. See INJUNCTION, 1.
1. Reply of employer to discharged employee, in answer to question as to why
latter was discharged, is privileged, and burden is upon employee to show exist-
ence of malice. Beder v. Jackson, 479.
2. It is sufficient if complaint states facts sufficient to show legal wrong for
which law will afford redress. McElwee v. Blackwell, 479.
3. In action for slander of title to trade-mark, where injury is not so much
the defamatory words, but was occasioned by positive acts and threats, by which
customers of plaintiff were deterred from trading with him, held, error to non-
suit plaintiff, because complaint did not set out the actionable words. 1d.
4. Action for libel cannot be sustained for false charges of crime in an affi-
davit for warrant made before magistrate having jurisdiction of alleged offence,
though deponent may be prosecuted for perjury; but if made maliciously before
a court without jurisdiction such action will be sustained. Francis v. Wood,
282.15. The defendant falsely and maliciously spoke of plaintiff the following
words, by reason of which he lost his position as clerk and assistant weigh-
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master: "He has caused the ruin and downfall of my clerkl" "Will
(meaning plaintiff) has been the ruination of my clerk; I do not want him
(meaning plaintiff) to have anything to do with my business ;" meaning that
plaintiff should not weigh any goods consigned to defendant. Held, that the
words thus spoken were actionable. Wilson v. Cottman, 796.
6. When some specific damage is caused by words falsely and maliciously
spoken, they may become actionable, when otherwise the law would give no
redress against the person speaking them. Id.
7. At a meeting of a body of citizens of Philadelphia styled the "Committee
of One Hundred," assembled for the purpose of considering the merits of can-
didates for public office, a letter reflecting severely on character of a judge who
was a candidate for re-election, by statements subsequently acknowledged to be
wholly untrue, was, by order of chairman, read by secretary, and, reporters
being present, appeared at length in daily papers. Held, that the communica-
tion was privileged, and legal malice not inferable therefrom ; that being based
on probable cause, it was proper for discussion at such meeting ; and that court
below was justified, in absence of proof of actual malice, in entering nonsuit in
action for libel brought against chairman of meeting. Briggs v. Garrelt, 493,
and note.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY, 17-19. INsuxtAIwcE, 24.
Mere fact that contract stipulates for liquidated damages in case of failure to
perform, does not prevent court of equity from decreeing specific performance;
it is only where contract is alternative-the performance of certain acts or pay-
ment of certain money in lieu thereof-that equity will not decree specific per-
formance. Lyman v. Gedney, 286.
STARE DECISIS. * THE PRINCIPLE or STARE DEcisis, 745.
STATUTE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 34, 38, 39. OFFICER, 7.
1. General repealing clause in unconstitutional statute does not affect previ-
ous laws. Wilke v. Barnes, 352.
2. Where, by act submitting question to voters of the several election districts
of Caroline county, whether or not spirituous or fermented liquors should be
sold therein, majority of voters in Third Election District was against the sale,
and by subsequent act new election district was established out of said third
district, the prohibition will continue. Higgins v..State, 479.
STOCK. See ATTACHMENT, 2-5, 15. BANKRUPTCY, 4. CONTRACT, 10, 23.
CORPORATION, 1, 6-8. GIFT, 4. MORTGAGE, 10.
STREET. See I)EED, 5. HIuHWAYS, &c., 3, 4-7.
SUBROGATION. See COMMON CARRIER, 20. EQUITY, 23. MORTGAGE, 18,
24, 29.
SUNDAY. See MUNICIPAL, CORPORATION, 18.
1. Carrying on of one's ordinary business on Sunday is an indictable offence
at common law, and also under statutes of Tennessee, if conducted so openly as
to attract public observation. Parker v. State, 722, and note.
2. It is no defence that accused conscientiously observes the "seventh"
rather than the "first" day of the week. Id.
SURETY. See ATTACHMENT, 14. BILLS AND NOTES, 7. DECEDENTS' ES-
TATES, 1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 5. GUARANTY. LDIITA-
TIONS, STATUTE OF, 7, 8. LUNATIC, 5. MORTGAGE, 24, 25.
1. On guardian's bond, concluded by final settlement of guaidian's accounts
in probate court, in absence of fraud and collusion. Braiden v. Mercer, 479.
2. Where creditor receives from principal debtor payment of interest in ad-
vance on past due note, agreement to give time is necessarily implied, and
creditor is debarred suing iseantime on note and surety discbarged-unless
creditor can show mistake or, possibly, agreement that right of suit should not be
suspended. Gardner v. Gardner, 412.
3. Whether sealed note which matured in 1860 and was credited with pay-
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ments by principal debtor down to 1865 should be presumed paid as to sureties
in 1884, raised but not considered. Gardner v. Gardner, 412.
4. Security on bond of defaulting county treasurer against whom an execu-
tion has issued for funds belonging to county in hands of treasurer, cannot take
homestead, which will exempt his property from debt incurred by reason of his
obligation on the bond. Me Waltu v. Jefferson Co., 551.
5. Presumption would be that funds in hands of treasurer arose, at least inpart, from taxes, and no evidence was offered by surety in this case that any
part of fund came from other sources, though treasurer was bound to keep
record of all funds received by him and source from which they came. Id.6. Surety of a trustee cannot maintain bill in equity to require his principal
to give additional securities on his bond given to secure cestuis rue trustent, orcounter security, and on failure to give such security have him removed. Ridge-
way v. Potter, 287.
7. The principal is under no legal duty to a surety to keep his co-suretiesin equal solvency as they were when they first became such, or to keep any co-
sureties to share in the liability. Id.
8. Courts of equity, in relief of sureties under apprehension of loss have goneto extent of allowing surety, after debt has become due, to file a bill to compelprincipal to discharge it; and a surety, when debt has become due, may compelcreditor to sue for and collect it from principal. Id.
9. On bill by a surety on bond of trustee to compel him to render an accountto the court where the ce.stuis que trustent are not made parties, it is not error forcourt to refuse to state the account, as it would not conclude them. Id.
TAX AND TAXATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 11, 27, S0. LICENSE,
. MANDAMUS, 5, 6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 16. PAYMENT, 1, 2.
UNITED STATES, 2. USURY, 10.
I. Trustee resident in another state, who holds as trustee no property inRhode Island, is not liable to taxation in town where his cestui resides in that
state. Anthony v, Cas ell, 616.
2. Where property is collected from one or more points, by any means oftransportation, and is awaiting the necessary preparation and facilities forfurther transportation, it is not liable to taxation. Board v. Standard Oil Co.,
287.
3. But where property is collected, even at point of final shipment, to awaitthe rise of markets or from any other cause having no relation to preparationfor, or exigencies of transportation, it will be held to have acquired a situs
making it subject to taxation. Id.4. Exemption from taxation is a franchise, a surrender %f which may bepresumed from long acquiescence in actual taxation, which government maytake advantage of, though same period of non-user would be ground of forfeit-ure in direct proceeding by state to revoke franchise. Sate of New Jersey v.
Wright, 412.
5. Goods intended for export from state of their production to another stateare subject to taxation in the former, until they have been started upon suchtransportation in a continuous route ; the carrying of them to the depot wherethe journey is to commence is no part of that journey. Coe v. Errol, 287.6. Where proper officers of county or town have levied a tax for satisfactionof'judgments against it, and no one can be found to accept the office ofcollector,a court of equity has no jurisdiction to fill that office or to appoint a receiver toperform its functions. Thompson v. Allen Co.,-152.
7. An assessment of different kinds of property, as a unit, which includesproperty not legally assessable, and in which part of tax illegally assessed is notseparable from other part, is invalid and will not support an action for recoveryof entire tax so levied. Santa Clara Co. v. Rd., 551.8. The fences erected upon line of'railroad between its roadway and land ofcoterminous proprietors cannot be assessed uqder head of roadway. Id.9. .Buildings and other property owned by municipal corporations and appro-priated to public uses, are but the means used for municipal purposes and areexempt from taxation not by express statutory prohibition, but by necessary
implication. Camden v. Camden, 151.
INDEX. 863
TAX AND TAXATION.
10. A village corporation was authorized by its charter to raise money to
defray expenses of police force, &c., and also to erect a hall. The building
thus erected contained a public hall, police court room, &c., and when not in
use for purposes of the corporation, the hall and other rooms were let for hire
and the money received therefrom was used towards paying expenses of the
corporation. Held, that building and lot were not liable to taxation by the
town in which they were situated. Camden v. Camden, 151.
TELEGRAPH. See CONTRACT, 4. EVIDENCE, 4, 5.
1. Prescribing a penalty against telegraph companies for failing to transmit a
message is valid and constitutional, whether message is to a point within or
without limits of the state. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferris, 287.
2. Where sender of message proves unreasonable delay, the burden of explain-
ing it is on the company. Id.
3. Delay of several hours in transmitting message that could be sent in
fifteen minutes shows want of diligence. Id.
4. Where business of office is such that one operator cannot receive messages
with reasonable promptness, it is duty of company to supply required assist-
ance. Id.
5. The law enjoins on telegraph companies prompt and skilful performance
of their undertaking and for failure to transmit or deliver a telegram to person
to whom it is addressed within a reasonable time, such compiny is liable to per-
son injured whether he he the sender or person to whom it was addressed. W.
U. Tel. Co. v. Hyer, 678.
6. In such case it is no defence that sender did not inform operator of im-
portance of telegram, when it is not shown that such information would have
changed method of transmission, time of delivery, or price demanded there-
for. Id.
7. Nor is it any defence that message is in cipher, provided it is plainly writ-
ten, and words are in letters of English alphabet. Id.
8. A verbal contract that plaintiff should labor for manufacturer at $2.25
per day, commencing Sept. 1st, but for no stipulated period, is defeasible at
will of either party, and telegraph company is liable for nominal damages only,
in not delivering telegram to plaintiff, seasonably notifying him of terms of con-
tract, whereby he lost all benefit from it. Merrill v. W. U. Tel. Co., 551.
TELEPHONE.
I. Telephone company is common carrier, in same sense as telegraph com-
pany. Its instruments and appliances are devoted to public use and subject to
leegislative control ; so that state legislature may prescribe maximum charges.
.Hocket v. State, 317, and note.
2. That article is manufactured under United States patent does not prevent
a state, in exercise of its police powers, from regulating its use. Id.
3. The word1 " telephone" covers the entire system or apparatus. Id.
TENANTS BY ENTIRETIES. See LIFE TENANT.
TENANTS IN COMMON. See PAnRTITION. 1. SHIPPING, 4.
1. One tenant in common may rightfully insist that the other shall contribute his
proportionate share for preservation of joint property, but not that he shall enter
on new investments, to be paid for from the joint property, or out of other funds
belonging to him, against his judgment and inclination. Field v. Leiter, 797.
2. Where one of two tenants in common of a tract of land, which had been
sold for taxes, instead of redeeming directly from the sale, made an agreement
with the holder of the certificate of purchase, that latter should take out tax
deed thereon, and then convey premises to former, which was done, it was held,
that transaction amounted to bat a redemption which enured to benefit of both
tenants in common, and court of equity would compel one taking conveyance of
tax title to convey to other one individual half of tax title on payment half cost
thereof. Lomax v. Gindele, 798.
TORT. See ATTACHMENT, 1. UNITED STATES CouRrs, 4.
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TRADEMARK. See SLANDER, 3.
1. The words "health preserving" preceding the word "corset" in the name
adopted by manufacturer of corsets under letters patent, but describe a quality
of the corset and cannot, therefore, be employed as a trademark. Ball v. Sie-
gel, 678.
2. Even if a party has a trade-mark in the name of "Balls" and picture,
words and form of lettering on labels pasted on his boxes containing corsets,
there is no infringcment when a different name is used by another manufacturer
with a picture, words and form of lettering so totally unlike those of former
that no one can reasonably mistake one for the other. Id.
3. If the words of alleged infringing device are such as would be'likely to
mislead persons in ordinary course of purchasing the. goods, then the injured
party is entitled to equitable protection if he takes reasonable measures to assert
his rights ; but a court of equity is not bound to interfere when ordinary
attention will enable purchasers to discriminate between the trade-marks used
by different parties. Id.
4. Manufacturer has right to use his own name as mark upon his goodt,
although it be same name with that of another manufacturer of same goods,
who makes the name a part of his own trade-mark, where there is no false
representation. Rogers v. Rogers, 744.
TRESPASS. See Hin~w±ys, &c., 1, 2. NEGUzGEiCZ, 11, 12, 16. 0-rI-
cEn, 2.
In trespass qgure dausum for felling defendant's trees across fence line and
covering plaintiff's land with brush, measure of damages is not confined to ex-
pense of removing brush, nor to value of land encumbered. llutchinson v.
Parker, 798.
TRIAL. See CRIaXAL LAw, 12.
Where plaintiff in action for personal injuries alleges that they are of per-
manent nature, defendant is entitled, as matter of right, to have opinion of
surgeon on his condition, based upon personal examination ; and the court
should compel plaintiff to submit to such examination. But where evidence of
experts isalready abundant, court must exercise its sound discretion in com-
pelling or refusing such examination, and its discretion is subject to review in
case of abuse. Sibley v. Smid'1 551.
TROVER. See SALE, 11.
1. To constitute conversion of chattels there must be some exercise of
dominion over the property, in repudiation of or inconsistent with owner's
rights. Evans v. Mason, 798.
2. In action of trover for horse hired by defendant to go to and from a place
named without stopping, his mere delay in'returning is not sufficient evidence
of a conversion. Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See BANK, 6. CORPORATION, 2, 3, 22, 38. DERTOR
AND CREDITOR, 9. EQUITY, 14-16. FEAUDS, STATUTE OF, 4, 5. GIFT, 4.
INSURANcE,.22. JUDICIAL SALE, 1, 2. LnI TATIONS, STATUTE OF, 11.
MORTGAGE, 19. SURETY, 6, 9. TAX AND TAXATION, 1. WILL, 25.
1. An interest in land does not pass, by resulting trust, from owner to one
whose money is expended in improving the land. Bodwell v. Nutter, 413.
2. When land was conveyed in trust for erection of church and academy for
benefit of a Lutheran congregation, the church council could not transfer to
others not Lutherans or to town council any portion of land for establishment
of academy or school. Busbee v. Mfitchell, 413.
3. Where trustee of fund held for benefit of life tenant with remainder over
purchases bonds at premium, he may retain out of interest such sums annually as
will restore to fund, at maturity of bonds, exactly what was taken therefrom at
time of purchase. Trust Co. v. Eaton, 162.
4. Right of trustee to retain such sums out of income may be adjudicated by
probate court upon settlement of his annual account. Id.
5. Where trustee holds note belonging to trust estate and receives in payment
thereof a credit allowed to himself on his individual indebtedness, the payment
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is not, on part of maker of note, a good payment to trust estate although trustee
is solvent at time of such payment. M1taynard v. Cleveland, 288.
6. Where party receives money of another to be invested in purchase of land
and pays out same, with other money of his own, in a purchase, taking deed
in his own name, he will hold land so acquired in trust for person whose money
he has so used in proportion it bears to entire consideration pai. Springer v.
Springer, 413.
7. In such case holder of legal title cannot set up as defence to bill to enforce
resulting trust, laches of defendant for time during which he recognised his
equitable rights. Such defence will avail him only from time he sets up adverse
claim. 
Id.
8. Where resulting trust is sought to be established, after lapse of fifteen
years and death of many people having knowledge of facts, on ground that com-
plainant's money was used in paying for land, and that his wife by fraud and
conspiracy had conveyance made to her imbecile son by former marriage, it is
incumbent on plaintiff to establish these facts by very clear and satisfactory evi-
dence or he can have no relief. Hencke v. Floring, 413.
9. The title to house and lot was taken in 1852, in name of R., considcration
being paid by D., who with his family continuously occupied and paid taxes on
said premises until his death, without accounting for rents to R., or being called
on by him to do so. R., at request of D.. afterwards conveyed premises to
C., who was D.'s daughter by a former wife. Hd, that D. has a resulting
trust in the premises, and that his wife was entitled to dower therein. Mer-
shon v. Duer, 152.
10. Where husband pays for land which is conveyed to wife, the presmnp-
tion is that a gift was intended, and a resulting trust will not arise in his favor.
Bead v. Huff, 150.
11. The proof which in such cases shall overcome the presumption of gift to
the wife must be of facts antecedent to, contemporaneous with, or immediately
following the purchase, so as to be in fact part of the same transaction, and
must be equally explicit with the proof required to establish a resulting trust. Id.
12. A statute provided that "1 express trusts may be created" * * * " for
the -beneficial interest of any person or persons, when such trust is fully ex-
pressed and clearly defined upon the face of the instrument creating it, subject
to the limitations as to time prescribed in this title." Held, that letters, state-
ments, and agreements which passed between plaintiff and defendant, as evi-
dence in this case, are sufficient to establish express trust within meaning of
statute. Objection that individual interests of beneficiaries are not stated is met
by rule that where conveyance of land is made to two or more persons and
instrument is silent as to interest each is to take, presumption will be that their
interests are equal. Loring v. Palmer, 552.
13. INVESTMENT OP TRUST FUNDS, 217.
TURNPIKE COMPANY. See CotroRATioN, 4, 5.
ULTRA VIRES. See RAILROAD, 13.
UNDUE INFLUENCE. See AcTIoN, 2.
UNITED STATES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 4. ERoRs AND ArPrEALS, 10.
MINES AND MINING, 1-4.
I. Plaintiffs wrote two letters to Chief of Bureau of Steam Engineering,
U. S. Navy Department, offering to supply certain boilers at specified price, to
which written replies were received stating that by direction of Secretary of
Navy the offers were accepted, and that specifications and drawings would be
furnished as soon as prepared. fleld, that these letters did not constitute con-
tract in writing and signed by contracting parties within meaning of Rev. Stat.,
sects. 3744-3747, and sects. 512-515 ; but were nothing more than preliminary
memoranda. Iron Co. v. United States, 479.
2. Sect. 2504, schedule M., p. 480 (2d ed.), R1ev. Stat., imposes tax fifty
per cent. ad valorem on proprietary medicines, and same schedule and section,
p. 477, makes duty on calcined magnesia twelve cents per pound.. A certain
firm put up calcined magnesia in bottles with their name blown thereon, wrapped




purchasers against imitations thereof, and calling attention to "trade-mark"
stamped thereon. The process used by firm in calcining magnesia was not a
secret one, but the preparation differed from ordinary calcined magnesia in that
grit was got rid of, and it had peculiar market value by reason of nicety with
which it was prepared. Held, that it was subject to tax as a proprietary medi-
cine. Ferguson Y. Arthur, 406.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See BAKRMurcy, 6. CONSTrUTIoNA. LAW,
42-44, 46. EnuoRs AD APPEALS, 2, 3, 7, 9.
1. Party who has moved from one state into another cannot sue in federal
court as non-resident, after showing by his acts and declarations before litiga-
tion commenced, an intention of becoming citizen in new place of abode. Winn
v. Gilmer, 706, and note.
2. Exclusive jurisdiction conferred on United States District Courts by 9th
sect. of the Act of Sept. 24th 1789, of all suits for penaltie and forfeitures
under the customs laws, is not taken away by grant of jurisdiction to Circuit
Court in 1st sect. of Act of March 3d 1875. United States v. Mooney, 215.
S. In action of trespass for seizing personal property colore ofioii with cir-
cumstances of aggravation and averment of special damage brought in Circuit
Court United States, under Act 3d March 1875, it is error for court to dismiss
suit on the ground that it did not "really and substantially" involve a contro-
versy within its jurisdiction ; where the conclusion is based on the opinion that
a verdict for $500 damages would be set aside as excessive. Berry v. EAmunds,
288.
4. The action being for tort it was for the jury to determine the damages,
and in view of the enormity of the offence they might have been made puni-
tive ; such a verdict should not be set aside unless the jury have committed
some gross error or acted under some improper influence or totally mistaken
rules by which damages are regulated. Id.
5. Where it does not appear as matter of law from the nature of case as stated
in pleadings that there could not legally be a judgment recovered for amount
necessary to give jurisdiction, the court, in order to dismiss suit for want of ju-
risdiction must find as a matter of faet upon evidence legally sufficient that
amount of damages stated in the declaration was colorable, and was s6 laid for
the purpose of creating a case. .d.
6. The discretion given by sect. 5, Act March 3d 1875, is judicial, proceeding
upon ascertained facts, according to rules of law, and subject to review for ap-
parent errors. rd.
USURY. See CONFLICT or LAWS, 3.
1. Agent for loaning money may take reasonable commission from borrower,
even with knowledge of lender, without transaction being thereby made
usurious, though full lawful interest is reserved to lender. Landis v. Sxton,
616.
2. Contract by executor for bonus from borrower of money of trust estate is
illegal and will not be enforced. Id.
3. By terms of building association mortgage, weekly payments on loan were
required, which amounted to more than legal rate of interest. The mortgage
indicated that such payments were for interest, expenses, &c. Held, usurious.
Waverly Asso. v. Buck, 480.
4. Where maker of promissory note payable in futuro, with ten per cent.
interest from date, omitting the words "until paid," pays that rate of interest
after maturity of note, he cannot recover excess paid over six per cent. accruing
after maturity. Rector v. Collins, 522.
5. It is not usury to add interest on several notes to principal, and then add
to sum interest on it at ten per cent. per annum for one year, and then take new
note for this last sum payable one Year after date, with interest at ten per eent.
per annum after miaturity, in payment of old notes. Grider v. Driver, 552.
6: It is not usury for one to sell property on credit for higher price than for
cash, with legal interest added ; but if sale be made on cash estimate, and time
given to pay same, and an amount is assumed to be paid greater than cash price,
with legal interest, that is usurious. Id.
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7. Plaintiff will not be relieved in equity from usurious contract except on
condition he pays principal and legal interest. Grider v. Driven, 552.
8. Although it will be presumed in many cases, in absence of contrary show-
ing, that laws of other states are same as our own, the presumption will not be
indulged where our laws impose penalty or forfeiture, as in case of usury. Id.
9. Parol evidence is admissible to show a different consideration from that
expressed in notes and conveyances. Such evidence is also admissible where
usury is pleaded regardless of the form the transaction may have in the writings
executed by the parties. Kidder v. Vandersloot, 152.
10. A. borrowed $2500 on several years' time, and to secure its payment
with interest, conveyed to the lender eighty acres of land, taking back a written
contract for a reconveyance on payment of principal and ten per cent. interest
annually, that rate being the highest then allowed by law, with $20 yearly for
taxes, making $270 annually, and the proof showed that only $250 was in fact
paid as interest, and that, on payment of that sum, and producing tax receipt
of such year he was credited with $270. It was held, the contract was not
usurious, and that the $20 was but a guaranty for the payment of the taxes,
which wera chargeable against the mortgagee by reason of the legal title being
in him. Id.
VENDOR AND VENDEE. See CONTP.ACT, 9. COVENANT, 2. EQUITY, 17.
FIXTURES, 1. FRAUDS, STATUTE o, 3. LIEN, 1, 2.
1. Where land is sold at fixed price per acre, and vendor fraudulently mis-
represents the number of acres, vendee is entitled to abatement in price, al-
though deed contains the phrase "' more or less." Tyler v. Anderson, 570, and
note.
2. If vendee of land remaining in possession, buys in outstanding incum-
brance, he will not be permitted to set up adverse title under it. Purchase
enures to benefit of vendor's title and vendee can only abate purchase-money,
or in case he has paid this, recover amount expended by action on covenant
broken or other proper remedy. Bush v. Adams, 552.
3. The principle governing courts of equity in enforcement of liens is implied
agreement held to exist between vendor and vendee that former shall hold lien
on lands sold for purchase-money, on ground that person who has estate ought
not, in conscience, as between them, to keep it and not pay purchase-money;
but if vendor takes collateral and independent security for purchase-money, he
thereby waives all right to vendor's lien. Beal v. Ilarinyton, 679.
4. A person purchased land, for which he agreed to give certain goods and
convey town lots valued at $1000, and had land so purchased conveyed to his
sons in trust for himself, they paying nothing, and delivered the goods, but was
unable to convey the lots for want of title thereto. The sons afterwards, at
father's request, conveyed land to tlird person, who paid nothing therefor, but
held title for the father. Held, that vendor had lien on lands conveyed by lim
to extent of $1000-the unpaid purchase-money-which he could enforce
against the sons and their voluntary grantee. Id.
5. Where purchaser of land entered into possession under agreement that
purchase-money was not to be paid unless vendor should, within three years,
make him a warranty deed conveying a perfect title, and in case of failure so to
do, purchaser was to remain in possession for three years and pay reasonable
rent for time he could hold peaceable possession ; and before expiration of three
years he acquired title from other parties, it was held, that there was nothing in
relation of parties, under original contract or otherwise, that prevented purchaser
from yielding to superior title, purchasing same to secure his peace and assert-
ing it against his vendor. Green v. Deitrich, 413.
VERDICT. See CRIMINAL LAW, 13, 14.
WAGER. See PuBLIC POLICY, 1.
WAGES. See ExEMpTIoN, 9, 10.
WAIVER. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 8. EVIDENCE, 1. EXEMxTION, 9, 10.
VENnoR AND VENDEE, 3.
INDEX.
WARRANTY. See AGENT, 5, 6. BAILSENT, 1. CONTRACT, 21. INsURANcE,
14. SALE, 3; 7.
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES. See DAyAGES, 8. DEED, 10, 11.
EQUITY, 13..
1. If owner of land on running stream so construct embankments to protect
his land from current, that man of ordinary prudence would reasonably antici-
pate damage to owners of other lands in case of flood, he is liable for such
damage. Crawford v. Rambo, 480.
2. Where all that can be inferred from what complainant states in his bill,
is, that in case of heavy freshet, stream will, if embankment remains, overflow
portion of his land and destroy the crops, if any thereon, case for injunction to
restrain defendant from maintaining embankment, is not made out; the few
acres liable to such occasional overflow being part of a farm of more than 100
acres. Blaine v. Brady, 480.
8. Where one deliberately and without compulsion, selects a particular por-
tion of a floatable stream fbr storage of logs, and thereby prevents another
from entering such common highway with drive of logs from tributary stream;
be is liable for damage occasioned thereby. McPheters v. Log Driving Co., 799.
.4. Wages and board of men while waiting for a reasonable time would be
an element of damages ; so, too, would expense moving one crew out and an-
other in, as well as increased cost of drive next season and interest on contradt
price for making drive during time payment was delayed, because of inalility
to complete drive owing to such obstruction. Id.
5. Loss of supplies left in woods for use when completing drive and destroyed
by wild beasts, too remote to constitute element of damage. 11d.
6. An easement originating from water supplied by spring not situated on
land belonging to grantor of plaintif's premises, will not pass as appurtenant
to estate conveyed, unless it has become attached to same ; but if it has become
appurtenant to it either by express or implied grant or by prescription, a convey-
ance of that estate will carry such easement, whether mentioned in deed or not,
although it may not be necessary to employment of estate by grantee. Douty
v. Dunning, 799.
7. There may be such adverse and exclusive use of water flowing through an
aqueduct for each period of time as may be considered presumptive evidence
of a grant. rd.
8. Right to draw water from spring and have pipes laid in soil of another,
and to enter thereon, repair and renew same, constitutes an interest in realty,
assignable, descendible and divisible; and easements growing out of it may be
acquired by grantor prescription and thus become objects of title in others. Id.
9. Easement will become extinguished by unity of title and possession of
dominant and servient estates in same person by same right; but the owner-
ship of two estates must be co-extinsive, equal in validity, quality, and all
other circumstances of right. If one is held in severalty and the other only as
to a fractional part thereof'by the same person, there will be no extinguishment
of the easement. Id.
WILL. See CONMLICT or LAws, 8. CONTRACT, 13. EXECUTORS AND An-
MINISTRATOnS, 5. MANDAMUs, 7. PoWER, 1.
1. Parol evidence admitted to show that by "lot numbered six, in square
four hundred and three," which testator did not own, w~s intended lot No. 3,
in square 406, which testator did own. Patch v. Wnite, 352.
2. When- testator's intention appears that all after-acquired property should
pass by will, conveyance of all the estate previously devised by trust deed with
power of revocation which is subsequently exercised, does not revoke will.
Morey v. Soler, 480.
3. Real estate specifically devised is not charged with general pecuniary
legacy where there is nothing to show such intention. Davenport v. &rgent,
480.
4. Legacies, unless otherwise controlled by the will, draw interest after one
year from its probate, notwithstanding that executor is unable to gather in tl e
assets and pay the legacy within the year. Baptist Convention v. Ladd, 679.
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5. where there is dispute between executor and legatee as to interest due on
.legacy on account of delay caused by litigation for protection of the estate, an
acceptance by legatee of less than amount due is an accord and satistction, if
payment is made on condition that it shall be in full for balance due and money
is accepted without protest against such condition. Baptist Cony. v. Ladd, 679.
6. Devise of real and personal property generally, without stating the purpose
to a corporation created and existing for educational purposes alone, must be
regarded as a devise for educational purposes. Academy v. Sullivan, 680.
7. Such a corporation is not one for pecuniary profit, merely because fees are
charged for tuition ; a corporation for pecuniary profit is one organized "for
the pecuniary profit of its stockholders or members." Id.
8. By one clause of will testator devised to his wife for and during the term
of her natural life, certain real estate. The reversionary interest therein was
not specifically devised. By general residury clause, he devised to his wife all
the rest, residue and remainder of his estate. Held, that by the terms of the
will and the intention of testator as gathered from the whole instrument, the
wife took an estate in fee in the real estate thus devised. Davis v. Callahan, 680.
9. When possibility of failure of sufficient assets to meet legacies named by
.testator in his will, has not been anticipated and specifically provided for by him,
the presumption of intended equality prevails between general legatees, as well
as equality in respect to share to be borne in all deficiencies of assets. .Emery
v. Batehelder, 680.
10. In administration of testamentary assets where there is a deficiency of
such assets after payment of debts, expenses and specific legacies, the loss is to be
borne pro rata by those pecuniary legacies which are in their nature general. Id.
11. Annuities stand on same ftoting as legacies; where the estate is deficient
both must abate proportionally. d.
12. Bequest of sum of money to one after decease of legatee, to whom in-
come of money is given during life, vests at once on testator's death. Crosby
v. Crosby, 800.
13. Where testator devises property to his sons, and also property belonging
to them to another, they must either relinquish their claim to their own property
so devised, or to the provision made in their favor. Ditch v. Sennot, 800.
14. Doctrine of election does not apply where testator has but part interest
in an estate which he devises ; but even in such case, if it is apparent, from
terms of will, that testator intended to devise whole estate, including interest
of third person, then doctrine will apply to such third person if a devisee. Id.
15. A., by will, gave $10,000 to B., in trust for C., for life, with re-
mainder to children of C., if she had any, if not then to D. C. had no chil-
dren. D. died inlifetime of C., leaving one child. Held, remainder became
vested in D. immediately on death of testator, subject to be divested by birth
of child to C., and that on death of C., without children, fund passed to heir-
at-law of D. Vandewalker v. Rollins, 414.
16. The quality of property for purposes of transmission by will or inherit-
ance is not changed from character in which testator or intestate left it, unless
by some clear act hp. has impressed upon it definite character as money or land.
When, for security of fund, money is converted into land by judicial decree,
the land is substituted for fund and goes to same person who-would have taken
it had it remained personal estate. Id.
17. On question of undue influence, proponent may show that nominal lega-
cies to heirs other than children, were inserted at suggestion of person who
wrote will, because he erroneously supposed it necessary to. validity of same.
As to testamentary capacity, the will itself is evidence. Whitman v. Morey, 414.
18. Where portions of deposition are read by one party for purpose of con-
tradicting iiitness who gave it, other party may read, from same deposition, so
much as pertains to same subject, and tends to explain, qualify or limit what is
so read. Id.
19. Practice of requiring executor, on issues of insanity and undue influence,
to call all subscribing witnesses to will, if alive, sane and within jurisdiction,
should not be departed from without good cause. Id.
20. Whether party shall be allowed to put leading questions to his own wit-
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nesses is within discretion of presiding judge and is not matter of exception.
Whitman v. Morey, 414.
21. Rule forbidding party to discredit his witness does not extend to case of
attesting witness when, by legal intendment, he has no choice. id.
22. On issues of insanity and undue influence declaratious of testator tend-
ing to show state of his feelings towards relatives, to whom he gave only Lcminal
sum, may be received. Id.
23. Whcre evidence of testator's capacity to make will was conflicting, court
instructed jury that if they believed that at time will was executed taator was
so diseased mentally as not to be of sound mind then their verdict should be
for plaintiff. Held, that instruction was erroneous, as it stated rule too broadly.
Freeman v. Earky, 799.
24. A person may be so diseased mentally, as not to be of. sound mind, and
yet possess a distoksing mind, which is mental capacity to know and understand
what disposition he may wish to make of his property, and upon whom he will
bestow his bounty. Id.
25. A-person capable of transacting ordinary business is capable of making
a valid will. To incapacitate person fiom making a will, derangement or im-
becilitv must be such as to render him incapable of understanding the effects and
consequences of his acts. Id.
26. Realty was devised to trustee in fee to pay over income to certain cestuis,
no time being limited. Provision was made as to one of ce.tuis that in case of
his insolvency or of attachment of his equitable estate, his right to income should
terminate, and his share be paid to A., B. and C., their heirs and assigns, also
that trustee might, in certain contingencies, pay over to cestui his whole inter-
est "in fee simple for his own use," free from all trusts. Kdd, that cestui que
trustent took each an equitable estate in fee simple. Greene v. Wilbur, 616.
27. Revocation of will is not affected by death of legatees or devisees named
in it; nor by marriage of testator, there being no issue of marriage ; nor by
alienation of larger part of his estate, which was specifically disposed of by will;
nor by acquisition of other estate to amount much greater than he possessed at
time will was made; nor by concurrence of all above circumstances. Hoitt v.
BEioitt, 414.
28. Declarations of testator that he understood a will made by him was
revoked, not admissible on question of revocation. Id.
29. Declarations of testator as to his intention in disposition of his property,
not competent evidence from which to ascertain his intention as expressed in
the will. Id.
30. A. devised real and personal property to trustees to hold in trust for
P., with direction to apply, from time to time, such portion, or if necessary, the
whole of the income to the support of P., and upon the latter's arrival at age
of eighteen, or in case of her marriage before that age, then to pay over to
her the whole estate or such portion thereof as in their judgment should seem
most for her benefit, leaving this matter to the discretion of the trustees. P.
arrived at the age of eighteen, but trustees in exercise of their discretion with-
held the payment of the principal. Upon P.'s death, held, that P. took a
vested estate which pasied to her-devisees. Weatherhead Y. Stoddard, 531.
31. No estate will beheld contingent unless very decided terms of contin-
gency are used in the will, or it is necessary in order to carry out testator's
intent as therein expressed. Id.
32. TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS As ArzECTED BY THE RULES OP PRVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAw, 153.
WITNESS. See EVIDENCE, 6-9, 14, 17, 20. HABEAS CORPUS, 2.
On trial of party for larceny, after laying proper foundation, a grand juror
was called to contradict one of defendant's witnesses, by testifying to his state-
ments on cath before grand jury, which he had denied. It wbs objected that
a gran.d juror could not be called as a witness to disclose what occurred before
grand jury, but court held evidence proper. Bressler v. State, 800.
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